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## HISTORIOGRAPHY IN HUNGARY\*

1790 - 1848

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The beginnings of modern historical scholarship in Hungary reach back as far as the seventeenth century. The foundation of a university by the Society of Jesus at Nagyszombat (Trnava) in 1635 can be regarded as the first milestone on the rising road of development, unbroken until the end of the eighteenth century. Although history, as a subject, had little significance in the official curriculum of Jesuit instruction, a group of eminent scholars furnished the same solid groundwork for future historians as did the Bollandists or the members of the Congregation of Saint Maur in the West. The long war of liberation fought against the Turks greatly retarded their zealous activity, but the relative peace and prosperity Hungary enjoyed throughout the eighteenth century brought amazing results. Among those who contributed most to the enormous collection and publication of texts and historical documents, George Pray (1723-1801) and Stephen Katona (1732-1811), both Jesuits, are the most outstanding and accomplished. Pray, who may truly be called the father of Hungarian historical scholarship, in his penetrating critical studies, clarified and definitely solved scores of long debated problems, while Katona, in the forty-four volumes of his *Historia Critica Regum Hungariae*, presented a synthesis of the whole course of Hungarian history so rich in material that its use is still indispensable in historical research.

Satisfying an ever increasing popular demand, the task of the following generation should have been a comprehensive and readable presentation of national history. If, however, the forthcoming era of Hungarian historiography—which is the subject of the present study—fell somewhat short of these expectations, the fault lies in an abrupt change in the cultural, social and political life of the country.

\*The present essay is an outline of the author's detailed study on the same subject in manuscript. A part of the material, complete with bibliography, was published previously by the author in Hungary, *A Magyar Történetírás, 1790-1830*. Budapest, 1942, pp. 206.



In Hungary, throughout the eighteenth century, the ideals of a deeply religious Baroque civilization remained basically unchallenged. The dissolution of the Jesuit Order in 1773, however, created a grave crisis in the system of education, hitherto largely under Jesuit direction. Under the pressure of the government most of the abandoned secondary schools had been taken over by other religious orders, but the famous university of Nagyszombat went under the direct control of the state. The erudite association of Jesuit historical scholars soon disintegrated and the level of higher education began to decline. In 1780 the university was transferred to Budapest, already a thriving cultural center of the country, but in the appointment of the professors not scientific achievements, but political reliability became the leading motive for decades.

In the atmosphere of well-established conservative traditions the sudden invasion of enlightened ideas under Joseph II (1780-1790) only increased the confusion amidst the government's preposterous social and administrative experimentation. As a reaction, both the leading aristocracy and the growing urban middle classes followed with distrust the spreading influence of the new French philosophy; consequently, the principles of enlightened criticism were only sporadically and cautiously applied to the course of Hungarian history. The offensive frivolity of Voltaire never impressed his Hungarian readers; nevertheless, Hume, Robertson, and especially Gibbon were not only well known and admired, but the reading public hopefully expected, almost until 1848, the appearance of a "Hungarian Gibbon". It was only characteristic that the philosophic background of these thoroughly enlightened works had scarcely any significance; the most admired feature was the formal perfection, the masterful selection and grouping of material in the frame of a fluent and highly readable presentation.

The well publicized display of the bloody excesses of the French Revolution and the miscarried conspiracy of a small group of Hungarian Jacobins disillusioned even those who, at the beginning, showed some sympathy for the cause of liberty and equality. The government, supported by general indignation, tightened the control of censorship and prevented both the importation of foreign books and studies abroad. The system of controls reached the stage of a nearly air-tight separation of the Habsburg Monarchy from the rest of Europe in the police state of Metternich. Meanwhile, the veterans of the old school of historians departed and the new generation had no facilities to acquire the same erudition either at home or abroad. The continuity of scholarly traditions broke off, and in the 1820's the level of the formerly highly advanced Hungarian historical science reached a new low, although, under the influence of the ever-increasing tide of nationalism, popular interest in the subject as well as numerical production of small *compendia* was rising steadily.

Modern nationalism in Europe is generally regarded as the fruit of the French Revolution. In Hungary, however, the same movement started even sooner as a reaction against the measures of Joseph II, tending to



abolish the jealously guarded feudal constitution and to discredit the Hungarian language in favor of the German. At the time of the Emperor's death the country reached the verge of open rebellion, and although the system so anxiously preserved by the Hungarian nobility was certainly antiquated in many respects, the champions of the resistance could pose as the defenders of right and liberty against a ruthless absolutism. The immediate political results of the struggle were short-lived and superficial, but in the atmosphere of general enthusiasm the national language and literature soon reached a never surpassed height in artistic perfection. From 1825 on, even active political opposition to the Viennese government was resumed in full vigor, either in the form of a more cautious and conservative program sponsored by Count Stephen Széchenyi or in the increasingly radical and liberal agitation of Louis Kossuth.

Since, at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Hungary, as a political unit, Hungarians were still in the minority (some 45%), the reaction to their sweeping nationalism among other nationalities varied. The well educated middle-class elements of German descent, suffering under the same hardships as their Hungarian compatriots, willingly joined them on a common platform of liberal and nationalistic policy, soon changed their language to the Hungarian and, by 1848, fought heroically in the Hungarian army against Austrian imperialism. The compact German population in southern Transylvania, the so-called "Saxons", living in almost complete isolation for six centuries, on the basis of a narrow and exclusive local patriotism, defended their ancient privileges just as bitterly as the Hungarian nobility, first against the administrative measures of Joseph II, and later against the menace of Hungarian nationalism. Among the other nationalities, such as Slovaks, Ruthenians, Rumanians and Serbs, the politically active and well-oriented middle class was almost entirely missing, and the poorly educated rural masses were slow to respond either to the impact of Hungarian nationalism or to contrary trends, mostly in the form of an intensive Panslavist propaganda. Nevertheless, the clever Austrian policy, in an effort to neutralize the Hungarian demand for independence, successfully fostered the same tendencies among these nationalities at the expense of Hungarian unity and managed to turn them against the fighting Hungarians in 1848-49.

Hungarian historiography, from 1790 to 1848, reflected all stages of the above-sketched development, from the cosmopolitan Enlightenment to the fiery nationalism of Romanticism. In the 1790's most authors worked either under the inspiration of their brilliant French models or followed the more conservative and doctrinaire German Enlightenment. Until about 1830, Herder's humanitarian nationalism was predominant, but during the same period there developed a genuine Hungarian school of historians in defiance of any foreign influence. In the last two decades before 1848, the ruling theme of nationalism took an openly political trend, while, once again, the works of French liberal authors presented the most challenging examples.



Despite the breach in Jesuit traditions, a few industrious scholars volunteered to continue the work of collecting and publishing manuscripts of historical interest. The most eminent among them in erudition was Martin George Kovachich (1743-1821). The gigantic work of his life was a collection of 300 volumes of all sorts of manuscript documents. Unfortunately, only a small portion of the invaluable material was published in his lifetime, mostly pertaining to the development of Hungarian common law. A more accomplished but much less scrupulous editor of documents was George Fejér (1766-1851), director of the library of the University of Budapest. Leaning on the enormous collection of this library, he published from 1829 to 1844 forty-three volumes of his *Codex Diplomaticus Hungariae*, almost single-handed. Since the major part of the published material was arranged for the press after second hand transcriptions, the huge collection—although still indispensable—cannot be used without due precaution. Conversely, scrupulous fidelity and exactitude hampered the successful publication of documents collected by Count Joseph Kemény (1795-1855), a devoted scholar of Transylvanian history. A large number of brilliant critical studies were only by-products of his activity as a collector. It is deplorable that only four volumes had been published of this enormous wealth of historical sources.<sup>1</sup> Documents of basic importance in reference to the Turkish invasion of Hungary were published in exemplary manner by Anthony Gévy (1796-1848), a learned official of the State Archives of Vienna.<sup>2</sup> Sixteenth century narrative sources of Transylvanian history were expertly edited by Joseph Charles Eder.<sup>3</sup> Editors of useful collections of medieval chroniclers were John Christian Engel,<sup>4</sup> Stephen L. Endlicher,<sup>5</sup> and Charles George Romy.<sup>6</sup>

The first center of the ideas of the French Enlightenment was a circle of young men in Vienna, members of the Hungarian noble guard. Their leader, George Bessenyei (1747-1811), made an attempt to survey Hungarian history in the spirit of Voltaire, but his fragmentary notes never amounted to a coherent unit. The same is true of the similar endeavor of another disciple of Voltaire, Count John Fekete. After the outbreak of the French Revolution a number of highly educated enthusiasts turned immediately from history to politics. Two of them, John Laczkovics and Joseph Hajnóczy, both intelligent authors of essays and pamphlets on the problem of a revision of Hungarian law and constitution, became involved in the above mentioned conspiracy of Hungarian Jacobins.

More dangerous attacks were launched against the edifice of the ancient Hungarian constitution by some agents of the Viennese government de-

<sup>1</sup>*Deutsche Fundgruben*, 2 vols. Klausenburg, 1839; *Erdélyország Történetei Tára*, 2 vols., 1837-45.

<sup>2</sup>*Urkunden und Actenstücke*, 3 vols., Wien, 1838-41.

<sup>3</sup>*Scriptores Rerum Transylvanicarum*, 2 vols., Cibinii, 1797-1800.

<sup>4</sup>*Monumenta Ungarica*, Viennae, 1809.

<sup>5</sup>*Rerum Hungaricarum Monumenta Arpadiana*, Sangallen, 1849.

<sup>6</sup>*Monumenta Hungarica*, 3 vols., Pest, 1815-17.



manding reform in taxation and military service. The origins of the dispute reached far back to Maria Theresa's régime, but the costly French wars seemed to justify a new attempt to convince the Hungarian nobility to abandon their untenable privileges. The ablest contenders for these reform plans were Michael Piringer<sup>7</sup> and Anthony W. Gustermann,<sup>8</sup> both using an enormous wealth of historical material to substantiate their propositions. On the other hand, the equally erudite spokesmen for the defenders of the constitution did their best to point out the obvious distortions and historical inaccuracies of their opponents in order to escape the keen logic of enlightened political and economic theories.

The attacks of the Enlightenment against religion were repelled by Leo Szeitz (1746-1792) whose large manuscript surveying Hungarian history could not be published because of the author's sharply anti-Austrian attitude. He emphatically insisted on the historical value of legends and other pious medieval sources, but shared the enlightened criticism against the pagan myths of Hungarian antiquity. The evaluation of the role of religion in history was the main subject of a much read compendium of medieval Hungarian history by the poet Benedict Virág (1753-1830).<sup>9</sup> Although himself a priest, he glorified the pre-Christian era of Hungarian history and dated the beginning of the decline of patriotic virtues from the time of the acceptance of Christianity. He condemned kings for their liberality toward the Church, denounced the Holy See for interfering in domestic affairs, maintaining that the crusaders were only tramps and adventurers, the religious orders were organized only to harbor hypocrites and idlers. In close adherence to Josephinism, he insisted that the only way to curb the excesses of religion was by strict state control over religious affairs. This bold criticism, however, added little to the popularity of the work, which was secured by its literary qualities, its ardent patriotism and dramatic presentation of events and persons. Only the force of rising nationalism explained the friendly reception of a three-volume survey of Hungarian history by Ignatius Svastics,<sup>10</sup> completely innocent of any criticism or scholarship. He dwelt complacently upon the most glorious scenes of national history and characterized his heroes almost in the manner of folk tales.

Conservative traditions and enlightened criticism were well balanced in the widely used three-volume textbook of Hungarian history by Isaiah Budai (1766-1841),<sup>11</sup> a student of the University of Göttingen, later professor of history at the Protestant college of Debrecen. As a faithful Protestant himself, he encountered great difficulties in telling the story of the Reformation and the role of the Habsburgs in it. In order to elude the vigilant censors, he restricted the critical subject to the basic facts without

<sup>7</sup>*Ungarns Banderien*, 2 vols., Wien, 1810-16.

<sup>8</sup>*Die Ausbildung der Verfassung des Königreichs Ungarn*, Wien, 1811.

<sup>9</sup>*Magyar Századok*, Buda, 1808-16.

<sup>10</sup>*Magyarok Históriaja*, Pozsony, 1796-1805.

<sup>11</sup>*Magyar-Ország Históriaja*, Debrecen, 1805-12.



comment, or, when he could not restrain his criticism, blamed the evil counselors for the blunders of their masters.

The only truly outstanding historian of the era of Enlightenment was John Christian Engel (1770-1814). Born in northern Hungary of German parentage, he received his academic education at Göttingen as a faithful disciple of August L. Schlözer, the leading authority of contemporary German historiography. After his graduation he settled down in Vienna, working in various government positions until the end of his short life. Unsurpassed in productive capacity, he combined intense devotion to his sources with exceptional critical ability, but unfortunately he shared his master's contempt for the formal perfection of presentation; hence his books never gained much popularity. His first great but unfinished work,<sup>12</sup> the history of the medieval Hungarian provinces, was much more a critical survey of the available sources than a readable story of Bulgaria, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Wallachia; nevertheless, it was a substantial contribution to the much neglected history of these countries. His best and last work was his Hungarian history in five volumes,<sup>13</sup> although there is a great difference between the value of the medieval and modern sections. In the first three volumes the solid, pragmatic framework of medieval Hungarian history left little to be desired, whereas the rest of the work was so hastily composed that the fatally ill author could not escape grave misconceptions and exaggerations. Besides his valuable scientific bequest, his interesting personality is also worth studying. Engel exhibited in a precarious balance the whole complexity of contemporary Hungarian society: he never denied his German ancestry, wrote and spoke German, yet he was always proud of his Hungarian fatherland and his recently acquired nobility; he was a devout Lutheran, yet he served the Catholic dynasty with unbounded loyalty; he fully understood and appreciated the divergent ambitions of each nationality within the vast polyglot state, but he was sincerely convinced of the possibility of peaceful cooperation.

The Romantic movement in Hungarian historiography increased the influence of German literature and scholarship, but eventually invigorated Hungarian nationalism, already in an advanced stage of development. The works of Herder, the father of Romanticism, were well known and read in Hungary; regarding history, however, the activity of a group of amateur enthusiasts in Vienna under the leadership of Baron Joseph Hormayr found the liveliest echo. Enjoying the moral support of the government, they dedicated themselves to the study of the history and folklore of all nations and peoples of the Monarchy, publishing the results of their research in well written and widely popular pocket books and magazines (*Oesterreichischer Plutarch*, *Archiv*, *Taschenbuch*) in the belief that through these publications they might promote mutual appreciation and understanding among these nations, thus strengthening the coherency of the heterogeneous

<sup>12</sup>*Geschichte des Ungarischen Reichs und seiner Nebenländer*, 4 vols., Halle, 1797-1804.

<sup>13</sup>*Geschichte des Ungarischen Reichs*, Wien, 1813-14.



Empire. Baron Aloysius Mednyánszky, Count John Mailáth, Laurence Hohenegger, Charles G. Romy, John Csaplovics and George Gyurikovits were the most prolific contributors of romantic descriptions of medieval castles, biographies of national heroes, together with countless legends, ballads and popular tales of historical or "folklore" interest.

The same mentality inspired the noteworthy contribution to Hungarian history of a German scholar, Francis Julius Schneller (1777-1833). He wrote his first book on the subject<sup>14</sup> while in the Austrian service, admittedly with the purpose of pointing out the steady trend throughout the history of the country toward the necessary union with Austria. His last work, a three volume set of Hungarian history,<sup>15</sup> was free from any such tendency. Leaning chiefly upon Engel's material, his brief sketches on the development of Hungarian culture, society and law, excelled in clarity.

Hormayr's thought was reflected in the ably compiled and highly readable volumes on Hungarian history by John Genersich (1761-1823)<sup>16</sup> and Samuel Klein (1784-1835),<sup>17</sup> both members of the same German community in northern Hungary (the "Saxons" of the County Szepes) from which Engel had started his career, and both writing under his marked influence. The ablest and most accomplished spokesman of the same political persuasion was Count John Mailáth (1786-1855), who, compelled by financial distress, subserviently adopted the instructions of the Viennese government and even played the role of occasional political informer. For this reason neither his person nor his five volumes of Hungarian history<sup>18</sup> attained any popularity. The whole composition was based upon secondary sources with little originality, but as a compendium it was an intelligent and well balanced conservative presentation of the highlights of political development, full of praise for the dynasty. The sharp condemnation of the War of Independence of 1848-49 in the second edition of the work (Regensburg, 1852-53) was certainly distasteful, although his testimony as an eye-witness contributed some interesting details.

The authors of the Romantic period so far discussed adopted the ideals of their German masters in style, in choosing their topics and in a general reevaluation of the past, but remained free from the influence of Romantic philosophy. The only attempt to apply the principles of Idealism to the whole course of national history was made by Ignatius A. Fessler (1756-1839). Born in western Hungary, he was reared in a deeply religious atmosphere and became a member of the Capuchin Order. In Vienna, however, under the influence of the religious reforms of Joseph II, he soon left both his Order and faith. He lived a restless life in Germany until 1810, when by

<sup>14</sup>*Ungarns Schicksal und Thatkraft*, Graz, 1817.

<sup>15</sup>*Die Geschichte Ungarns*, Dresden, 1829-33.

<sup>16</sup>*Kurzer Abriss der Geschichte von Oesterreich, Böhmen und Ungarn*, Tyrnau, 1824.

<sup>17</sup>*Handbuch der Geschichte von Ungarn und seiner Verfassung*, Leipzig, 1833.

<sup>18</sup>*Geschichte der Magyaren*, Wien, 1828-31.



the invitation of the Tsar he settled down until his death in Russia as the Superintendent of Lutherans in that country.

Fessler started his literary career under the inspiration of Wieland and Meissner with partly fictional or dramatized biographies, but soon turned to the history of his native Hungary. As a result of studies over a quarter of a century, the ten huge volumes of his Hungarian history were published between 1815-25.<sup>19</sup> The monumental work, despite its obvious shortcomings, is the largest popular synthesis of Hungarian history ever written, and not only the greatest achievement of the period under survey but its influence was predominant until the end of the century. The material he used as sources pertaining strictly to the history of the country was by no means wider than that available to his less talented contemporaries, but his acquaintance with the basic facts of general history enabled him to present Hungarian history for the first time as an integral part of the European development. He possessed no creative talent but he was blessed with an exceptionally receptive intelligence. His sentimentalism may be traced back to Rousseau, his interest in the evolution of human culture to Herder, his colorful and patriotic tone to John von Müller, and his intuitive method and peculiar interpretation of history as "the epic of the World Spirit, the activity of the Infinite as reflected in the Finite", to Fichte and Schelling. It was the forcible application of this philosophical abstraction which made his fluent presentation at times uneven and illogical. He was quick and naive enough to believe and to attempt to prove that the World Spirit was always ready to punish or reward as a sort of inescapable Nemesis in order to secure the eternal plans for the development of mankind. His dealing with the intricacies of government and politics remained superficial, but he knew how to bring his heroes to life within a colorful and dramatic pageantry on the stage of history, although he was always inclined to characterize them either as devils or as angels in human disguise. However easy a target for acrimonious historians, this was the feature which made Fessler the most favored source of inspiration for artists and authors throughout the nineteenth century.

A survey of the literary bequest of our historians does not indicate the existence of organized research in any field or period of Hungarian history. There was, however, a subject—the origin and relationship of the Hungarian race among and with other peoples of the world—which aroused widespread interest and engaged a number of enthusiasts in a persistent endeavor to solve the intricate problem. In the initial stages of linguistics, archeology and anthropology the early attempts did not result in lasting achievements, but the long and passionate debates on the subject contributed essentially to the development of nationalism.

The medieval tradition represented by popularly known chroniclers, referring to the Huns as the direct ancestors of Hungarians, remained virtually unchallenged until 1770, when a Jesuit linguist, John Sajnovics, dis-

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<sup>19</sup>*Die Geschichten der Ungarn und ihrer Landsassen*, Leipzig.



covered a startling similarity between the Hungarian language and the language of a group of little known peoples in Scandinavia and in northern Russia, particularly that of the Lapps. The ingenious publication was well received and further propagated in Germany, but encountered bitter opposition at home, where the literate public was reluctant to cast out Attila and his glorious Huns for the sake of an obscure "fish-smelling relation" in the north. The representatives of the vocal opposition used or abused linguistics, too, in order to refute the heresy of the northern relation and to prove either the traditional view or to suggest another illustrious possibility, namely, the relation of Hungarians to the Scythians of Antiquity.

The most detailed and widely read apology of the Hun and Avar origin was compiled in two volumes by Joachim Szekér.<sup>20</sup> A shorter but more scholarly essay dwelling upon the same theme was written by Ladislaus Bielek,<sup>21</sup> while John Bárdosy even published the alleged genealogy of the Hungarian princes from Attila to Árpád.<sup>22</sup> The last but most earnest contender of the Hun origin was the tireless collector, George Fejér, wasting his diplomatic erudition in inconclusive debates.

Lacking even the support of tradition, the theory of the Scythian ancestry was based solely on accidental similarity of some Hungarian words or customs with those of a wide variety of ancient nations which were supposed to be related to Scythia or the Scythians. Apart from the little known works of Andrew Huszti and Ferdinand Thomas, the utterly confused hypothesis gained considerable popularity through the works of the novelist Andrew Dugonics<sup>23</sup> and the poet Adam Pálóczi Horváth,<sup>24</sup> both well known in the history of Hungarian literature. The latter combined a passionate patriotism with an open hatred for anything foreign and, in order to clear his nation's ancestors from the charge of barbarism, he applied the pattern of Rousseau's "good savages" in proving their natural intelligence and high moral standards.

The historian who attempted to reconcile the wide variety of opinions in a gigantic system of high originality was Stephen Horvát (1784-1846). Unfortunately, however, his great capability and considerable erudition became clouded by a romantic vision in which every achievement of human history was attributed directly or indirectly to an omnipresent Hungarian genius.<sup>25</sup> Thus, in his uncontrollable fantasy, the Pyramids were built by Hungarians; Homer's epics covered in reality Hungarian history; Hungarians were fighting in the army of Alexander the Great; the Romans had Hungarian blood in their veins, etc. Public reaction to these amazing discoveries was strongly divided. The younger generation, although appreciating Horvát's fiery nationalism, rejected his groundless speculations;

<sup>20</sup>*Magyarok Eredete*, Pozsony, 1791.

<sup>21</sup>*Maiores Hungarorum*, Pestini, 1796.

<sup>22</sup>*Stemma Historicum*, Leutschoviae, 1807.

<sup>23</sup>*Szittyiai Történetek*, 2 vols., Pozsony, 1806-8.

<sup>24</sup>*A Magyar Magog*, Pest, 1817.

<sup>25</sup>*Rajzolatok*, Pest, 1825.



those, however, with lesser education or criticism, did not hesitate to follow his footsteps, expanding the circle of Hungarian relations to the extreme limits of space and time. Among many others, Joseph Szabó, a personal friend of the famous traveler and Sanskrit linguist, Körösi-Csoma, looked toward India as the cradle of Hungarian culture. Valentine Kiss reached similar conclusions regarding Media, while George Lakatos suspected Canaan as the ancient home of the Hungarians. The researches of a Greek scholar, Gregory Dankovszky (1784-1857) led to less spectacular though much sounder results when he discovered the primary importance of Byzantine sources concerning the earliest period of Hungarian history. Characteristic of the peculiar attitude of the whole group of amateur enthusiasts was the statement of Joseph Szabó at the end of one of his essays: "Whatever I said, I tried to prove as I could; if I told more, I told it in honor of my Nation".

It was the young Hungarian Academy of Sciences (founded in 1827) that finally attempted to rescue the science of history from dilettantism. When, however, the question emerged, who would be invited as members of the Department of History, no one seemed qualified to represent historical scholarship in such a distinguished assembly. As a matter of fact, only one of the first four members of the Department of History was a historian and the leadership of the small but influential group went to Joseph Bajza, an ambitious young poet and literary critic. In order to encourage research, the Academy frequently announced prizes for essays on a given historical subject, but the titles were rarely inspiring; moreover, the fact that the decision was in the hands of amateurs in history had a rather discouraging effect. As a consequence, there was no real competition and the terms had to be prolonged repeatedly due to lack of interest and cooperation. In the official publications of the Academy the achievements of other similar organizations were always carefully reported, especially those of the French Academy; all note-worthy contemporary publications of historical interest were reviewed in detail, but, characteristically enough, most of these reviews had been translated from leading German scientific magazines.

Contrary to the previous era of the Baroque, the historiography of the Enlightenment and of Romanticism contributed little to ecclesiastical history. Nevertheless, the picture of the latter period would not be complete without mentioning the eight volumes of the history of the diocese of Pécs by Joseph Koller (1745-1832).<sup>26</sup> He started the collection of material during his student years in Rome, and the huge publication comprehended the history of Christianity in this area from Roman times to 1781. Although his critical ability was unequal to his industry, the work is still a rich treasury of the most important documents of the history of Christianity in Hungary. A work of similar character was published by the Benedictine monk Damian Fuxhoffer (1741-1814),<sup>27</sup> who collected the

<sup>26</sup>*Historia Episcopatus Quinqueeclesiarum, Posonii, 1782-1812.*

<sup>27</sup>*Monasteriologia Regni Hungariae, Veszprimii, 1803.*



available documents concerning monasteries and convents of all religious orders in Hungary. However, only the first two volumes were printed in his lifetime; these contained a critical list of the houses of monastic orders together with the most important documents referring to them; the remaining three volumes were arranged for the press much later by another able Benedictine scholar, Maurice Czinár.

Although, during the course of the routine training in theology, seminaries always used a number of textbooks for teaching the history of the universal Church, these works were invariably either translations or more or less free adaptations of foreign books for the use of Hungarian students; a comprehensive history of the Church in the country remained the desire of many but, so far, was never fully accomplished. The first readable history of the Church in Hungary was the work of a young and talented professor of theology, Charles Lányi (1812-1856). The three volumes of the skillful survey dealt only with modern times,<sup>28</sup> and although the author did not survive the publication of the medieval period, his prepared manuscript was arranged and revised by Nándor Knauz and the complete work became the standard history of the Catholic Church in Hungary until the end of the century.

Scientific research in the history of the Protestant churches in Hungary had been carried out throughout the eighteenth century with as much zeal and erudition as had been applied by the members of the Catholic clergy to the study of Catholic history. Matthew Bél, Peter Bod, Joseph Benkö and Nicholas Sinay furnished an extensive collection of material for the use of their successors; nevertheless, the small and divided Protestant minority was not in a position to present adequately the fate of their respective churches in Hungary. Despite considerable public support, the heavy pressure of the Habsburg régime and harsh censorship discouraged their able scholars; thus, within the period under survey, only the works of the Göttingen-educated Francis Tóth (1768-1823) are worth mentioning. His great project, a comprehensive history of Protestantism in Hungary, remained unfinished; nevertheless, the first volume<sup>29</sup> told successfully the complicated story of Protestant beginnings until the end of the sixteenth century.

Throughout the whole period the ever-widening popular demand for a readable presentation of world history had been satisfied exclusively through translations and transcriptions of longer or shorter surveys. Until the Napoleonic wars the products of the French Enlightenment were predominant, although the works of its great representatives, Montesquieu and Voltaire, could not be published in translation until the 1830's. It was a since forgotten disciple of Voltaire, the ex-Jesuit Claude Millot, whose world history in nine volumes<sup>30</sup> challenged his Hungarian admirers to translation, a work full of entertaining stories and rich in morals, without

<sup>28</sup>*Magyarföld Egyháztörténetei*, Pest, 1844.

<sup>29</sup>*A Magyar és Erdély Országi Protestáns Ekkleziák Históriaja*, Komárom, 1808.

<sup>30</sup>*Elements d'histoire générale*, Paris, 1773.



the antagonizing interpretation of Voltaire. In a constant fight with the censors, no less than four translators labored in succession on the project, which was not completed until 1811. Besides countless individual biographies, popular accounts of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, a number of large historical dictionaries and encyclopedias were also translated into Hungarian, among them in 1795 that of Jean Bapt. Ladvocat in six volumes.<sup>31</sup>

The English representatives of the Enlightenment were relatively well known, too, but only Robertson's *History of America* was published in Hungarian in 1809. No translation but an ably composed compilation was the eight volume set of a history of the Austrian Monarchy by John Gener-sich (1761-1823).<sup>32</sup> Besides other authors of lesser importance, the work followed rather closely the well known *History of the House of Austria* by William Coxe, first published in 1807.

During the 1830's the sympathy of the young liberal generation turned again to the contemporary French historians; since, however, the knowledge of the German language was much wider than the French, actually the German liberals, such as Rotteck and Schlosser, became the most frequently quoted authors. For a respectable group of translations of modern foreign works the activity of Joseph Bajza (1804-1858), a leading member of the Academy, was responsible. He himself translated the history of the United States by Lardner (1836), then persuaded the greatest publishing house in Budapest to start a new series of translations under the title of "Historical Library". Thus, Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* was published in Hungarian in 1841, followed by the *Life of Washington* by J. Sparks, the history of the French Revolution by Mignet, the history of the English Revolution by Dahlmann, while the translation of Schlosser's *World History* could not be completed because of the outbreak of the revolution in 1848. Of course the existence of these and similar other translations cannot be the only indication and measure of the historical education and interest of the contemporary Hungarian reading public. Familiarity with the German language was general within the ranks of the middle class; many spoke French and English as well; consequently the limitations of the Hungarian language presented no obstacle for those in quest of wider information.

The contemporary historiography of the nationalities of Hungary received inspiration from the same political and patriotic sources as that of the Hungarians. With the exception of the Transylvanian Saxons, however, none of them possessed the solid foundation of extensive preliminary researches, hence their works contributed more toward the increasing separatist propaganda than to the promotion of historical scholarship.

The administrative measures of Joseph II threatened not only the Hungarian constitution but also the ancient privileges of the Germans

<sup>31</sup>*Dictionnaire historique portatif*, Paris, 1752.

<sup>32</sup>*Geschichte der Oesterreichischen Monarchie*, Wien, 1815-17.



(Saxons) in southern Transylvania. In the 1790's a series of skillfully composed dissertations dealt with the problem, defending with every weapon of law and history the system of their extensive autonomy against both the possible interference of the Viennese government and the demands of their Transylvanian compatriots. The ablest representative of this legalistic trend was Joseph Charles Eder (1760-1810), a sharp critical mind and tireless collector of historical documents. Besides a number of printed publications, his bequest amounted to 85 large volumes in manuscript. It was this stubborn fight for their rights that turned the attention of August L. Schlözer to the history of the Germans in Transylvania. The famous Göttingen historian, well provided with material by his Saxon admirers, published a richly documented critical survey in three volumes on the legal and historical background of the first Saxon settlement in Transylvania.<sup>33</sup>

The leading Saxon intelligentsia always was well aware of the importance of a uniform public opinion and, during the learned debates on medieval privileges, a series of publications propagandized the highlights of Saxon history. In this category the names of George M. G. von Herrmann, Michael Lebrecht and Lucas J. Marienburg are worth mentioning. Another group of "best-selling" books followed the fashion of the recently developed "statistics", which included elements of Transylvanian geography, folklore and history, presented from the point of view of Saxon patriotism. Such works by John M. Ballmann, Joseph Leonhard and Joseph Benigni were rich in interesting details of contemporary conditions. Praising the Saxon achievements, they wasted but few words of acknowledgement to Hungarians, while all described in the darkest tones the backwardness of the Rumanians.

During the 1830's the rising tide of Hungarian nationalism forced the Saxons to pursue a more vigorous policy of defense of their German nationality. The most effective means for fostering their own culture and traditions was a newly organized patriotic association, the *Verein für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde* (1841). Its first president, Baron Joseph Bedeus (1782-1858), a scholar of great erudition, adopted the modern methods of German historiography and contributed essentially to the clarification of the history of taxation and constitutional development in Transylvania.<sup>34</sup> Approaching the crisis of 1848, the works of the secretary of the same *Verein*, the capable John Charles Schuller (1794-1865), became even more significant. He first applied Niebuhr's critical method to early Saxon history and undertook the task of a scientific survey of the whole course of his people's past, which, however, he never completed.<sup>35</sup> Schuller eagerly pointed out, with the usual nationalistic exaggeration, that the Germans in Transylvania always supported the Habsburg rulers against the rebellious Hungarians, toward whom he felt no loyalty at all. Moreover, after the tragic defeat of the War of Independence of 1848-49, he hurriedly

<sup>33</sup>*Kritische Sammlungen*, Göttingen, 1795-97.

<sup>34</sup>*Die Verfassung des Grossfürstenthums Siebenbürgen*, Wien, 1844.

<sup>35</sup>*Umrisse und kritische Studien*, Hermannstadt, 1840.

assured the Viennese government that by the abolishment of Hungarian independence the supreme goal of Saxon ambitions had been accomplished.

Without the aggressive tendency of their Transylvanian relatives, the historiography of the German element in northern Hungary (Szepes), represented by Christian Genersich, Jacob Melzer and Charles L. Unger, excelled in monographs of local interest, with a predominantly friendly attitude toward Hungarians.

The historical literature of the Rumanians in Transylvania revolved throughout the whole period around the crucial question: were the Rumanians aborigines in the country, or not? The answer, thanks to ambitious Renaissance historians, was mostly affirmative until the eighteenth century. Then, however, German scholars (Thunmann, Sulzer) pointed out the fact that the question involved a number of other groups throughout the Balkans with similar language and ethnic qualities, hence the popular supposition that the Rumanians were the direct descendants of Trajan's settlers in Dacia had to be essentially modified. The question might have remained a subject for scholarly debates only, but in the atmosphere of overheated nationalism a group of ambitious Rumanian ecclesiastics converted the issue into an effective political weapon. The first application of the theory of continuity of an originally Roman population in Transylvania for political purposes was the famous *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (1791) which demanded equality for Rumanians on the ground that they were the first settlers in the country. Among those who furnished the indispensable scientific background for this shaky theory, most significant was the great trio, Samuel Klein, George Sinkai and Peter Maior, all well educated members of the orthodox clergy. Klein's (1745-1806) voluminous historical works remained in manuscript, but he found opportunity to propagate his views in his widely read Rumanian grammar. Censorship prevented the publication of the great work of Sinkai (1753-1816); nevertheless, as a complete reevaluation of Transylvanian history from the point of view of Rumanian nationalism, it became a cornerstone of the future historiography of his nation. A vigorous polemic attitude characterized the Rumanian history<sup>36</sup> of Peter Maior (1753-1827), published at the university press in Budapest, followed by a flood of pamphlets for or against the main argument of the book in behalf of Rumanian cultural and political aspirations.

In the development of Slovak and Serbian nationalism a sweeping Panslavism furnished the most appealing inspirations without much interest for the historical background of these nationalities in Hungary. A Serbian periodical (*Sripski Letopisi*) founded in 1824 and printed in Budapest until 1864, with a large number of articles translated from foreign sources, clearly attests to the predominance of Panslavistic interest, while the relatively small and poorly educated Serb minority in southern

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<sup>36</sup>*Istoria pentru inceputul Romanilor in Dacia*, Pest, 1812.



Hungary was unable to contribute essentially to research in their own history.

The interest of the Slovaks centered around the legendary empire of Svatopluk, whose role and power was enormously exaggerated in the small works of George Papanek, George Szklenar, George Fandly and Honoratus Novotny, all lacking scholarly value. The cultural, and later political campaign fostering Slovak nationalism in view of a possible unification of all Slavic peoples, was carried on with relentless energy by John Kollár, Joseph Šafařík and Louis Štur, all zealous promoters of Slovak language and folklore, but only amateurs as historians with ill concealed hatred toward anything Hungarian.

In the first attempts at surveying the history of the Ruthenians in north-eastern Hungary, instead of a nationalistic or political tendency, ecclesiastical interest was predominant. Besides a small and insignificant essay by Anthony Décsy, the only noteworthy contribution to the subject was published by Joannicius Basilovits.<sup>37</sup> He insisted on the existence of a Ruthenian principality supposedly independent until the fifteenth century, and the predominance of the eastern rite not only in this territory but in the whole of Hungary until the late middle ages.

Although the cultural and political ambitions of the nationalities of Hungary were scarcely compatible with the same tendencies of Hungarian nationalists, the vigorous activity of Germans, Rumanians, Serbs and Slovaks went largely unnoticed and unopposed; the great issues of a liberal transformation of constitution and government within an independent country occupied Hungarian public opinion, once again under the predominant influence of French liberal thought. The young generation of intellectuals enthusiastically read Lamartine and Michelet; those with more scholarly interest also consulted Guizot, Thiers and Tocqueville. Most of them mastered the French language sufficiently to follow the news of the latest political developments in the Parisian papers. The only historian, however, who succeeded in making use of his extensive knowledge of contemporary French historiography in his own studies was Paul Jászay (1809-1852). Under the influence of Augustin Thierry he undertook the composition of a history of modern Hungary. Exploiting unknown materials from the State Archives of Vienna, the first volume was published in 1846.<sup>38</sup> An impressive style combined with the skill of a novelist secured a great popular success, but the premature death of the able author put an end to the promising enterprise.

Actually, the best presentation of the latest period of Hungarian history was the work of a talented Frenchman, Augustin de Gerando,<sup>39</sup> who, through his Hungarian marriage, became well acquainted with the current political trends of the country. Although his Hungarian friends provided him with abundant information, he failed to realize the great cleavage

<sup>37</sup>*Brevis Notitia, Cassoviae, 1799-1805.*

<sup>38</sup>*A magyar nemzet napjai a Mohácsi Vész után, Pest.*

<sup>39</sup>*De l'esprit public en Hongrie depuis la révolution française, Paris, 1848.*

between Kossuth's liberal program and the disappointing reality; thus the overall picture shown in the highly intelligent essay appeared somewhat idealized. The heroic attempt to put the theory into practice, the War of Independence of 1848-49, had failed. The ruthless oppression of the country by the victorious Austrians rendered the activity of any honest historian utterly fruitless for almost two decades, and the greatest talents of the following era, Michael Horváth and Ladislaus Szalay, started their rising careers as historians in exile.

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# HITLER AND THE GERMAN GENERALS

1934-1938

by *Hildegard Boeninger*

There is perhaps no more controversial subject than the role played by the German Generals under Adolf Hitler's régime. Both within and outside of Germany they have been vehemently assailed for their moral defection and their submissiveness to the Chancellor of the Third Reich.

The present study intends to show the chief stages by which Hitler succeeded first in winning over the army and then in bringing it under his domination. These stages were: 1) The elimination of the S.A. as a rival armed force in the Massacre of June 30, 1934; 2) The demand for an oath of personal allegiance after the death of Hindenburg on August 2, 1934; 3) The reintroduction of conscription on March 17, 1935; 4) The remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936; 5) The dismissal of Blomberg and Fritsch on February 4, 1938.

The following exposition is not meant as an apology for the German Generals' conduct; its aim is to explain the methods by which Hitler accomplished the subjugation of the leading generals. For if the two most prominent figures in the drama, Werner von Blomberg as Minister of Defense, and Werner von Fritsch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, properly backed by leading fellow officers, had vigorously opposed some of the Chancellor's cunning moves, the course of history might have taken a different turn.

## *The Background of the Relationship of Army to State*

In the German Armed Forces it was a time-honored tradition that an active officer should completely abstain from participation in the political life of his country. Violations of this fundamental code were exceptions; as, for example, when, in the critical days of July 1914, the Chief of Staff von Moltke gave his Austrian colleague advice which clearly exceeded his authority;<sup>1</sup> or when, in the course of World War I, General Ludendorff meddled in politics.<sup>2</sup>

Under the Weimar Republic the tradition of keeping strictly to purely military matters was reinforced so that the army was considered to be "a state within the state". Officers and enlisted men did not have the franchise and, therefore, had no direct influence on the public affairs of their country. It was the politicians, not military men who persuaded Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. General Kurt von Hammerstein as Commander-in-Chief of the Army is reported to have said to Hitler: "If you come to power legally, I'll accept it. If not, I'll shoot."<sup>3</sup> But Hammer-

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<sup>1</sup>Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Vol. 11, (New York, 1928), p. 508.

<sup>2</sup>Wolfgang Foerster, *Generaloberst Ludwig Beck; sein Kampf gegen den Krieg*, (München, 1953), p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>Serge Lang and Ernst von Schenck, *Portrait eines Menschheitsverbrechers nach den*

stein, though an outspoken opponent of national socialism, had no cause to order shooting. For since President Hindenburg was the Supreme Commander of the 100,000 man army of the Versailles Treaty, the *Reichswehr* owed obedience to his decision when he named Hitler Chancellor of the Reich on January 30, 1933.

Hindenburg favored an eventual restoration of the Monarchy. The bulk of the officers, conservative as they were, shared the President's feelings. They regarded Hitler as an interim solution and strenuously resisted the infiltration of national socialist ideology in the ranks of the *Reichswehr*. But with Hindenburg's appointment of Werner von Blomberg to the post of Minister of Defense, the officers' corps began to lose its homogeneous character. Blomberg's nomination, intended to strengthen the right wing of the Cabinet, was, as will be seen, a fateful decision.

There were eight non-Nazis in the Cabinet against three Nazis, including the Chancellor. Blomberg was the only military member. Thus the officers' corps cannot be held responsible for the Enabling Act of March 1933 that gave Hitler dictatorial power.

Early in February 1933, Hitler met with senior generals and admirals of the armed forces at the home of General von Hammerstein. Admiral Raeder in his testimony at Nuremberg reported on Hitler's speech at this gathering:

"He specially emphasized—and this was really the main point—that both domestic and foreign policy were to be left entirely in his hands, that the *Wehrmacht* was to have nothing at all to do with this, that the *Wehrmacht* was not to be used even to deal with unrest at home . . . He wanted to insure an undisturbed period of development for the *Wehrmacht* so that it could become the factor necessary to prevent the Reich from becoming the sport of other nations; and for that reason it would be necessary in the next few years for the *Wehrmacht* to devote its entire attention to the preparation of its objective, training for the defense of the fatherland in case of aggression. The *Wehrmacht* would be the sole bearer of arms and its structure would be unaltered."<sup>4</sup>

To military men brought up in the army's settled tradition, these words must have been very reassuring, the more so as Hitler showed an apparently sincere devotion to Field Marshal Hindenburg. Reader's further testimony indicated how cleverly Hitler made use of the officers' loyalty to the "alte Herr":

"He spoke with particular respect of Reich President von Hindenburg, the Supreme Commander of the *Wehrmacht*, and we had

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*hinterlassenen Memoiren des ehemaligen Reichsministers: Alfred Rosenberg*, (St. Gallen, 1947), p. 241.

<sup>4</sup>*Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, Vol. XIV, (Nuremberg, 1948), p. 21. Italics mine.



the impression that he would respect this much-revered personality."<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, up to the President's death Hitler made it a point to display an almost fawning veneration for Hindenburg, much to the disgust of leading Nazis.<sup>6</sup>

The picture of Hindenburg, then in his 86th year and visibly failing in health, was a matter of grave concern for Hitler and he needed the full support of the *Reichswehr* for his schemes.

### *The Blood Bath of June 30, 1934*

The first notable action which Hitler took in his pursuit of the generals' favor was the Blood Bath of June 30, 1934. This massacre was really the culmination of long-standing friction between the Nazi Storm Troopers ("S.A.") and the *Reichswehr*. It was the fulfillment of Hitler's promise made in his speech to the military leaders at von Hammerstein's home in February 1933, when he said that the *Wehrmacht* would be the sole bearer of arms.<sup>7</sup>

The S.A., a para-military organization headed by Captain Roehm, numbered about two and a half million men. Roehm wanted to have these forces absorbed into the *Reichswehr* and the whole formed into a people's army with himself at the head. The officers' corps was united in its objection to such a plan, which would have meant surrender to the forces of revolution.

Although it is certain that Roehm did not then have a fixed plan for an early uprising of the S.A., rumors of an impending revolt did reach the army command in June 1934. An S.A. group leader in Westphalia called on General Halder, who was then Chief of Staff in *Wehrkreis VI*, and told him that he would be Halder's successor when the *Reichswehr* was merged with the S.A. Halder reported this disclosure to General von Fritsch, who informed him that similar incidents had occurred in other parts of Germany. Fritsch now took defensive measures against a possible

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>6</sup>Hermann Rauschnig, *Die Revolution des Nihilismus*, (Zürich/New York 1938), p. 309.

<sup>7</sup>According to Wheeler-Bennett in his *The Nemesis of Power; the German Army in Politics, 1918-1945*, (London, New York, 1953), pp. 311-313, Hitler is supposed to have come to an agreement with the Generals on board the pocket battleship *Deutschland* on April 12, 1934. The chief source of Wheeler-Bennett's information seems to be the *Weissbuch über die Erschiessungen des 30. Juni*. The account of the so-called "Pact of the Deutschland" has not been corroborated anywhere else and Wheeler-Bennett himself points to a divergent report given by Herbert Rosinski in his *The German Army*, (London, 1939), pp. 222-223. Here Rosinski speaks of a conference on board the *Robert Ley* in June. Alan Bullock refers cautiously to the *Deutschland* pact when he writes "It is believed to have been during the course of this short voyage on the *Deutschland* that Hitler came to terms with the generals." *Hitler; a Study in Tyranny*, (New York, 1952), pp. 263-264. Yet Wheeler-Bennett bases his further analysis of events on the assumption that the "Pact of the Deutschland" is an absolute fact.

S.A. uprising by concentrating an infantry regiment in Döberitz, which could be used for the defense of Berlin.<sup>8</sup>

These rumors may have been purposely launched by Heinrich Himmler, the infamous leader of the Security Echelons ("S.S."), in order to bring the tension between the S.A. and the army to a head. At any rate, the generals appear to have taken the rumors seriously enough to have issued a warning protest. It seems certain that Chancellor Hitler was urged to honor his pledge of February 1933. At all events, on June 29th, just one day before the "purge", the *Völkischer Beobachter* published a lengthy article by General von Blomberg, the Minister of Defense, entitled "*Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich.*" After making a clear distinction between praetorian guards, an obvious allusion to Roehm's S.A., and the German soldier, he wrote:

"The role of the *Wehrmacht* is unequivocal and clear. It serves this [Hitler's] state which it affirms from innermost conviction, and it stands by this leadership which has restored to it the noblest right to be not only the bearer of arms but also—recognized by the State and the people—the bearer of unlimited trust."<sup>9</sup>

It is impossible to determine to what extent the army's reminder prompted Hitler to act on June 30, 1934. But it seems clear that the tension between the *Wehrmacht* and the S.A. was the crucial factor. The consideration of other issues involved goes beyond the present study.

However much the *Reichswehr* welcomed the elimination of the S.A. as a rival force, the massacre was not carried out by the army. This ugly task Hitler delegated to the S.S. The scope and method of the operation must have been abhorrent even to Hitler supporters like Blomberg and Reichenau, Chief of the Armed Forces Department. The Führer and his right-hand men, Hermann Goering and Heinrich Himmler, seized the opportunity to rid themselves not only of Roehm and the chief S.A. leaders, but also of many political opponents of the Third Reich. The total number of victims is estimated to have been around one thousand.<sup>10</sup> Among them were two members of the officers' corps, General Kurt von Schleicher, former Chancellor of the Reich, and General Ferdinand von Bredow. Both were shot down in cold blood.

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<sup>8</sup>Peter Bor, *Gespräche mit Halder*, (Wiesbaden, 1950), p. 104. This account furnishes the answer to Wheeler-Bennett's question: "If the generals were not at least partially informed of what was about to happen, why were the *Reichswehr* alerted?" (*op. cit.* p. 322.). Yet he admits that the Army leaders did not know exactly how Hitler would implement his promise to eliminate the SA. Thus he frees them of the accusation of direct complicity. On the other hand he blames the Generals for not having informed themselves on what Hitler's procedure would be. In view of the traditional aloofness of the Army from partisan politics, this expectation seems somewhat unrealistic. Certainly any inquiry into what was strictly a Party affair would have met with stern rebuff.

<sup>9</sup>Werner von Blomberg, "Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich," in *Völkischer Beobachter*. (Ausgabe A, München, June 29, 1934), p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>*Le Livre Blanc Austro-Allemand sur les assassinats de 30 juin et 25 juillet 1934*, (Paris, 1935), p. 122.



These murders placed the generals in a peculiar dilemma. On the one hand they were relieved that by the elimination of Captain Roehm the threatening second revolution had been averted. On the other hand, they were incensed by the horrifying massacre, and by the murder of two of their own comrades.

Whatever their feelings, the generals took no effective steps by way of protesting, largely because they lacked the authority to move without orders from Blomberg and Hindenburg. The late Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt told his former Chief of Staff, Günther Blumentritt, that on the occasion of the Roehm affair, several generals, among them Ritter von Leeb and von Witzleben, had talked things over with him. But because of the complicated situation they felt unable to take action.<sup>11</sup> Franz von Papen, then Vice-Chancellor, related that after having been released from protective custody, he rushed to General von Fritsch and asked him, "Why had he not assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief?" The general replied that the army "could not move without explicit orders from Blomberg or Hindenburg."<sup>12</sup>

Not only were there no orders, but Blomberg and Hindenburg even supported Hitler. Blomberg, on July 1st, hastily issued the following decree to the *Wehrmacht*:

"The Führer with soldierly resoluteness and exemplary courage has himself attacked and smitten the traitors and mutineers. The *Wehrmacht* as the bearer of arms of the entire nation, far from the struggle of internal politics, will show its gratitude by loyalty and devotion."<sup>13</sup>

President Hindenburg was persuaded to send the following telegram to Hitler:

"From the reports submitted to me, I recognize that by your own resolute attack and courageous personal intervention you have nipped in the bud all treasonable intrigues. You have saved the German people from a grave danger. For this I express my profound thanks and sincere appreciation."<sup>14</sup>

Blomberg's action may be explained by his Nazi sympathies. With Hindenburg it was different. He was then failing fast. Some time before the purge he had retired to his country estate, and it seems reasonable to assume that he was badly informed on what had really happened.<sup>15</sup> Accord-

<sup>11</sup>General Günther Blumentritt in a letter to Hermann Lutz, January 5, 1953.—The present writer has had access to private correspondence which will eventually become a part of the Hoover Institute and Library Archives.

<sup>12</sup>Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, (London, 1952), p. 318-319.

<sup>13</sup>Werner von Blomberg, "An die Wehrmacht," in *Völkischer Beobachter*, (Ausgabe A, München, July 2, 1934), p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>Paul von Hindenburg, Text of telegram as published in *Völkischer Beobachter*, (Ausgabe A, München, July 3, 1934), p. 1.

<sup>15</sup>John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Wooden Titan; Hindenburg in Twenty Years of German History, 1914-1934*, (New York, 1936), pp. 465-466.

ing to Secretary of State Otto Meissner, it was Hitler himself who had a draft of the telegram submitted to Hindenburg with the request that the latter send it to him, in order to restore order and confidence among the people. Before acceding to Hitler's request, Hindenburg consulted Blomberg, who, Meissner asserts, broadly affirmed the truth of the Chancellor's account.<sup>16</sup>

On July 1st, it had been officially stated that General von Schleicher was shot while resisting arrest for treason. In reality he had been murdered, as was his wife who endeavored to protect her husband from the assassins.

Hitler, in his *Reichstag* speech of July 13th, distorted numerous facts. As regards the Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow, he reiterated the charge of treason. Hindenburg did not believe this to be true and insisted on a thorough investigation, which Hitler promised but failed to carry out.

The only overt protest against the murders of the two generals came from the *Vereinigung Graf Schlieffen*, an unofficial organization of active and former members of the General Staff. At a meeting early in 1935, Generals von Mackensen and Hammerstein insisted that the names of the ill-fated generals be restored to the roster of honor. Mimeographed copies of these minutes were distributed to the members. They did not reach the public because Hitler upon hearing of the action of the *Schlieffen Verein* forbade the circulation of the minutes.<sup>17</sup> Even the *Vereinigung Graf Schlieffen* evaded the real cause of the murder of Schleicher and Bredow. The minutes merely stated: "Our comrades died on a field of battle to which their destiny led them without violation of their honor."<sup>18</sup>

Today there appears to be unanimous opinion among army men in Germany that the *Reichswehr* should have met Hitler's challenge. In a private letter, General Lossberg has declared that the *Wehrmacht* Command made a grievous mistake in accepting the liquidation of Schleicher and Bredow as an episode in Hitler's bloody reckoning with his S.A.<sup>19</sup> General Guderian expresses regret that the *Wehrmacht* Command did not emphatically insist on full satisfaction.<sup>20</sup>

Thus what at first appeared to be a victory for the military leaders became in reality a triumph for Hitler and the S.S. The latter, which had been but a part of the S.A., was elevated to an autonomous position within the National Socialist Party, "in recognition of its services, especially in connection with the events of June 30."<sup>21</sup> The *Reichswehr* had the satis-

<sup>16</sup>Otto Meissner, *Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler*, (Hamburg, 1950), p. 369.

<sup>17</sup>"Zur Ermordung des Generals Schleicher," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Vol. I, No. 1, (Stuttgart, 1953), pp. 71-96.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 73. Wheeler-Bennett adduces evidence that Hitler actually exonerated von Schleicher and von Bredow (*The Nemesis of Power*, p. 337). This would have had the effect of renewing the Generals' faith in their *Führer*.

<sup>19</sup>Bernhard von Lossberg in a letter to Hermann Lutz, July 22, 1952. See also his *Im Wehrmachtsführungsstab*, (Hamburg, 1949).

<sup>20</sup>Heinz Guderian, *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten*, (Heidelberg, 1950), p. 27.

<sup>21</sup>Schulthess' *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, (Munich, 1934), p. 187.



faction of being affirmed as the "sole bearer of arms." Yet the false charges of treason against two prominent members of the army reflected on the integrity of the *Reichswehr* itself.

We can well imagine that Hitler, who always stressed "honor" as one of the highest human values, felt disdain for the military leaders when he realized that they actually put up with his wanton dishonoring of two of their comrades. As Rudolf Pechel, long-time publisher of the *Deutsche Rundschau*, writes concerning Schleicher's and Bredow's assassination: "These murders of two of their own caste and the consequence for the *Reichswehr* are the first incurable blow to its morals."<sup>22</sup>

### *The Oath of Personal Allegiance to Hitler*

On August 1, 1934, the day before Hindenburg died, Hitler, aware of the approaching death of the President, summoned the Cabinet in order to promulgate a decree whereby the offices of President and Chancellor were to be merged. The contents of this decree were first made known to the German people through a broadcast on August 2nd, following the announcement of Hindenburg's death on that morning. In the general confusion and sorrow which seized the nation upon hearing the news of the venerable President's passing, the illegality of the Cabinet's decree went unnoticed. Neither the Constitution nor the Enabling Act were permissive of such a procedure. The Enabling Act expressly stated that it did not apply to matters affecting the rights of the President.<sup>23</sup> By combining the two posts in his own person, Hitler wielded new and greater power, and this in particular over the *Wehrmacht*, which regarded the Reich President as its Supreme Commander.

Formidable as was this *coup d'état*, it was surpassed by an even greater one on the day of Hindenburg's death. This was perpetrated by General von Blomberg through a military ordinance which ordered all officers and men to pledge an oath of allegiance to the "Führer of the German Reich and People, Adolf Hitler." General von Reichenau dictated the text of the new oath to his subordinate Foertsch as follows:

"I swear by God this holy oath: that I will render unconditional obedience to the Führer of the German Reich and People, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and will be ready as a brave soldier to stake my life at any time for this oath."<sup>24</sup>

The oath of the *Reichswehr*, decreed in August 1919, read:

"I swear loyalty to the Constitution of the Reich and solemnly promise as a brave soldier to protect the German Reich and its

<sup>22</sup>Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand*, (Zürich, 1947), p. 138.

<sup>23</sup>Bernhard Schwertfeger, "Hindenburgs Tod und der Eid auf den 'Führer,'" in *Die Wandlung*, Vol. 3, (Heidelberg), pp. 563-578.

<sup>24</sup>Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, (New York, 1952), p. 84.

legally ordained institutions at all times and to render obedience to the Reichpresident and my superiors."<sup>25</sup>

This wording was changed in 1933 by legal parliamentary procedure to:

"I swear by God this holy oath, that I will serve my people and my country at all times faithfully and honestly and will be ready as a brave and obedient soldier to stake my life at any time for this oath."<sup>26</sup>

The alteration on August 2, 1934, was a wholly unconstitutional *coup*; it was performed without Cabinet approval and with only *ex post facto* legalization by the *Reichstag*.

Probably few officers grasped the momentous significance of the oath to Hitler personally, although the American journalist Hubert Knickerbocker contends that "thousands of officers absented themselves that day from duty 'on account of illness.'" But when they came back each had to take the oath individually. Knickerbocker witnessed the swearing in of the Berlin garrison and recollects:

"It was a most impressive ceremony, and I carried away from it the conviction that this army would never break its oath and turn on Hitler until it met defeat."<sup>27</sup>

We know that General Beck, the Chief of Staff, realized the implications of the new wording. H. B. Gisevius, in his testimony at Nuremberg, stated that Beck called August 2, 1934, the blackest day of his life.<sup>28</sup> This is corroborated by Beck's brother Wilhelm, who, in a letter to Professor W. Foerster, says:

"He [Beck] was taken completely by surprise at this command, and he repeatedly said later that he could never forgive himself for not having carried out his original intention of handing in his resignation at once . . . Later the gravest conflicts of conscience arose in him on account of this oath."<sup>29</sup>

The extreme haste with which Blomberg summoned the army to pledge an oath to Hitler was testimony to the latter's need for strengthening his position in the newly combined office of Chancellor and President. Hitler naturally felt grateful to Blomberg for his prompt action. On August 20, after the popular vote had sanctioned the new order at the top level of the Reich, Hitler expressed his thanks to the Armed Forces and added:

"Just as the officers and enlisted men of the *Wehrmacht* pledged their allegiance to the new state in my person, so shall I regard it

<sup>25</sup>*Reichsgesetzblatt* 1919, No. 153, (August 15, 1919), p. 1419.

<sup>26</sup>*Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933, Teil I, No. 136, (December 2, 1933), p. 1017.

<sup>27</sup>Hubert R. Knickerbocker, *Is Tomorrow Hitler's?* (New York, 1941), p. 9.

<sup>28</sup>*Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, Vol. XII, (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 243.

<sup>29</sup>Wolfgang Foerster, *Generaloberst Ludwig Beck; sein Kampf gegen den Krieg*, (Munich, 1953), p. 27.



at all times as my highest duty to intercede for the continued existence [*Bestand*] and inviolability [*Unantastbarkeit*] of the *Wehrmacht* in fulfillment of the testament of the deceased Field Marshal and faithful to my own will to establish the army firmly as the sole bearer of arms in the nation."<sup>30</sup>

The mutuality of the oath was recognized by both Hitler and the generals. Hitler, ever since his advent to power in January 1933, had given assurances to further the best interests of the German people and to preserve peace. General von Reichenau reports Hitler as having said at the time of the oath, "The *Reichswehr* can depend on me as I depend on the *Reichswehr*."<sup>31</sup> That other prominent German officers were aware of the reciprocal obligation implicit in the oath is shown by an entry in Heinz Guderian's diary:

"Tomorrow we swear the oath to Hitler. An oath heavy with consequence! God grant that it will be kept on both sides with equal loyalty for the welfare of Germany. The army is accustomed to keep its oath. May it be able to do so honorably."<sup>32</sup>

Here the question arises as to whether the generals were released from their oath when Hitler violated his pledges. Hitler himself had written in *Mein Kampf*:

"If a people is led to destruction by the instrument of governmental power, then the rebellion on the part of each and every member of such a nation is not only a right but a duty."<sup>33</sup>

Thus even by Hitler's standards the army chiefs would have been free to take action against their leader if the occasion demanded it.

"Blind obedience" was a sacred tradition in the German army. An outstanding exception was the famous incident in 1812, when General Yorck von Wartenburg signed the Convention of Tauroggen. However, this disobedience was not directed against the General's superior, but against the foreign oppressor of his country.

Under Hitler's régime some of the *Wehrmacht* chiefs conveniently took refuge behind the oath to cover up their moral weakness. Yet others were sincere in their contention that an oath once sworn should never be broken under any circumstances. Their point of view is perhaps best expressed by General Blumentritt:

"For me, an oath remains an oath, and obedience, obedience. Whether a government is good or bad has nothing to do with the issue. In the course of history, the governments of other nations

<sup>30</sup>Hitler's message to Blomberg in *Völkischer Beobachter*. (Ausgabe A, München, August 21, 1934).

<sup>31</sup>Stated in an interview of Reichenau with *Le Petit Parisien*. (August 7, 1934), as reported by Hermann Foertsch, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>32</sup>Guderian, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>33</sup>Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, (New York, 1939), p. 122.

have done wrong. But this was no reason for their soldiers to overthrow their government."<sup>84</sup>

On the other hand there were, and are, those who argue that there are limits to the obligations imposed by an oath. General Ludwig Beck gave forceful expression to his reasoning:

"History will place a heavy burden of guilt on the military leaders if they do not act according to their knowledge and conscience. Their soldierly obedience has its limits wherever conscience and responsibility forbid the execution of a command."<sup>85</sup>

It is significant that the generals Halder and von Witzleben, who, in 1938, plotted the overthrow of Hitler, were fully aware that the execution of their plan would definitely mean the end of their military career.<sup>86</sup>

But no matter how one views the pledging of the oath to Hitler and its binding force "to the bitter end," the fact remains that the consequences were most disastrous. As Chester Wilmot points out:

"With that oath the *Wehrmacht*, and through it the German people, became bound body and soul to the person and policies of Adolf Hitler. From that compact there was no divorce and little desertion until Hitler released the bond by taking his own life. That oath was to be the corner-stone of his power, the rock upon which every attempt at military opposition to the Nazi régime was broken."<sup>87</sup>

### *The Reintroduction of Conscription*

The peace settlement of 1919 provided for the general disarmament of the victorious powers, which was to follow in due time the enforced restriction of the German Army to a limit of 100,000 men. The problem had been fully discussed under previous governments of the Weimar Republic. In December 1932, the Disarmament Conference at Geneva acknowledged Germany's "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations." The implementation of this policy was rendered more difficult by Hitler's advent to power.<sup>88</sup> When further negotiations seemed to yield no concrete results, the German Government, on October 14, 1933, announced its withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations.

To justify this serious step the Reich issued a resounding proclamation, the essential parts of which ran as follows:

<sup>84</sup>Letter of Günther Blumentritt to Hermann Lutz, September 12, 1951.

<sup>85</sup>Foerster, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

<sup>86</sup>Letter of Franz Halder to Hermann Lutz, November 15, 1951.

<sup>87</sup>Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

<sup>88</sup>*Survey of International Affairs 1932*. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, (London, 1933), p. 288. For a detailed account of the intricate deliberations and negotiations on Disarmament, see *Survey of International Affairs for the years 1932-1935. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 2nd Series, Vol. IV.*



"The German Government and the German people are united in their desire to pursue the policies of peace, reconciliation, and understanding, as the bases for all resolutions and every action. . .

"The German Government and the German people renew their avowal of assenting gladly to the actual disarmament of the world, with the assurance and readiness to destroy the very last machine gun and to dismiss the last man from the army, insofar as the other nations resolve to do the same."<sup>39</sup>

At the same time, Hitler in an appeal to the German Nation declared:

"The Government presents this resolution joined with a renewed affirmation of a policy of the most sincere desire for peace and readiness for understanding to the German people for consideration, and expects from them a profession of the same love of peace and readiness for peace, but also the same concept of honor and the same determination."<sup>40</sup>

This explicit policy of the German Government was made an issue in the Reichstag election of November 12, 1933. The voters were asked whether or not they were in agreement with the declared peace aims of their government. President Hindenburg in a broadcast to the German people appealed to the voters to cast their ballot in favor of this policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the results were overwhelmingly in the affirmative.<sup>41</sup>

The proclamations of the Reich Government, the Reich President, and the Reich Chancellor, approved by the vast majority of the nation, thus constituted *the basis for Germany's future foreign policy*. Until 1938, in numerous speeches and interviews, Hitler continuously stressed his love for peace and his abhorrence of war.

The disarmament negotiations reached a crucial point in the Spring of 1934. The French note of April 17th frustrated further work of the Conference. As André François-Poncet, then French Ambassador to Berlin, points out, this action gave Hitler the excuse to rearm as he saw fit.<sup>42</sup>

Within a year Hitler was prepared to take advantage of the deadlock reached at Geneva. On March 13, 1935, he told his liaison officer with the *Reichswehr*, Colonel Hossbach, that he was ready to reintroduce military conscription. The proclamation was to coincide with the expected decision of the Quai d'Orsay to extend the period of conscription in France. Hossbach indicated that twelve corps commands and thirty-six divisions was the goal toward which a military defense organization should strive. But

<sup>39</sup>*Deutscher Geschichtskalender* 1933, (Leipzig), pp. 298-299.

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 298.

<sup>41</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 314. 40,632,628 Germans voted "yes" for the policy thus outlined by their government and President, and only 2,100,191 voted "no."

<sup>42</sup>André François-Poncet, *Souvenirs d'une Ambassade*, (Paris, 1946), pp. 178-179. See also *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*. 2nd Series, Vol. IV (London, 1950), No. 310, Annex.

he begged Hitler first to confer with his military leaders and other responsible men. Consequently, a conference took place on March 15th.<sup>43</sup>

Ironically enough, it was General von Blomberg, since 1934 Minister of War, and not a civilian official, who was taken aback by the Führer's announcement, though to be sure for political and not for military reasons; he feared that Hitler's move would cause the Allies to intervene.

Blomberg's objections were overruled. There was, apart from verbal protests, no foreign intervention when general conscription was decreed on March 16th. On the contrary, within a few months, on June 18th, the British Government, without consulting France, saw fit to conclude a Naval Agreement with Hitler which implicitly recognized Germany's right to rearm. It was Hitler's first notable victory over the timorous objections of his Minister of War. Naturally the military chiefs as a whole were delighted that rearmament could now proceed undisturbed.

### *The Reoccupation of the Demilitarized Rhineland Zone*

Encouraged by the passivity of the Western Powers and by their embarrassed position toward Mussolini's war in Ethiopia, Hitler early in 1936 decided to reoccupy the Rhineland, on his own initiative. General von Manstein, upon being questioned about the role of the military in this affair, answered emphatically:

"We did not demand the military occupation, and above all, we did not intend it to be a preparation for war. On the contrary, at the time the occupation was carried out, I was the chief of the Operations Department, and I myself had to draft the orders for that occupation. Since we were completely surprised by the decision of the Führer, I had only one afternoon in which to do it, because the following morning the generals concerned came to receive their orders. I know that at that time the Reich Minister of War and General von Fritsch stated their objections, and warned Hitler against such a one-sided solution of this question."<sup>44</sup>

However, there is evidence that Hitler did discuss his bold plan with a few confidants. In February, during the winter Olympics, Hitler took Blomberg aside and said, "I have decided on a military reoccupation of the Rhineland. That will be a great surprise."<sup>45</sup>

Blomberg was frightened. It seemed obvious to him that France would react militarily. Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, shared Blomberg's grave apprehensions:

<sup>43</sup>Friedrich Hossbach, *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler*, (Wolfenbüttel, 1949), p. 95.

<sup>44</sup>*Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, Vol. XX, (Nuremberg, 1948), pp. 603-604. It seems evident that the words "On the contrary" should stand by themselves as a separate sentence, because they belong clearly to the first sentence. In the French edition the comma also appears after "contrary." (See p. 644).

<sup>45</sup>Raymond Cartier, *Les Secrets de la Guerre dévoilés par Nuremberg*, (Paris, 1946), p. 59.



"Goering . . . agreed to intervene with the Führer in order to convince him that we were in no condition to risk a war. But in the course of the ensuing conversation, Hitler swung Goering around and won him over to his idea. The Führer insisted to us that France would not march. 'Moreover,' he added, 'if your fears are justified, if the situation becomes really dangerous, I will reverse my order and recross the Rhine'."<sup>46</sup>

The operation proceeded on March 7, 1936. About 30,000 men were moved into the demilitarized zone.<sup>47</sup> They stopped on the right bank of the Rhine. Only three battalions of infantry crossed the river by rail: one was sent to Aix-la-Chapelle, one to Treves, the third to Saarbrücken. Their commanders had a secret order to withdraw immediately if the French undertook any military countermeasure.<sup>48</sup>

It is remarkable that this secret order became known at once to foreign correspondents in Berlin and soon also to statesmen abroad.<sup>49</sup>

Some days after the reoccupation, the three German Military Attachés in London, for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, with the knowledge of the Ambassador, sent a telegram to Berlin, the gist of which was: "Situation grave. Fifty-fifty peace or war."<sup>50</sup> At the same time, it became known that the French were making military preparations.

Blomberg became jittery. He demanded the immediate withdrawal of the three advance battalions back to the Rhine. Even General Keitel and General Jodl of the *Wehrmacht* Staff joined in this recommendation. But Fritsch, who had originally objected to the occupation, now favored standing firm, and so did Foreign Minister von Neurath.

The grave apprehension felt in German military circles was disclosed by M. Dobler, French Consul General in Cologne at that time. He testified that on March 20th a German officer visited him and said:

"It is the civilians who commit such stupidities, and not the military leaders . . . The advice of the army is that it would be best if we cleared the Rhineland again, and you should demobilize the troops which you have transferred to the Maginot Line."<sup>51</sup>

This officer was on the staff of General von Kluge, who was in command of the troops that had occupied the demilitarized zone. At the close of the conversation, the officer significantly asked the Frenchman whether he

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>47</sup>France, Assemblée Nationale. No. 2344. Commission chargée d'enquêter sur les événements survenus en France, 1933-1945, Rapport. Vol. I, p. 18. Hereafter referred to as France 2344.

<sup>48</sup>Walter Goerlitz, *Adolf Hitler*, (Stuttgart, 1952), p. 46.

<sup>49</sup>William L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary*, (New York, 1943), p. 46; Letter of Otto Tolischus to Hermann Lutz, September 26, 1952. See also his book, *They Wanted War*, (New York, 1940), p. 73; *Le Procès Flandin devant la Haute Cour de Justice*, 23-26 Juillet 1946. (Paris), pp. 70-76; Pierre-Etienne Flandin, *Politique française 1919-1940*. (Paris, 1947), pp. 193 ff.; Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*. (Boston, 1948), p. 196-198.

<sup>50</sup>Geyr von Schweppenburg, *The Critical Years*, (London, 1952), pp. 62-63.

<sup>51</sup>France 2344, *op. cit.*, Annex II, p. 489.

[the German] could take back some message to his general [Kluge]. This may have been an attempt to sound out French intentions. At any rate, it was a most unusual incident, which corroborates the German evidence available that the military leaders were really frightened by Hitler's daring move. They, of course, knew the hopeless inadequacy of the German forces, which would have been no match for the French troops present at the border.<sup>52</sup> In later years the Führer himself repeatedly declared that he considered the Rhineland occupation the greatest risk of his life.<sup>53</sup> As General Lossberg wrote: "There was not a single division, not even a regiment, that would have been ready for battle."<sup>54</sup>

When there was no more danger that his bluff would be called, Hitler remarked to a national socialist *Gauleiter*: "If I had listened to my generals, I should not be standing here today."<sup>55</sup>

Blomberg's and Fritsch's warning against the Rhineland gamble had a fateful consequence on Hitler's relationship to the military leaders. General von Manstein believes:

"That warning is the first source for the distrust which subsequently the Führer increasingly felt for the generals. Later at a private conference which I had with him, he himself admitted that that was so."<sup>56</sup>

On the other hand, Hitler's unexpected success in March 1936 now won him fresh support from the military ranks, which felt that the Führer's political discernment had been correct.<sup>57</sup>

### *The Dismissal of Blomberg and Fritsch*

In the well-known Conference of November 5, 1937, the Führer for the first time disclosed to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the *Wehrmacht*, and to Foreign Minister von Neurath, his long-range plans for the acquisition of Germany's allegedly needed *Lebensraum*. The objections which the Generals von Blomberg and von Fritsch raised on this occasion are generally regarded as having precipitated their downfall in February 1938, because Hitler realized that these men might seriously hamper the implementation of his projected aggressions.

The wire-pullers in the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis, which began early in

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, Rapport I, p. 17.

<sup>53</sup>Letter of Bernhard von Lossberg to Hermann Lutz, July 22, 1952.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.* General Lossberg was at that time Captain of the Operations Division and inspected the battalions at Aix-la-Chapelle and Treves shortly after the occupation. Lossberg writes that the wife of the Commander of the battalion at Treves had hastily packed toys into his officer's trunk because he thought it was a practise alarm.—The inadequacy of the German divisions is also mentioned by General Blumentritt when he recalls "the gloomy atmosphere, the poor equipment, the knowledge that the French could easily have thrown them back." (Letter to Hermann Lutz, February 25, 1952.)

<sup>55</sup>Kurt Assmann, *Deutsche Schicksalsjahre*, (Wiesbaden, 1950), p. 45.

<sup>56</sup>*Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal*, Vol. XX, (Nuremberg, 1948), pp. 603-604.

<sup>57</sup>Telford Taylor, *Sword and Swastika*, (New York, 1952), pp. 90-91, 317.



1938, were evidently Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and Heinrich Himmler, Chief of the S.S. Both aspired to even greater power for themselves and for the Nazi Party, and they wanted to remove rivals.<sup>58</sup>

The opportunity to get rid of Blomberg arose when the latter married his secretary, Eva Gruhn, who, as he knew, had "a past." Hitler and Goering were both witnesses to the marriage, thus giving it official approval. There is good reason to believe that Goering and Himmler had long known about Eva's police record. At the appropriate moment they revealed it. Blomberg's prompt resignation or dismissal then became inevitable and was demanded by the military leaders. When this affair came to a head, the instigators behind the scene, Himmler and Goering, slipped a dossier into Hitler's hands charging the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General von Fritsch, with homosexuality. Outraged by this accusation, Fritsch at once gave Hitler his word of honor that it was absolutely false. But a witness, held in readiness, was brought in and identified Fritsch as the guilty man. The witness, named Schmidt, was a convicted blackmailer. Hitler chose to accept the testimony of this criminal rather than the word of honor of his Commander-in-Chief, who was highly esteemed throughout the army. Fritsch was promptly dismissed, ostensibly for reasons of health. At a military trial, however, Schmidt was forced to admit that the real offender was a retired cavalry officer, von Frisch. On March 18, Fritsch was acquitted for proven innocence.

It is difficult to believe that Hitler was unaware of the shameful role which Himmler, with the help of his right-hand man, R. Heydrich, played in the scandal. He refused, however, to have the action of the S.S. investigated. The evidence available shows that Hitler personally was no party to the plot. But when he saw the golden opportunities which his henchmen provided, he grasped them in his crafty way without scruples.<sup>59</sup>

The dismissal of Blomberg and Fritsch, together with that of a number of other generals and of diplomats, announced on February 4, 1938, caused a great stir and much speculation. Hitler himself took over the functions of Blomberg, as the latter himself had obligingly suggested,<sup>60</sup> and General Walther von Brauchitsch was put into Fritsch's place. In addition the Führer usurped personal control of the new Supreme Command of the

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<sup>58</sup>Reports of Interrogation of German Prisoners-of-War, made by Members of the Department of State, Special Interrogation Mission, headed by Dewitt C. Poole (Wiesbaden, 1945), p. 5. "Schacht says Blomberg was put out of the way because Himmler wanted to be Minister of War."

<sup>59</sup>The following works give a detailed treatment of the Fritsch Affair; Hermann Foertsch, *Schuld und Verhängnis*; Johann Kielmansegg, *Der Fritschprozess 1938* (Hamburg, 1949); Friedrich Hossbach, *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler*. Foertsch reproduces a deposition made by the late General von Rundstedt, pp. 102-103. On January 31, 1938, Hitler summoned him for an interview in which the Chancellor displayed violent rage against the leading generals for their timid attitude towards the Rhineland occupation and for their slow progress in rearming. Blomberg's mesalliance and Fritsch's alleged misdemeanor were apparently of less importance to Hitler, and he does not seem to have mentioned Blomberg's and Fritsch's objections to his war plans.

<sup>60</sup>Foertsch, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

Combined Armed Forces (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, abbreviated O.K.W.). Henceforth, he wielded absolute dictatorial power in military as well as in political matters. The servile General Keitel became Chief of the O.K.W., and Goering received the baton of a Field Marshal.

For domestic and foreign consumption, on February 20th Hitler declared in a speech to the Reichstag, after a generous tribute to the *Wehrmacht* and in particular to Blomberg and Fritsch for their meritorious services:

"If ever international baiting and well-poisoning should attempt to break the peace of our Reich . . . the world would then see as quick as a flash how much this Reich—people's party and *Wehrmacht*—is animated by *one* spirit and fanatically dominated by *one* will."<sup>61</sup>

Unfortunately, the evil machinations involving the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were concealed from the public and were suspected by only a few of the high ranking officers. Fritsch himself at first believed that the whole maneuver was an attack on him personally. The generals by their whole training and tradition were quite unfamiliar with scheming and plotting, skills in which their opponents excelled; they were no match for men employing gangster methods. General von Fritsch especially was quite helpless in dealing with such defamers. Only gradually did it dawn on him what the game was about. On February 23rd, he dictated this statement:

"At no time has a people allowed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to suffer such disgraceful treatment. I wish to record these facts explicitly so that future historical writing may know how in the year 1938 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was treated. Such treatment is not only unworthy for me but is at the same time dishonoring for the entire Army."<sup>62</sup>

At a meeting of the senior generals on June 13, 1938, Hitler expressed deep regret at the injustice done to von Fritsch. He proposed to appoint him to a National Defense Council that was, he said, being organized, as a member of which Fritsch could serve his country even better than in his previous capacity. In the course of his address, the Führer choked with emotion as he begged the generals not to abandon the colors in these critical times.<sup>63</sup>

Hitler's oration had a sincere, convincing ring. The generals were made to feel the difficulty of his position in not reinstating Fritsch in his former post. However, there is good reason to suspect that the speech was, in good part at least, a masterly performance skillfully staged to prevent determined action on the part of the generals. The fact that the National

<sup>61</sup>Reichstag, *Verhandlungen*, Band 459. 2nd Session, 1938. (Berlin, 1938), p. 34.

<sup>62</sup>Friedrich Hossbach, *Von der militärischen Verantwortlichkeit in der Zeit vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, (Goettingen, 1948), pp. 26-27.

<sup>63</sup>Foertsch, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130.



Defense Council never was created justifies the belief that the Führer was deliberately duping the generals. At any rate, Hitler's emotional appeal led to a directive of the O.K.W. ordering all officers to consider the "Fritsch Affair" closed, to avoid discussion of the matter with outsiders, and even to refrain from talking about it among themselves.

This injunction was not strictly obeyed, for Fritsch was publicly presented with a villa in Berlin called "Haus Treue" (Loyalty) purchased from voluntary donations by his comrades. Furthermore, Hitler was induced to effect an outward rehabilitation by naming Fritsch "Chef" of his former artillery regiment.<sup>64</sup>

These gestures were wholly inadequate to redress the grievous wrong done to a highly distinguished general. For this inadequacy several men are directly responsible. General Keitel, Chief of the O.K.W., bears the responsibility for the order which declared the Fritsch Case closed. And Brauchitsch, by remaining as Commander-in-Chief, practically condoned Fritsch's removal. Later, when Fritsch realized that his cause had not been properly defended by his comrades-in-arms, he admitted regretfully that he should have taken action.<sup>65</sup> But this realization came too late. Passivity in the momentous episode of January/February 1938, was the decisive factor in Hitler's astute scheme to make himself master of the entire *Wehrmacht*.

### Conclusion

In retrospect we can clearly see how, in successive stages ranging over five years, the Generals gradually fell under Hitler's domination. In some cases the Generals were placed on the horns of a dilemma: determined action on their part against the Führer might well have impaired the special interests of the *Wehrmacht*. Hence the Generals put up with the murder and defamation of their fellow officers Schleicher and Bredow when these occurred concomitantly with the elimination of the S.A. as a rival force. Hardly aware of the unconstitutionality of the oath to Hitler's person, they regarded it as a reciprocal and reassuring pledge on the Führer's part. Though at first opposed to Hitler's ventures when he decreed universal conscription in 1935 and again when he ordered the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, the Generals—not unnaturally—waxed enthusiastic over the Führer's spectacular success in both these daring moves. But in 1938 the Army accepted a fatal blow in the shameful removal of its Commander-in-Chief. M. André François-Poncet, who as French Ambassador to Berlin had closely watched the development from 1931 to the end of 1938, justly

<sup>64</sup>Kielmansegg, *op. cit.*, p. 30. "The position of 'Chef' of a regiment is nothing but an outward decoration. It carries no rights except attachment to the regiment, no duties and no responsibilities."

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 122. In answer to a question put to him by the Baroness Schutzbar as to why he had not struck a blow at his opponent, Fritsch replied, "Yes, I should have done that."—Henceforth his life became a burden to him. It appears that the soldier's death he met on the outskirts of Warsaw was not unwelcome to him.

declared: "[The Army] had triumphed in 1934; the Party took its revenge in 1938."<sup>66</sup>

Blomberg was one of the few who perceived that it was in the very nature of the Party to work for his downfall. In his memoirs he wrote:

"Hitler and his party wanted total power in their hands; no secondary powers, no independence of action could be tolerated, only the totalitarian, indivisible, untrammelled power could prevail. This had been accomplished everywhere except in the armed forces. Direct command functions were in the hands of a soldier, myself; the Führer held only indirect command powers. This created distrust."<sup>67</sup>

Indeed, distrust is inherent in totalitarianism. From the very outset Hitler was suspicious of the generals' attitude toward him and the Nazi régime. His distrust is understandable if one recalls that no group exerting leadership in Germany in the early thirties really thought that Hitler would ever elude its control. When in 1933, Franz von Papen persuaded the Reich President to entrust the Chancellorship to Adolf Hitler, he and his associates fancied that they could always dominate the man of their choice; they considered him too inexperienced in statesmanship. Similarly, the leading generals believed that the "Bohemian Corporal" would always be dependent on their expert advice, since "the unknown soldier of the World War"—Hitler's favorite description of himself—could not possibly pretend to be as competent in military matters as they were. In this reasoning the generals repeated the fateful mistake the politicians had made before them. They vastly underrated the megalomaniac urge and insatiable lust for power which drove their *Wehrmacht* chief irresistibly to catastrophe.

Perhaps, too, a certain trend toward disintegration of moral values explains the generals' motives in accepting Hitler's actions. Blomberg, according to the editor of *The Berlin Diaries*, Helmut Klotz, accepted an estate in East Prussia as a gift from National Socialist landowners "as a token of thanks for his services to the Prussian farming Community."<sup>68</sup> Brauchitsch, on his part, when advanced to Fritsch's post in February 1938, allowed Hitler to arrange a financial settlement with his first wife to facilitate remarriage. Thus, he undoubtedly placed himself under moral obligation to Hitler.<sup>69</sup>

The rapid enlargement of the armed forces, of which at least one

<sup>66</sup>François-Poncet, *op. cit.*, p. 290. This statement was erroneously omitted in the American edition, *The Fateful Years* (New York, 1948). The Ambassador confirms the view he expressed in the quoted passage and regrets its omission in the English translation. (Letter to writer, May 8, 1953).

<sup>67</sup>As quoted in Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>68</sup>Helmut Klotz, ed., *The Berlin Diaries* (New York, 1934), pp. 277-278.

<sup>69</sup>There are a number of sources substantiating this, among others Jodl's diary for February 1, 1938. In initiated army circles the fact was well-known and the financial transaction deeply resented.



branch, the Air Force under Goering, was almost wholly nazified, had resulted in a considerable increase of Nazi-inspired officers, and this made action against the Party forces difficult. Also, the military's deliberate abstention from politics played its crucial role.

The Nuremberg Tribunal expressly cleared the German General Staff from the charge of having been a criminal organization conspiring for war. On the other hand, it is also true that during World War II, in obedience to their oath to Hitler, "Germans in arms were to carry out manifold acts of aggression and spoliation, torture and murder throughout the length and breadth of Europe."<sup>70</sup>

The plight of the German Generals under the Hitler régime may well serve as an example of the wise warning of antiquity: *Principiis obsta*—"Resist [evil] in its beginnings."

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<sup>70</sup>Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

## INVESTMENT POLICY AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN EAST-MID-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

by Vladislav J. Paulat

The basic factor in the dynamic development of a socialist economy is the ratio of investment to consumption. Communist economists in the Iron Curtain countries based their theory on Keynes' General Theory, in particular on the part in Chapter 16, reading: "It is preferable to regard labor, including, of course, the personal services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as the sole factor of production, operating in a given environment of technique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand".

This theory partly explains why Communist economists have been able to take the unit of labor as the sole physical unit required in the Communist economic system apart from units of money and time.<sup>1</sup>

The level of consumption in Communist countries is determined by the government policy calling for investment in industry, transport, agriculture, construction and building as well as other economic sectors, regardless of consumers' requirements or needs. The planned investment must be effected at any price and only that part of the national income which is left may be spent for consumers' goods.

The well-known Keynes' equation:  $Y$  (national income) =  $C$  (consumption) plus  $I$  (investment) has been simply changed to:  $Y = I + C$  so that investment ( $I$ ) is a constant and consumption ( $C$ ) a dependent variable.

Although the output of industry in the principal satellite countries is expected to double or treble by the end of the current long-range economic plans, consumption should rise by 50-88 percent.

### *Target for Five Year Plans of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania<sup>2</sup>*

	Czechoslovakia 1953 1948 = 100	Hungary 1954 1949 = 100	Rumania 1955 1950 = 100
Industrial production	198	310	244
Agricultural production	153	154	188
Consumption	150	150	188

These facts are the main reasons for a comparatively low standard of living. It is particularly felt in Czechoslovakia since this country had a very high standard of living before World War II, as compared to other Iron Curtain countries.

Although the output in industry in Czechoslovakia rose by about 67 percent over the 1937 level, consumption per head increased only by 17 percent in 1948. Prior to World War II, only 8.7 percent of the entire population was engaged in industry, whereas in 1952 this share is estimated at 14.7 per cent (dependents of industrial laborers are not included in this

<sup>1</sup>Cp. O. Procházka, *Investice v Dvouletém Plánu* (Investment in the Two Year Plan), (Prague, 1947), Česká Společnost Národohospodářská.

<sup>2</sup>World Economic Report, 1950-51, (New York, United Nations, 1952), p. 33.



percentage). There is a tremendous shift in population, particularly from the countryside to cities and from households to industrial factories, in all Iron Curtain countries, especially in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. This shift means that working people must eat more food of greater calorific value than in agriculture or in households, because they are working hard. The agricultural population before World War II consumed large quantities of meat, fat and cereals, which were not covered by statistics. Therefore, the consumption figures published by the Communist régime of any satellite country must be taken with a "grain of salt".

As a matter of fact, some population groups such as Stakhanovites, shockworkers, innovators, miners and workers in metallurgical, engineering and chemical industries, have had a higher consumption of meat and fat than before World War II. On the other hand, consumption of these basic foodstuffs by former businessmen, office clerks and owners of large farms or factories is far lower than it was prior to World War II.

To bar inflation of bank note circulation and increase compulsory savings, the dual system of prices in government trade was introduced in all Communist-dominated countries. Additional supplies of consumer goods were used to introduce or increase free sales of these goods in government stores at higher prices than in cooperative stores selling the rationed goods. This dual system of prices served to divert to government stores, from the black market, a part of the income of higher paid workers, salaried officials, professionals, farmers and traders, thereby reducing private profits and the effect of such profits on overall demand. At the same time the government secures a high income from these sales which form the backbone of the commodity (turnover) tax, prevents the inflation which could arise from excessive purchasing power and controls the prevailing price level. Since almost everybody is forced to buy a certain part of his needs in these stores, the increase in real wages and the standard of living is slight.

The volume of investment is connected with the productivity of labor, the latter rising adequately with the capital supply. With the increased volume of productivity, the volume of work needed for production of consumers' goods, necessary for the maintenance of mankind, is decreasing. This portion of work is devoted to investment. With the increase in investment the supply of capital goods rises simultaneously. Productivity rises again; and, thus, the maintenance costs decrease so that new savings are achieved, which flow from investment to consumption. The greater the capital investment, the higher the productivity of labor and the more is saved and spent for investment.<sup>3</sup>

The greater the volume of employment, the greater the gap between the aggregate supply price of the corresponding output and the sum which the entrepreneurs can expect to get back from the expenditure of consumers. Hence, if there is no change in the propensity to consume, employment cannot rise unless at the same time investment is increasing so as to fill

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<sup>3</sup>Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Economics of Peace*, (New York, 1945).

the increasing gap between the aggregate supply price of the output and investment.

Cost of maintenance in any enterprise falls correspondingly to the volume of capital and productivity of work of the said enterprise.

It is a fact that the volume of the work needed for standard consumption represents a steadily diminishing quantity and the amount of work needed for production of capital goods steadily increases. Thus the increase in production grows more than the increase in consumption. A steady profit on invested capital is assured by the accruing investment and creation of depreciation reserves.<sup>4</sup>

The increasing profit on investment represents an advantage for capital and a relative disadvantage for consumption.

The accelerated tempo of capital investment in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, is based on the principle that accumulated capital saves labor and reduces costs of production, with the result that the released labor is used in production of capital goods.

According to the long-range national plans, employment in industry will be expanded rapidly in all satellite countries in the next five to six years. The revised long-range economic plans in the above listed Iron Curtain countries fixed the figure exceeding 3 million new workers, who were expected to be absorbed into manufacturing, building and mining by 1953. Such an extension of employment in industry and service occupations would raise many problems of capital formation. The basic data on current investment, its allocation and the present level of capital per worker in industry are of great importance.

The main issue will be whether the rate of investment will be sufficient to provide the capital equipment needed to absorb new workers into industry at the same time as an increase in the amount of capital per worker takes place through the modernization of industry and the development of heavy industries. The available information indicates that gross capital per worker was, on the average, lower than in Western Europe. Gross annual capital per worker has been assumed to be about 1,500 dollars at 1938 prices.<sup>5</sup>

In ten principal West European countries this ratio varied from 2,750 to 3,000 dollars. If the satellite countries intend to attain the West European level of capital investment, they must raise the annual allocations of funds for capital investment to about 3,000 dollars. According to this assumption, the amount of 9,000 x 780,000, viz., 3,340 million dollars at 1938 prices, or 334 billion Czechocrowns, will be needed for the scheduled increase in manpower in Czechoslovakia of 780,000 men. The revised Five Year Plan in Czechoslovakia estimates the need for investment at 558 billion Czechocrowns, of which 223 billion Czechocrowns are to be spent for new plant and dwelling construction; thus 335 billion Czechocrowns

<sup>4</sup>Cp. Keynes, Boulding and R. M. Berri, *Logiques d'un nouveau capitalisme*, (Paris, 1946).

<sup>5</sup>*Economic Survey of Europe 1949*, (Geneva, United Nations, 1950), p. 217.

(3,350 million dollars at 1938 prices) should remain for capital investment. This indicates that Czechoslovakia intends to cover not only the necessary gross capital for new workers but also an adequate increase in gross capital per worker in general, including also aged workers.

A similar trend can be traced in Poland, Hungary and other satellite countries.

No doubt the present tempo of industrialization in all satellite countries is based on the idea that the final target of steadily increasing investment must be a greater productivity of capital and labor based on a greater production, since production in its turn is an investment function. Investment is a saving function; and saving is dependent on capital accumulation. It is supposed that investment is equal to savings, although the eventual discrepancy is one of the main reasons for business cycles (economic fluctuations). In some underdeveloped countries such as Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, industrialization is necessary to raise the comparatively low standard of living and to remove the steadily growing under-employment of the peasantry. Some adjustment in the industrialization of Poland and Hungary was also recommendable, but no expansion of the postwar industrial potential is economically sound in Czechoslovakia.

Since labor income is essentially a consumption income, saving is generally based on the income of people representing the higher brackets of population, whose income originates more from the yield of rented houses, stocks and capital invested in business enterprises than from labor. Since capitalists deriving income from rents, profits and so forth do not exist in the Iron Curtain countries and the labor income has been more or less equalized, the increase in private voluntary saving was slight. As a matter of fact, leading government officials, actors, writers, Stakhanovites, shockworkers and innovators show a greater income than standard workers, but the wage and salary differentials are not so great as they were before World War II. At that time presidents of large concerns had a salary of about 300,000 dollars, while the average annual wage of a standard workman did not exceed 300 dollars annually. It is remarkable that this gap was far greater in Middle Europe than in the U.S. or any other country in the West.

After the inauguration of long-range plans the annual increase in savings did not appear adequate for increasing investment.

This lack of voluntary saving gave impetus to compulsory saving derived from commodity taxes (turnover or sales tax). This tax is not only the backbone of recent budgets in all satellite countries but a basis for steadily growing investment. It provides for about on half to three fourths of the government revenue in the captive countries. The commodity tax is a resource not immediately dependent on the success of profitability of an individual plant. This tax operates, rather, directly as an instrument of accumulation of capital for the state budget. Funds accumulated in the plant as tax revenue are distributed among various plants and industrial branches according to the Economic Plan in order to expand production.



Every manager is expected to secure a high return of the commodity tax in addition to the profit.

Not even Communist economists in the captive countries could change the classical Keynes' equation: Savings = Investment ( $S = I$ ). They, however, misinterpreted another of Keynes' principles: "Current investment means an addition to the value of the capital equipment which has resulted from the production activity of the relative period". When translated into communistic lingo this principle was changed as follows: When the working class is not inclined to save, it must work at wage rates fixed by the government. These rates are not low in comparison to the prewar level, but are subject to a heavy wage tax. In addition, the prices of all commodities include an extremely high sales tax which amounts on the average to about 40-50 percent of the selling price of the relative product. Thus it is possible to invest huge amounts during the present long-range economic plans in all captive countries.

These taxes represent "compulsory savings". They are based on balanced budgets, on profits of national enterprises, covering not only the necessary depreciation quotas but all investment as well. They are similar to national insurance contributions which create the huge reserves of these mighty organizations in all satellite countries. Voluntary, individual savings were converted into compulsory insurance contributions.

This commodity tax, which generally equals planned investment, is involved in prices of commodities. When the Five Year Plan was launched in Czechoslovakia the level of voluntary savings and the accumulation of capital in national enterprises derived from current profits and depreciation quotas was not adequate to meet the requirements for investment scheduled in the first long-range plan. Similar conditions prevailed in other satellite countries.

*Development of Deposits in Czechoslovakia*  
(in millions of Czechocrowns) \*

	Savings	Current accounts
January 1946	9,436	
June 1946	28,837	
December 1946	47,188	
June 1947	67,327	
February 1948	29,854	48,997
December 1948	32,787	46,202
February 1949	35,915	62,909
April 1949	36,117	78,714
December 1949	36,058	126,820

This table demonstrates a striking difference between the development in savings on the one hand and deposits in current accounts on the other. In the period of 1948-49, there was a slight increase in savings but

\*One Czechocrown was equal to two cents.

a great growth in short term deposits (payable on call), which constitute social savings, but cannot be used to finance long term investment.

Dr. Dolansky, Minister of Finance in Czechoslovakia between 1946-1949, stated the following causes for the low savings level: political troubles at home, the political situation abroad, crop failure in 1947-48, a revised property tax and increase on the property tax, leading to hoarding. It was determined that extensive propaganda is necessary to create new savings which must be anonymous.<sup>6</sup>

It is noteworthy that the increase in savings was also slight in other captive countries. Since it did not cover the required investment, compulsory saving in the form of heavy commodity taxes was introduced in all Iron Curtain countries.

As a matter of fact, the present conditions in the three principal industrial countries of Western Europe, Great Britain, Western Germany and France, are not better. Each country, in its own way, is beginning to show the effects of a low level of individual savings.

During the recent years of spectacular growth, Great Britain has been putting into the improvement and maintenance of her basic industry hardly enough to keep it going, much less to expand it. British economists put the figure for gross investment in fixed capital during 1951 at nine percent of the gross national product. In France it was 13 percent and in West Germany 14 percent.

The French and German rates of investment are higher than in Great Britain, but they have been sustained by a form of "forced savings" that Great Britain has not applied. Germany and France used the local currency counterpart of United States aid (under the Marshall Plan for the most part) as a fund for financing productive investment. In Western Europe as a whole about six billion dollars of investment, if housing is included, has been so financed since the middle of 1948. France and West Germany can claim the greater part of this amount.

The counterpart sums of money consist of funds withdrawn from the economy for wheat, cotton and other aid-financed imports of raw materials. In Great Britain such funds have managed to flow through the normal government budget channels with the net result that the need for the government to have recourse to inflationary financing is reduced. In France and West Germany, however, these funds constitute the largest source of investment finance for industry.

The real resources that are thus converted into investment are not voluntary savings, but they are extracted from the economy by a process that can continue only as long as there is large-scale outside aid. In France and West Germany, it is realized, that this aid is coming to an end soon, viz. in 1957, when the United States plan to drop further assistance to West European countries.

The British have refrained from using counterpart funds to make up

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<sup>6</sup>*First Czechoslovak Five Year Economic Plan, (Prague, 1948).*

for the absence of private savings which were not growing because of a low rate of interest. And while the French and West Germans have done more to build up their industries in the past, they have worked themselves into a position where, in the absence of outside aid, they may turn out to fare worse than Great Britain in the future.

In all three countries the only significant form of private savings at present is that practiced by companies that do not pay out the profits they earn but invest them in new plant and equipment (self-financing). However, this means that only going concerns and their affiliates can develop, while it is the vital new establishments, which keep an economy lively and competitive, that cannot get money. This means that both the French and West German economy have been developing on a very conservative basis, just supporting old established concerns and omitting all new ventures which had usually led to overspeculation and business depression. Yet the shortage of savings is now emerging as the fundamental limitation of the rate of innovation.

In all three West European countries the remedies proposed seem to be out of date—more incentives for private enterprise, lower taxes on industry and on incomes and drastic curtailment of government expenditures.

It is also hoped that the propensity to consume will decline in the future since the depleted stock of household equipment, clothing and other consumers' goods in all three West European countries will soon be replenished with products of industrial concerns which are working at full capacity at present. If this expectation proves true, a greater part of the national income may be put aside as savings and converted into investment when necessary. However, it is understood on all sides that it is much easier to destroy the machinery by which an economy provides for its future than to repair it or build it anew.

In addition to the gross investment of France and Great Britain in 1938-49, listed on page 48 of this article, I wish to demonstrate the recent development in the three West European countries.

*National Income and Gross Investment in Great Britain, France  
and West Germany (in billions of national currency)<sup>1</sup>*

	1949	1950	1951
Great Britain:			
National income	10.291	10.665	11.284
Gross public and private investment	1.669	1.529	2.249
France:			
National income	6,539	7,117	9,082
Gross public investment	134	135	180
Gross private investment	1,680	1,729	2,392
West Germany:			
National Income	63.2	71.7	90.2
Gross public and private investment	16.954	20.45	28.925

<sup>1</sup>Statistical Yearbook 1952, (New York, United Nations), pp. 406-14.



*Investment as the Principal Factor in Communist Countries*

The liberal principle that consumption increases simultaneously with production, but comparatively less than investment, is no longer valid in the Communist economies. The volume of investment is a constant, whereas the output of consumer goods is a variable dependent on the allocation of raw materials, fuel and manpower. The results of the planned economies in both the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries prove that the targets fixed for heavy industry are very high as compared to the prewar peak years, and yet they are usually fulfilled. Production figures fixed for all branches of the consumer goods industry are comparatively low and even these low targets are sometimes not attained.

Stalin found the means of an authoritative solution in a rapid industrialization, particularly in the field of heavy industry. This principle has been applied in all Iron Curtain countries.

In "capitalist countries" the ratio between investment and consumption is the base for the actual entrepreneur's profit or potential profit. The entrepreneur sacrifices present savings for investment if there is prospect of a greater yield than the current or standard rate of interest. The profit is, therefore, a pure dynamic conception resulting from two different time periods.

This "classical" principle cannot be applied in Communist countries, where the ratio of consumption to investment has been fixed in all long-range economic plans. The profit factor is not so important as in a liberal economy, although the government (state) appears as entrepreneur.

A salient feature in the present plans in the captive countries is the emphasis laid on the development of heavy industry. Since this tendency has been evident from 1949 and is combined with a more extensive modernization of old equipment, the rate of investment was raised considerably above the level of 1946-48. The proportion of national income allocated to investment has been increased to the level exceeding that in West European countries.

The present tempo of accelerated investment in industry in the captive countries proves that these countries are still in the first stage of development of the consumption-to-investment ratio. This industrialization includes not only the backward countries such as Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, but Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany as well, although the latter two countries were considered overindustrialized after World War II. Communist leaders and economists promise that the second stage will come soon, as soon as this ratio is changed, insofar as the increase in production will be divided to the comparative advantage of consumption and disadvantage of investment. The latest development in the United States, in which the standard of living was doubled during the last 20 years, is demonstrated as a feasible goal.

The government's actions in the satellite countries are intended as an adjusting factor to provide means which will affect the growth of capital equipment to such an extent that the saturation point (maturity

of industry) will be attained at a rate which would not put a disproportionate burden on the standard of living of the present generation in favor of the next generation.

"The disproportion between the economic system and technical progress leads to a critical point in the economy, which means a permanent depression. In 1930 this critical point was reached in several countries," assert some Communist economists.

Poland and Czechoslovakia passed the critical point for the following reasons: 1, The decrease in capital investment interrupted during World War II is more than offset by the expulsion of Germans and confiscation of their property. This means that a greater part of capital investment is allocated to each unit of the labor force and productivity of labor must rise. 2, Even though the total population decreased, maintenance costs are to fall, not equally with the decrease of the population, but faster, because the land, buildings and other capital goods with marginal profit are no longer used. 3, New expansion of exports is expected to consume the goods equivalent of labor saved by new investment, or a higher consumption of export goods at home without new investment. 4, New production created by increased productivity will be absorbed by new investment in capital goods and by increased consumption of consumer goods, viz., extensive public works and intensification of consumption.

Since the Soviet economy did not reach the critical point, it is presented as a model economy to all captive countries including Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, although these are highly industrialized countries, based on entirely different economic factors.

In the capitalistic world the greatest task at this critical point is to solve increased consumption. Before reaching the critical point the situation is quite simple, since the potential investment is greater than the actual supply of savings. Consumption demand competes with investment demand and represents a retarding factor in the development of new investment. Such is the opinion of Communist economists.

A definite solution could be found in an economic system which would intensify consumption to such an extent that it would reach the limits of productivity. This system does not exist in the world to-day.

Several systems were theoretically worked out and tested by such eminent economists as Gunnar Myrdal, Keynes, Beveridge and the members of the brain trust of the late President F. D. Roosevelt.

It is not easy to regulate consumption which is more or less a constant in the well known Keynes' national income equation. Therefore, Communist leaders in the captive countries are promoting investment at a fixed level to establish new factories and plants producing consumer goods in the future. The accelerated tempo of investment outlined in the present long-range plans was increased further after the outbreak of the Korean War. Thus production of consumer goods has been neglected. Investment in Czechoslovakia and other captive countries is hampered neither by the

lack of savings, since compulsory savings are available, nor by the profit factor which is a determinant in the capitalistic economy.

Practically no investments were made in the property confiscated from the Germans and traitors in Czechoslovakia and Poland. On the contrary, some industrial equipment was transferred from the former German districts to Eastern provinces. It is also noteworthy that the private segment of industry which existed in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the first two or three years after 1945 used far more funds allocated for investment than the nationalized segment. In the first years after the cessation of hostilities very poor results in investment were achieved in mining, foundries, power and chemical industries, despite the support of the government.

In all captive countries investment is growing more quickly than national income. However, this is not true of the Soviet Union. Seemingly, the Soviet Union is considered adequately equipped with capital goods; more attention is now being paid to the production of consumer goods to raise the present standard of living of the Soviet people to that prevailing in the captive countries.

In 1951 Czechoslovakia and Hungary revised their Five Year Plans. In the same year Poland, Eastern Germany and Bulgaria announced substantial upward revisions in the targets for the next years. All plans provide for much higher rates of increase in investment in relation to national income. The expansion of investment in fixed capital in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria depends to a considerable extent upon imports of capital equipment from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

*Indices of National Income and Investment in 1950 and 1951<sup>a</sup>*  
*Preceding year = 100*

Country	National Income			Investment in fixed capital		
	1950	1951	1952 <sup>b</sup>	1950	1951	1952
Bulgaria	116	130		114	138*	
Czechoslovakia	107	110	115*	140	121*	117*
Hungary	120	123	105	167	145	125
Poland	121	112	110	153	138	122
Rumania	125	120		139	130	
Soviet Union	121	112	111	123	112	111

There is a tremendous difference between the investment level in the first postwar years and under the present long-range economic plans.

This survey proves that the results of the investment policy are different not only in the West and East but even in individual countries of the Soviet orbit. In "old" industrial countries, including Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, the ratio of depreciation and maintenance to new investment is comparatively very high, but "new" industrial countries, such as Hungary and Yugoslavia, show a surprising progress in net investment in fixed capital:

\*My estimates.

<sup>a</sup>World Economic Report 1950-51, (New York, United Nations) p. 29.

<sup>b</sup>World Economic Report 1951-52, (New York, United Nations), p. 45.



*Investment in Fixed Capital in 1938-49*  
(in millions of dollars at 1938 prices)<sup>10</sup>

Country	Gross investment in fixed capital				Depreciation and maintenance				Net investment in fixed capital			
	1938	1947	1948	1949	1938	1947	1948	1949	1938	1947	1948	1949
Czechoslovakia	285	250	285	295	165	188	190	192	120	62	95	103
East Germany	900	250	390	530	400	250	270	290	500	—	120	240
Hungary	71	42	107	170	54	54	56	60	17	12	51	110
Poland	354	291	352	436	216	210	216	222	138	81	136	214
Yugoslavia	92	156	203	258	55	56	62	68	37	100	141	190
Great Britain	3583	3710	3930	4120	1967	1855	1950	2050	1616	1855	1980	2070
France	1665	2210	2333	2470	1435	1410	1434	1462	230	800	899	1080

Under the present long-range plans the volume of investment is increasing rapidly. However, it can be expected that depreciation and maintenance will substantially rise within the next five or six years as soon as the present huge investment begins to deteriorate.

*Investment of Some Captive Countries under Long-Range Plans*  
(in millions of dollars converted at current rates of exchange) \*

Year	Yugoslavia <sup>11</sup>	Czechoslovakia <sup>12</sup>	Hungary <sup>13</sup>	Poland <sup>14</sup>
1950	484	1,840	809	2,809
1951	460	2,100	997	4,023
1952	360	2,460	1,321	4,813
1953		2,300	1,619	6,000 (estimate)
1954			1,960 (est.)	8,000 (estimate)

Thus Poland ranks second (after Great Britain) and Czechoslovakia fourth (after Great Britain, France and Western Germany) in investment in fixed capital.

It is noteworthy that under the first short-term economic plans in 1947-49 almost proportionate volumes of funds were allocated to industry, transport plus agriculture, and dwellings plus public service. From 1950 the share of industrial investment rose to 40-60 percent of total allocations. Investment in dwellings and transport was substantially reduced.

\*It must be stressed that the intrinsic value of the U. S. dollar in 1950-53 was almost half the 1938 value.

<sup>10</sup>*Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, (Geneva, United Nations), p. 29.

<sup>11</sup>Figures for 1951-52 based on the report of Boris Kidrič, Chairman of the Economic Council to the Yugoslav Federation of Trade Unions, on October 12, 1951. The 1951 investment figure was 95 percent of 1950 (*World Economic Report 1951-52*, New York, United Nations, p. 45.)

<sup>12</sup>Based on the announcements of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office.

<sup>13</sup>Investment in 1950—Zoltan Vas, *Tasks of the Second Year of the Five Year Plan, in 1951—Nepszava* (Budapest), December 18, 1951, in 1952—*Nepszava*, December 17, 1952, in 1953—*Nepszava*, *ibid*.

<sup>14</sup>Investment in 1950—Polish Fiscal Act in *Dziennik Ustaw*, Warsaw, April 20, 1950. 1951-53—*Inwestycje i Budownictwo*, Warsaw, January-February 1953.

*Distribution of Planned Investment in East-Mid-European Countries*  
(in millions of dollars in 1948 prices and percentage of the total)

Country and Period	Capital Expenditure		Percentage distribution of investment				
	Total	Yearly	Industry	Transport & Trade	Agriculture	Dwellings	Public service
Poland 1947-49 <sup>15</sup>	3,975	1,325	36	21	9	16	18
1950-55	49,600	8,267	55.6	16.4	9	13.9	5.1
Czechoslovakia 1947-48 <sup>16</sup>	1,340	670	36	22	7	20	15
1949-53	11,160	2,232	40.6	17.2	8	11.7	22.5
Hungary 1947-49 <sup>17</sup>	570	190	32	27	9	12	20
1950-54	7,242	1,448	51.7	13	12.9	7.6	14.8
Rumania 1949-50 <sup>18</sup>	1,140	570	47.2	20	9.4	5.2	18.2
1950-54	6,000	1,200	48.2	18.4	13.1	5.2	15.1
Yugoslavia 1947-51 <sup>19</sup>	2,900	580	43	26	8	23	
Bulgaria 1947-48 <sup>20</sup>	221	110.5	45	15	6	11	23
1949-52	2,100	525	43.1	18.8	17.9	4.5	18.8

Since actual investment is dependent on the available raw materials and adequate labor supply, it is expected that the planned allocations of funds for current investment under the long-range plans will not be spent. Yugoslavia, for example, cut substantially her investment expenditure for 1951-52. Czechoslovakia reduced the 1953 allocation by 16.1 percent. Poland never attained the scheduled average investment of 8,267 million dollars. Iron Curtain countries promote production of investment goods for reproduction of further capital goods or consumer commodities. Construction works on highways, waterways, railroads, new schools, libraries and so forth are very limited, since these public works do not represent an investment with profitable yield but an investment in public interests only. Moreover such investment does not increase the war potential of the country.

The ratio between profitable and consumption investment in the short-term economic plans was the criterion of the function of credit. It was questionable whether the old function of credit would be maintained or impaired. Similar apprehensions were expressed concerning the function of money and the price system. It was expected that the available savings and the proceeds of taxes would not cover the government expenditure and

<sup>15</sup>*Plan Szescioletni*, Warsaw, 1952 and *Inwestycje i Budownictwo*, Warsaw, January-February 1953.

<sup>16</sup>Dolanský, *Revised Five Year Plan*, in *Rudé Právo*, Prague, February 27, 1951. Investment in 1951—*Rudé Právo*, January 3, 1952, in 1952—*Rudé Právo*, January 30, 1953 and in 1953—*Rudé Právo*, September 16, 1953.

<sup>17</sup>*Economic Survey of Europe since the War*, (United Nations, Geneva, 1953), pp. 24 and 30.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.* and *Scanteia*, Bucharest, December 16, 1950 and August 23, 1953.

<sup>19</sup>*Ekonomist* (Yugoslav Economic Magazine) Belgrade, 1947-1951.

<sup>20</sup>*Economic Survey of Europe since the War*, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 and 30. The Five Year Plan in Bulgaria was fulfilled in four years, 1949-52, instead of in 1949-53.

consumers' investment to bring the production level to the limit of its capacity. Credit expansion, consuming all accumulated savings, and monetary expansion were expected.

The first economic plans allocated most funds for replacement, war reconstruction works and maintenance. Only a few new investment works were outlined in these short-term plans. Only about 30-35 percent of the value of investment affected the money market; the rest was represented by the depreciation quota of the existing investment.

In the current long-range plans this ratio was changed. About 30-35 percent of investment represents replacement and maintenance. Indirect investments amounting to about 10 percent are the equivalent of financial transfers for existing buildings, transport of industrial equipment, purchase of patents, licences and utilization rights. They do not affect the supply of raw materials and manpower.

#### *National Income*

In a socialist economy the role played by national income seems to be more important than in "capitalistic" countries. It is, however, analysed from the same three angles: 1, its ratio to the gross national product; 2, its sources, particularly the portion derived from earnings; 3, its spending, especially the ratio between investment and consumption.

Gross national income equals the aggregate of all products plus services rendered in a certain country within a fixed period. In the same way it can be said that there is an equation between production of goods and creation of incomes, since gross national income equals the gross national product. Thus the aggregate of incomes created during production of all goods or rendering of services within a fixed period represents the gross national income.

Net national income equals the gross national income less amounts allocated to the depreciation fund and "transfer" incomes, such as unemployment benefits, government subsidies to farmers, manufacturers, traders and similar items. Net national product is the value of gross national product diminished by amounts which were used as compensation for obsolete production equipment, corresponding to the depreciation quotas.<sup>21</sup>

In the U.S.S.R. another method for computation of the national income was introduced. The value of the gross national income less the income of servants of public agencies, professional services and passenger transportation constitutes the net national income.

National income is the backbone of national planning; therefore a correct estimate of the national income is of paramount importance for the Socialist economy of Czechoslovakia, and other satellite countries.

The shrinkage of national income in the great depression was very serious in Czechoslovakia, since the total loss reached 74 billion Czechocrowns between 1931-37, as compared to 1929, but it was not so steep as in other East-Central European countries.

<sup>21</sup>J. R. Hicks, *The Social Framework*, (Oxford, 1943), p. 119.



*Net National Income in East-Central European Countries*  
(in billions of national currency)

	1929		1934	Decrease
	National currency	Million dollars	National currency	in per- centage
Czechoslovakia (Kč)	66.1	1,962	56	15
Bulgaria (levas)	56.2	347	34.5	39
Hungary (pengoe)	5.89	1,077	3.54	40
Rumania (lei)	201	973	99	51
Yugoslavia (Dinar)	69	1,495	32	54

The unemployment figures in Czechoslovakia, 738,300 jobless in 1933, 622,700 in 1936 and 408,949 in 1937, prove the correlation between unemployment and national income. The industrial production index (1929 = 100) showed a similar trend, since it was 60,2 in 1933, 80,2 in 1936 and 96,3 in 1937.<sup>22</sup>

Czechoslovakia did not lose so much as the other East-Central European countries, since she was not so dependent on the value of agricultural products as her neighbors in South-Eastern Europe. Moreover, she introduced rigid prices for chief agricultural products supported by substantial government subsidies.

Since World War II, the development of the national income in Czechoslovakia has shown a trend similar to other East-Mid-European countries.

*Net National Income in Billions of National Currency<sup>23</sup>*  
(at current prices)

	Price index 1938 = 100						
Country	1938	1947	Index	1948	Index	1949	Index
Czechoslovakia	58.6	194	312	213	352	260	342
Hungary*	5.5	15.5	460	25.2	472	39.5	472
Poland*	19.8	1,490	7,900	1,930	10,000	2,220	12,000
Yugoslavia*	54.2	157	350	215	370	228	360

In 1953, the net national income should have reached 395 billion Czechocrowns in Czechoslovakia, 63.2 billion forints in Hungary and 4,700 billion old złotys (or 141 billion new złotys) in Poland. During 1950-52 the annual rate of increase was 12-15 percent in all captive countries.

Czechoslovak Communist experts adopted the Soviet scheme for the computation of the national income. Therefore, Czechoslovak estimates include not only the volume of production but all types of services embracing even the public sector. And just the share of the latter increased considerably during 1937-49.

In 1947 the national income reached the prewar level, although the

\*Corresponding exchange rates of listed countries were, Hungarian forint = 8.52, Polish złoty = 0.25 and Yugoslavian dinar = two cents.

<sup>22</sup>*Annuaire statistique de la République Tchèqueoslovaque*. Published annually by the State Statistical Office, Prague.

<sup>23</sup>*Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, (United Nations, Geneva, 1950), pp. 236 and 273.

1937 production volume was not attained in 1947. That proves that the increase in production did not keep pace with the increase in wages.

*Czechoslovak National Income in 1929-53*

Year	Amount in billions of Czechocrowns <sup>24</sup>
1929	66.1
1933	52.6
1938	55.2
1945	91.2
1946	155.4 (after the depreciation of currency by 200%)
1947	194
1948	213
1949	260
1950	278
1951	306
1952	352
1953 (plan)	395

In 1946 Czechoslovaks spent 78 percent of their income for consumer goods and services. The rest of the national income was consumed by the government. In 1947, the consumption ratio decreased to 76 percent and public expenditures to 19 percent; so five percent of the national income was invested. In the first two post-war years the development in spending the national income was a little different from that of 1937.

*Personal Expenditure on Consumer Goods and Services  
(in millions of Czechocrowns)*

	1937 <sup>25</sup>	1946 <sup>26</sup>	1947 <sup>27</sup>
Food	48,147	45,390	44,650
Beverages	7,911	10,259	13,958
Tobacco	7,880	6,200	9,150
Rents	2,920	4,800	4,800
Fuel and illumination	3,395	4,182	4,866
Non perishable consumer goods	6,304	2,500	5,000
Other household utensils	2,581	950	1,632
Wearing apparel	12,840	13,044	17,500
Printed matters	3,091	3,850	2,800
Private automobiles	448	150	200
Transportation and telephone	3,259	4,680	5,321
Entertainment	771	1,500	1,786
Other goods and services	9,023	—	—
Total	109,096	101,205	120,580

Considering the "rent freeze" in most apartment houses, the increase in rent is surprising, and so is the increase in expenditure for fuel, illumina-

<sup>24</sup>*Statistical Yearbook 1952*, (New York, United Nations), p. 406 for 1936-38. Other figures from periodical statements of the State Statistical Office, Prague, and *First Czechoslovak Economic Five Year Plan*, (Prague, 1948), Ministry of Information.

<sup>25</sup>In prices of 1946.

<sup>26</sup>In prices of the respective year.

<sup>27</sup>In prices of the respective year.

tion, transport and telephone. The remarkable decrease in consumption of non-perishable goods and household utensils proves that these two categories of goods were not available on the market. Expenditure for beverages, tobacco and entertainment increased because the population had no other channels for spending their earnings. Consumption of wearing apparel increased in value but not in quantity, since it was strictly rationed.

According to the sources, the national income in Czechoslovakia was divided as follows: (in millions of Czechocrowns)<sup>28</sup>

	1937	1946	1947
Rents on buildings and lands	2,220	4,958	5,950
Profits of entrepreneurs and liberal professions and national enterprises	21,803	47,345	60,334
Salaries including pensions	20,033	51,100	60,958
Wages	14,534	51,997	67,158
Total national income	58,590	155,400	194,400

*Distribution of the National Income according to the Recipients  
(in billions of Czechocrowns)*

	1938	1946
Income from farms and forestry	9.33	29.61
Entrepreneurial income (industry, trade and professions)	7.66	13.78
Wages and salaries, including pensions	30.74	102.76
Income from capital	2.84	0.53
Rentals and sub-rentals	1.77	4.34
Public income transfers (social insurance benefits, relief payments)	2.58	13.47
Deblocking of frozen money in banks		9.34
Personal income	54.87	172.83
Undistributed profits of corporations	0.4	- 1.66
Profits of public enterprises (tobacco)	2.55	3.98
Employers' contributions to social insurance	1.42	—
Public income transfers	- 2.58	- 13.472
Deblocking of money		- 9.34
Government subsidies		- 4.25
Net national income	56.66	148.08

The changes in the composition of the national income are particularly striking in the following items: entrepreneurial income and capital income; both shrank considerably if the depreciation of currency is taken into account. On the other hand, wages and fringe payments increased in excess of the depreciation coefficient. It is obvious that the distribution of the national income in the U.S. is entirely different.

<sup>28</sup>Miloš Stádník, *Národní Důchod a Vydání v Československu*, (Prague, 1947).



*Distribution of the National Income in U.S. according to Origin (1919-35)*<sup>29</sup>

Economic group	Percentage of the total			
	Minimum	Year	Maximum	Year
Agriculture	6.8	1932	18.6	1919
Manufacturing	17	1932	25.6	1920
Mining	1.7	1932	3.8	1920
Construction	1.3	1933	3.8	1924
Transport	9.7	1923-24	12.6	1932
Trade (Commerce)	11.3	1934	15.1	1921
Finance and real estate	10.8	1920	15.4	1932
Service	8.6	1920	14.3	1932
Government	2	1919	16.3	1933
Miscellaneous	2.7	1930	4	1934

The American national income was divided by productive function, commodity production 37.6 percent, transport and distribution 19.9 percent and services 42.4 percent on the average between 1919-35.

*Distribution of the American National Income according to the Type*<sup>30</sup>

Source	Percentage of the total			
	Minimum	Year	Maximum	Year
Employees' earnings	67.8	1921	74	1935
Entrepreneurs' net income	10.5	1932-34	16.8	1919
Dividends on shares, etc.	4.5	1933	7.8	1930
Interest on savings, etc.	5.1	1920	10.8	1932
Rent	2.2	1934	6.5	1922

Even in the U.S. the share of the service income of 81 percent is very high, whereas the property income accounted for only 19 percent in 1929-38.<sup>31</sup>

*Banking system*

Financing and banking systems in all captive countries are very simple, since the central bank, which is a bank of issue, governs monopolistically the entire system. All central banks provide economic units (enterprises) with working capital through the single account system. All financial transactions of the national (state) enterprises have to pass through this bank which provides working capital upon request. Such loans must, of course, be duly approved by the Central Planning Office or be backed by approved operation plans. In brief, the National (State) Banks in all captive countries finance all short-term transactions of nationalized economic units. Any private enterprise applying for a loan to the state bank or treasury may be placed under public control. State banks in the Iron Curtain countries play a different role from the central banks in the West. The national economy, and investment in particular, is not dependent on

<sup>29</sup>Simon Kuznets, *National Income and Capital Formation, 1919-35*, (New York, 1937), National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 15.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>31</sup>Simon Kuznets, *Uses of National Income*, (New York, 1942), National Bureau of Economic Research. Occasional Paper 6. March 1942, p. 38.

the money market, discount policy or open market operations, as is the case in the West.

Investment banks were established to finance and control investment activities in mining, manufacturing, transportation and important sectors of building. Thus this type of bank is practically a financial department of the Central Planning Office. The funds at its disposal are allocated by the central and local government budgets. The amounts earmarked in these budgets for investment are transferred to this Bank. It can draw upon the National (State) Bank. It handles the depreciation fund of industry. All industrial enterprises, state and private, pay regular contributions to this fund in proportion to their sales. All enterprises of a larger or medium size have to secure a permit from the Central Planning Office before carrying out any capital outlay not included in their plan. Only small investments are allowed without special authorization.

Each national enterprise must open an investment account with the Investment Bank regardless of the volume of transactions carried on it. Each year all national enterprises are obliged to deposit with the Bank the equivalent of the relative depreciation quota; the Investment Bank advances loans to finance construction and equipment investment approved under the current economic plans in the Iron Curtain countries until the completion of this investment. The necessary working capital is provided by the State Bank and people's banks.

The functions and activities of the Investment Bank are manifold. It issues long-term debentures, aids in planning investment funds and disbursing as well as controlling expenditures to assure that they are made only for specific purposes according to the Plan. Applications for loans covering new investments must be supported by plans pertaining to the proposed investment, all calculations and computations regarding the project in question, economic agreements, investment sheets and production plans.

All agricultural loan and savings cooperatives, savings banks, general and traders' loan institutions were converted into People's Credit Banks. Generally, only one People's Credit Bank is now permitted in any community. They are authorized to accept deposits and administer them without risk of loss, and to encourage thrift. They may advance loans to members and in special cases even to non-members. They are, however, not permitted to establish new industrial enterprises.

County People's Banks, located in seats of individual counties, are central and supervising organizations of their member cooperatives in their areas. In general, they act as clearing houses for local People's Credit Banks. Central People's Credit Banks in state or provincial capitals act as clearing houses, accept surplus funds on deposit, grant loans and act as agents in all transactions with securities, and supervise the member banks.

Cash money requirements of the national enterprises, government agencies and private sections of the economy must be checked and controlled by the bank of issue. Communist economists contend that the fluctuation of money in circulation is dependent on the balance of payments be-

tween national enterprises and agencies of the public economy on the one hand, and the population on the other, since a great proportion of circulation is created by payments of the national enterprises and the government agencies in the form of wages, salaries and payments for agricultural products.

Mutual payments between national enterprises, including financial institutions, must be made in cash. All short-term loans necessary as working capital for national enterprises must be supported by trade agreements concluded between individual national enterprise and/or a government agency. In addition, the prospective borrower must present proof that the production in question is secured by deliveries of the necessary raw materials, semi-finished products, tools and accessories in due time.

In this way any superfluous production is *a priori* excluded. All national enterprises must draw up their financial plans and present them through their district supervising directorates or ministries to the Central Planning Office, which closely cooperates with the bank of issue. Finally, the bank of issue prepares an aggregate plan for cash money requirements and short-term loans for all national enterprises, public administration agencies and new investments.

The goal of the cash-money-requirement plan is to fix and maintain the circulation of currency on an economically sound basis. The Central Planning Office is performing the function of a direct regulator and stabilizer of the currency. The control of cash requirements should discover unsound developments in the nationalized economy, and thus affect the stabilization of the currency.

In Czechoslovakia the National Bank of Czechoslovakia started its activities in May, 1945, with a high volume of money in circulation. After the monetary reform, money in circulation declined to 24,233 million Czechocrowns in December, 1945, as compared to 8,042 million Czechocrowns in December, 1937, corresponding to the depreciation of the currency by 200 percent. But the circulation increased to 58,539 million in December, 1948. To discourage inflation, financial plans were introduced by the government to regulate cash money (liquidity) requirements and credit (investment) requirements.

After 1945 there were 16 banks in Czechoslovakia, which were reduced to eight institutions, viz.: the Živnostenská Bank for large industrial concerns, the Legiobank-Agricultural Bank to handle agricultural and small loans for peasants, artisans and small industry, the Prague Credit Bank, for financing foreign trade, the Central Bank of Cooperatives as a central institute for cooperatives, the Credit Institute of Agricultural Cooperatives, handling loans and deposits of the rural population, and the Land Bank-Rediscounting Institute, negotiating loans for municipalities and local governments, and administering the capital market. In addition, there were two local banks, viz., the Moravian Bank in Brno, for the province of Moravia, and the Slovak-Tatra Bank for Slovakia, and the Postal Savings Bank, which played an important part in collecting small deposits. In



1949, the latter Bank administered 114,248 million Czechocrowns in deposits.

By the end of 1948, all Czech and Moravian banks amalgamated with the Živnostenská Bank, and the Slovak-Tatra Bank became the central commercial bank in Slovakia. The Land Bank-Rediscounting Institute was converted into the Investment Bank. Finally, on February 19, 1950, the Czechoslovak State Bank was established. It is a merger of the National Bank, the Živnostenská Bank, the Slovak-Tatra Bank and the Postal Savings Bank, with share capital of three billion Czechocrowns. Only people's credit banks and the Investment Bank exist in addition.

In Poland the Narodowy Bank Polski (bank of issue) was renewed, the Państwowy Bank Rolny (the State Agricultural Bank) advanced agricultural loans, the Pocztaowa Kasa Oszczednosci (the Postal Savings Bank) offered the same facilities as the same institute in Czechoslovakia. The Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Bank of National Economy) granted government loans. The Państwowy Bank Kommunalny (the State Communal Bank) in Warsaw and a similar institute in Poznań acted as central banks for all local savings banks. The Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych (the Bank of the Federation of Cooperatives) was a central bank for Polish cooperatives, with its main office at Poznań. Another central cooperative bank was established by the merger of the Bank Gospodarstwa Społdzielczego, Centralna Kasa Spółek Rolniczych and Bank Spoleni. The Bank Handlowy (Commercial Bank) in Warsaw was reestablished there to support the "remnants" of private-owned industry and commerce.

Reorganization of the financial system began in 1948 and was completed in 1951 on the strength of the new Polish Constitution of March 22, 1951. The Bank Narodowy Polski became a tool of the governmental financial policy, a clearing house for all national enterprises, The Commercial Bank (Bank Handlowy) in Warsaw takes care of the financial transactions of foreign trade and the Polska Kasa Opieki is in charge of financial transactions of the national insurance. The Financial Co-operatives limit their activities to individual villages or towns, where they have their headquarters. The Agricultural Bank supervises the activities of the local rural cooperatives. The Bank of Crafts and Trade finances handicrafts and retail trade and grants loans to these groups of the population. The Bank Inwestycyjny (Investment Bank) grants loans to local governments and communities, particularly to promote capital investment. The General Savings Bank acts as the central bank for local savings banks. The Municipal Bank finances municipal economy.

Hungary adopted the Soviet banking pattern in April, 1948. The entire banking system was practically transferred into the hands of the National Bank with the exception of investment banks, local savings banks and loan societies. The National Bank has the monopoly of banking services for all national enterprises. The Investment Bank was established to finance and control investment activities.

The Hungarian Bank of Commerce and Industry is a Soviet-owned

bank which is in charge of the various Soviet dominated enterprises. The Bank for International Trade was endowed with the monopoly of banking transactions connected with foreign trade. It cooperates with the Hungarian Bank of Commerce and Industry.

The National Savings Institute is a merger of the country's savings banks and the Postal Savings Bank. It grants short-term credits to small industry and commerce. The Bank of Cooperative Societies, a long established center for rural cooperatives, acts as the central bank for agriculture.

Rumania issued a decree on August 13, 1948, by which all private and public banks and credit institutions were ordered dissolved with the exception of the National Bank, the National Industrial Credit Company (investment bank) the Sovrom Bank and two savings institutions. The Sovrom Bank, a joint Soviet-Rumanian establishment, is now the largest commercial bank in Rumania. It manages and supervises all "Sovrom" industrial companies which represent the bulk of the Rumanian industry, trade and transport.

Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania maintain similar banking institutions headed by the National Bank for cash money and short-term credit services and the Investment Bank to finance and control investment activities. Local deposit and loan societies or cooperatives collect small deposits and grant limited loans to local farmers, peasants, artisans and cooperatives. These savings banks and cooperatives are controlled by central financial institutes in the capitals.

#### *Monetary and Price Policy and Standard of Living*

The price of investment in consumer goods in the communist economy does not represent the money equivalent of the cost of production, nor is it the result of bargaining based on the law of supply and demand. Mr. Hilary Minc, Deputy Prime Minister in Poland, announced: "In a capitalistic state, when you talk about investment you have to ask the question where will money come from. In Poland we do not have to worry about money. We do not care about the amount of money to be spent for raw materials and labor which are needed for a new investment project."

Translated into plain language, this means that some investment must be made in the socialist economy regardless of the production costs. It is obvious that this principle has been applied to almost all investment in heavy and armaments industry in the Iron Curtain countries.

The price policy is the main tool for the equalization of the national income and for its "sound" redistribution in the socialist economy. Reduction in production costs may, therefore, wholly or in part result in increased plant profits or government revenues, instead of in lowered prices. Not more than one third to one half of all cost economies achieved during the first years of the planned economy in captive countries can have been used for the reduction of sales prices.

This policy, followed in all satellite countries on the Soviet pattern,

substantially differs from that followed by the socialist parties before World War II. In that period Socialists supported the idea of high income taxes computed with progressive rates and strongly opposed any "indirect" taxes causing a comparatively high price of food and other consumer goods. After World War II, in the initial stage of socialization, the rates of income tax showed a slight progressive scale, since it was the intention of the Communist leaders to pay incentive wages to Stakhanovites, shockworkers, innovators and similar "supermen" not subject to different rates. On the other hand, they introduced the said commodity taxes which must be paid for by all people regardless of their income level. Thus the purchasing power of current wages and salaries is comparatively low, particularly when people were compelled to purchase a portion of the required consumer goods on a "free market" at exorbitant prices.

All satellite countries faced the choice between two alternatives resulting from the increased productivity, viz., whether the benefits from the increased productivity should be reaped in the form of lower prices while keeping nominal incomes stable, or in the form of higher money incomes while keeping prices stable. Czechoslovakia has chosen the second alternative, which means that the increase in money incomes should be concentrated in precisely those trades the productivity of which has risen. In addition, the double price system prevailing in captive countries offsets the influence of the increased money incomes. In the Soviet Union a series of price reductions has been decreed at the beginning of each year since 1948. The price reductions announced in early 1951 and 1952 were considerably smaller than in the preceding years. This indicates that the rate of increase in the output of consumer goods is now settling down to a normal proportion. The same phenomenon may be followed in all Iron Curtain countries as a result of a steadily increasing volume in production of capital goods. War preparations and stockpiling of strategic commodities after the outbreak of the Korean War strengthened this trend.

All countries belonging to the Soviet orbit intended to keep the prices of basic foodstuffs and other consumer goods on the same level as they were after the cessation of hostilities in 1945. But when rationing of some basic foodstuffs was discontinued, their prices rose. Prices on the free market rose in the first years of the existence of the double price system because wages and salaries increased faster than production. If the free market were abolished this would result in expansion of the black market and speculation. The rising prices of the free market are not a healthy symptom, but at least superfluous purchasing power is being absorbed to the benefit of the state and not of individuals. Thus the private profiteers were replaced by an orderly organized state profiteering system.

In Poland and Hungary the average money earnings of industrial workers increased considerably but not as much as prices. The pace of industrialization is such as to increase the total number of industrial workers, temporarily at any rate, faster than the supply of consumer goods. This difference has been recently accentuated by the diversion of a greater share



of the industrial output to defense programs and capital investment in general.

The structure of relative prices in the East European countries seems to be similar to that of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Czechoslovakia. Prices of basic foodstuffs are fixed at high levels to avoid the necessity for rationing. In Czechoslovakia the prices of rationed goods were only three times as high as before World War II, corresponding to the depreciation of the Czechocrown by about 200 percent, although industrial wages in 1951 were more than four times higher than in the prewar period. There was a consequent need for rationing together with a big overspill of purchasing power onto the free market. High rations for privileged classes of workmen make it possible for these people to avoid buying expensive foodstuffs on the free market. People who were not working in industry and received smaller rations were compelled to purchase a part of the needed foodstuffs on the free market and their standard of living was, therefore, far lower than it had been before World War II. After the monetary reform of May, 1953, Czechoslovakia followed the standard Soviet pattern and derationed all consumer goods.

In Bulgaria industrial consumer goods were derationed in 1951. As in the Soviet Union in 1947, derationing was accompanied by a monetary reform intended to eliminate the possibility of substantial spending in excess of current income out of the cash reserves accumulated by part of the population during the period of rationing and double prices. To this end, the rate of exchange for cash was set at one new leva to 100 old levas (savings deposits were exchanged at more favorable rates) while wages, salaries, pensions and prices paid for compulsory deliveries were converted at the rate of one to 25 levas. The uniform food prices introduced after derationing were substantially higher than the previous ration prices but below free sales prices, while prices of industrial goods were reduced. As a result, the cost of living increased, and an upward adjustment of wages took place. Later in the year, prices both of foods and of some industrial goods, were lowered. The exchange rate is 1.70 leva to 1 ruble, or 6.80 leva to 1 dollar.

In Hungary the situation on the food and consumer goods market improved considerably in the first half of 1952, following the favorable 1951 harvest. Rationing of food, introduced at the beginning of 1951 at the same time as an increase in prices of non-rationed food and industrial goods, was partly abolished at the end of 1951. In 1952 the rationing of meat and fats was abolished, without any increase over previous ration prices. In the third quarter of 1952 prices of bakery products were reduced, and thereafter there was a decline in prices on free markets. Hungary was the only country in which derationing was not accompanied by a monetary reform.

In Rumania the monetary reform was introduced in January, 1952, and the exchange rate for cash varied: 100 old lei to one to 400, with more favorable rates for savings and bank deposits. Wages, salaries, and prices

paid for compulsory deliveries were converted at the rate of one to twenty lei. At this rate of conversion, prices of consumer goods on free sale in government trade were fixed at a level five to 20 percent lower than that prevailing before the reform. According to recent information, worker incomes now amount to 300-650 lei monthly. While wages in general have been frozen since the currency reform, prices have fluctuated considerably. One immediate effect of the monetary reform was to wipe out peasant savings, thereby forcing them to flood all their crop reserves on the "free market" to raise quick cash. This increase in the volume of foodstuffs reduced "free market" prices during the first few months after the currency reform. Goods which are rationed are often unavailable. The following comparative prices in lei (11.02 lei are worth one dollar) give a general picture of purchasing power left to the worker:

Commodity:	On ration	On "free market"
1 loaf of rye bread (700 grams)	0.70	2.-
1 kilo of pork	7.-	20.-
1 kilo of beef	4.80	7.56
1 quart of milk	1.10	3.-
1 shirt	25.-	80.-
1 pair of shoes	70.-	250.-
1 pair of socks	2.60	8.-
1 man's suit	200 - 300	1,000 - 1,500

Poland was another exception to the general rule of the price and marketing policy in East-Central Europe. After the monetary reform introduced on October 28, 1950, which fixed the value of one złoty at 25 cents, the rationing of meat and fats was re-introduced in 1951, followed in 1952 by rationing of some other consumer goods. The prices of these goods on the free market were raised considerably.

On January 3, 1953, the Polish government abolished the rationing system, fixing new prices for goods and services, and revising wage scales. Although Poland now produces 15 percent more food than before World War II for a population which has decreased by ten million, some food shortages have developed. It seems that large-scale food exportation and stock-piling are the chief causes of the present shortages.

When the Six Year Plan was inaugurated, the Polish government promised that by 1955 the standard of living would increase by 60 percent over that of 1949. But in 1953 real wages and thus the standard of living went down. Peasants sold only their surpluses for higher prices than those of 1951, but the bulk of their production was taken over by the state at very low prices through compulsory deliveries, so that the state earned the resulting profit.

While the average monthly wage increased from 500 złotys to 750 złotys from January 1951 to January 1953, the most important commodities show the following increase in the same period of time (in złotys):<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup>Based on publications of the *Wiadomości Statystyczne*, August 16 and October 1, 1951, *Gazeta Handlowa*, January 1951, *Wola Ludu*, January 5, 1952.

Commodity	January 1951	January 1953	Percentage increase
Bread (kilo)	1.45 <sup>33</sup>	3.0	103
Flour (kilo)	3.0	6.0	100
Pork (kilo)	8.98	20.53	146
Butter (kilo)	27.0	55.0	104
Lard (kilo)	12.88	35.0	172
Sausage (kilo)	11.68	27.0	131
Sugar (kilo)	5.25	15.0	278
Egg (unit)	0.90	1.60	78
Milk (liter-quart)	1.36	3.10	125
Gasoline (quart)	1.50	4.0	170
Coal (100 kilos)	12.0	30.0	150
Cotton shirt	45.0	62.0	38
Men's shoes (one pair)	200.0	252.0	26
Men's suit	500.0	610.0	22

Czechoslovakia, among the last countries to regulate the price level, enacted a monetary reform on May 30, 1953. All cash was exchanged at a rate of 5:1. All group savings were exchanged at the same ratio of 5:1. Savings bank deposits were exchanged at 5:1 for the first 5,000 Czechocrowns, with a progressive ratio ranging between 6.25 and 50 for amounts exceeding 50,000 Czechocrowns. Wages, taxes, other payments and prices were reduced at a ratio of 5:1. Prices on the free market were taken as the basis for the price regulation, not the low prices of the rationed market. Deflated food prices were reduced by an average of 31 percent, textiles by 37 percent, compared to the former "free market". Wages and salaries, reduced at a ratio of 5:1, were slightly raised by 34-70 halers (1/100 of a Czechocrown) to help bridge the gap between the old prices of rationed goods and the new ones. All bank deposits blocked by the first currency reform of November 1945, as well as all Government bonds issued since 1945, were declared null and void.<sup>34</sup> Rationing of food, clothing, footwear, and soap was discontinued.

The Czechoslovak currency reform is regarded as the most drastic measure ever taken by a Communist government against its population. It means an entire pauperization of all classes of the population and annihilation of the middle class, including businessmen, artisans and farmers. It forces all people regardless of their age to join the rank of the working class. The currency reform drastically reduced the Czechoslovak living standard.

<i>Industrial Worker's Average Monthly Wages</i>			
	825.0	4.543	5.326
			1.138
<i>The Living Standard</i>			
Real wage index	100	95.1	94.4
Nominal wage index	100	544.7	645.7
Consumer price index	100	573.0	683.9
			169.3

<sup>33</sup>The present exchange rate of the zloty is 4 zlotys to 1 dollar, or 25 cents to one zloty.

<sup>34</sup>The present exchange rate of the Czechocrown is 1.8 Crowns to 1 ruble, or 7.2 Crowns to 1 dollar.



*Average Prices of Basic Consumer Goods (in Czechocrowns)*

	1937	1950		1952		1953 (June) <sup>35</sup>
		Ration	Free	Ration	Free	
Rye bread (kilo)	2.60	-	5.0	8.0	16.0	2.80
Wheat flour						
(coarse) kilo	2.90	-	13.0	16.95	38.80	5.0
Pork (kilo)	12.10	50.0	190.0	51.60	285.30	29.40
Lard (kilo)	14.15	65.0	240.0	67.10	467.80	36.0
Potatoes (kilo)	0.75	-	3.0	2.15	5.10	0.72
Skimmed milk (quart)	1.65	4.20	8.0	4.50	9.60	2.0
Eggs (piece)	0.70	3.30	6.10	3.60	9.15	1.10
Beer, 7 proof (quart)	2.60	-	9.50	-	9.0	1.40
Roasted coffee (kilo)	41.70	-	800.0	-	1457.0	300.0
Brown coal						
(100 kilos)	20.80	59.17	-	63.95	-	9.40
Men's wool suit	507.70	2600.0	4492.0	2268.0	7105.0	530.0
Long sleeve						
men's shirt	27.55	200.0	708.0	262.0	624.0	70.0
Ladies' silk stockings	11.0	137.0	263.0	120.0	611.0	22.0
Men's leather shoes	82.85	1012.0	2663.0	680.0	2487.0	168.0

These summaries prove clearly that the Communist countries can maintain a high level of investment by high prices and a low standard of living for the population, since an excessive part of the national income is allocated for investment and only the remainder can be consumed. High prices enable the governments to impose enormous commodity taxes which are needed to support exorbitant government expenses included in national budgets.

*Conclusion*

After World War II, East-Central Europe was in a state of economic chaos caused by war, five to seven years of Nazi occupation and exploitation, and by Red Army looting and plundering, particularly of industrial equipment. Not only the equipment of industrial factories, but even rails were dismantled by the Soviet troops and sent to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet, until 1947, was unable and unwilling to help in the rehabilitation of the "liberated" countries. Instead, UNRRA supplied 1,404 million dollars of aid to the Iron Curtain countries, excluding the former enemy countries, Rumania and Bulgaria, and the U.S. granted credits of about 162 million dollars.

The Cominform, called into being in September 1946, ordered the East-Mid-European countries to abstain from the Marshall Plan organization. In January 1949, representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. established KOMEKON, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. Its fundamental purpose is to integrate East-Central European industry into the Soviet economy, and in so doing create a bloc of economic power which will increase production; and to establish an advanced military, political and economic bulwark for the Soviet Empire.

The U.S.S.R. now has three industrial-military bases. The first is the

<sup>35</sup>Prices of some consumer goods (but not bread, meat, fat etc.) were reduced by 5-40 percent at the end of September 1953.

Eastern Ruhr, based on the highly developed coal and steel industrial basin in Upper Silesia, in Poland and the Ostrava basin in Czechoslovakia. Numerous metallurgical and engineering works in Eastern Germany and Hungary complete this advanced base dominating Western Europe. Soviet Russia's natural economic basis is Donbas in the Ukraine, with numerous industrial giants in the Caucasus, Moscow and Leningrad. The third base is in the Asiatic centers in the Urals, Kuznieck, Karaganda, and the Far East, not far from Alaska.

It is noteworthy that the European base in the Soviet Union has not been developed since World War II, only the Asiatic base. On the other hand, all satellite countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, have been forced to set up giant metallurgical and engineering combines, some of which lack any background in natural resources, and which can exist as "prosperous" units only while the present political cooperation with other countries of the Soviet orbit exists.

All Iron Curtain countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany and Poland, are classic examples of exploited countries whose natural resources, industrial potential and technical knowledge have been used in favor of a third country, i.e. the U.S.S.R., counter to the interests of the captive countries. Production of investment goods leads to an excessive over-industrialization in Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, particularly in the sector of heavy industry, while the production of consumer goods, needed for a higher standard of living, is intentionally neglected.

The share of gross investment in the national income in the U.S.A. and Great Britain was 21 and 20 percent respectively in 1951, while in Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries it accounted for about 38 percent.

Investment in fixed capital was increased by 21 and 17 percent in Czechoslovakia in 1951 and 1952 respectively, in Hungary the increase reached 45 and 25 percent, in Poland 38 and 22 percent, but in the U.S.S.R. only 12 and 11 percent in the same period. The pressure on these satellite countries proves that the Soviet Union has used every means to lower the existing standard of living in some Iron Curtain countries, while the comparatively low standard of living in the U.S.S.R. is to be raised until it reaches the Mid-European level.

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# CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ITALY: MY NEGOTIATIONS WITH MUSSOLINI

by *Vlastimil Kybal*

## PART II: 1923-1924

### 1

When Czechoslovakia, of its own accord, renounced any political rapprochement with Fascist Italy, my diplomatic activities in Rome were reduced, at the end of 1923 and in the beginning of 1924, to attempting economic cooperation. This was undertaken both by private and governmental negotiations. Towards the end of September, 1923, I was visited by the directors of the Škoda works, who informed me that they were constructing in Italy six sugar refineries for about 36,000,000 lire, one in Molinella, four others in the vicinity of Padua and Ferrara, and a sixth at Leghorn. I called to their attention similar possibilities in Turkey, eventually in collaboration with the Italians, and they seemed interested. I might add that I had just been visited officially by the Turkish Minister, Suad Bey, accompanied by his secretary, who requested a 'Turko-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, to be signed by us two at Rome, and commercial and consular agreements, to be concluded at Constantinople. In similar fashion the Albanian envoy would often confer with me regarding the development of Czechoslovak business contacts with Albania, the political and economic implications of which were given careful study by our Commercial and Military attachés. Late in 1923, the new Spanish envoy proposed a commercial treaty with Spain and the eventual visit of Dr. Beneš to that country.

With Italy, there ensued tortuous negotiations regarding a new commercial agreement, which had been initiated on November 6, 1923, suspended by Christmas, and finally concluded on March 1, 1924. The treaty was formally signed in the "Sala della Vittoria" of the Palazzo Chigi by Mussolini on the one hand, and by Mr. Dvořáček and Dr. Peroutka on the other, having the marked effect of improving the Czechoslovak economic position in Italy. I attended the negotiations as a mere observer, and found the experience to be most instructive. On that same March 1, together with Mr. Dvořáček, I signed a consular agreement and one for the avoidance of double taxation. The latter had been negotiated by our financial advisors, headed by Dr. Valníček, whereas the former had been drawn up by Dr. Halfar, with my cooperation.

At the same time, together with other experts, I investigated the complicated question of the "collectivities". In addition, I interceded at the proper places, even with Mussolini, regarding the fixing of the Czechoslovak war debt to Italy: it amounted to more than 165,000,000 lire, not counting 18,000,000 lire for war material captured from Austria-Hungary.

On March 17, 1924, I signed a bilateral Italo-Czechoslovak treaty of legal assistance, and an agreement to extradite criminals and another con-



cerning the enforcement of judicial decisions negotiated by our specialists within the framework of the Conference of the Successor States.

By these measures during my mission to Rome, Czechoslovak economic and legal questions were resolved by means of treaties, to an extent neither outlined nor mutually agreed upon with any other European or overseas country.

## 2

Political relations between Czechoslovakia and Italy were dealt a new blow late in 1923 by the Franco-Czechoslovak military alliance. News of this new agreement hit Rome with the impact of a thunderbolt from a clear sky on December 28. At once I wired summaries from the Rome morning papers to Prague, wherein the main objectives of the alliance were interpreted as fresh attempts by France to avoid isolation, to extend French hegemony over Central Europe and thereby to resurrect Hapsburg power in a new form (*Il Messagero, Corriere Italiano*). At the same time I requested from Prague instructions as to what I should say to the government and the press.

That very day I discussed the matter with the Yugoslav envoy, who deemed our alliance with France perfectly logical. Italy, he stated, had neither an established foreign policy nor the resources to implement one. It had merely oral understandings with Hungary and Bulgaria.

In the evening I sent to Prague a telegram of some two hundred words referring to the comments of the evening editions (*Giornale d'Italia, Il Mondo, Idea Nazionale, Epoca, Agenzia Volta*) regarding the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance. Every day I continued to keep Prague informed of Italian sentiments concerning the alliance, since government organs viewed the alliance with alarm lest it provoke Yugoslav and Greek aggression against Italy in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, while the opposition papers accused France of seeking to encircle Germany and isolate Italy.

Under the circumstances, the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty developed into my most burdensome political problem, inasmuch as the initial report of it immediately produced in Italy a wave of adverse criticism, of suspicion and of distrust. The Italians acted as if they didn't care even to talk to us and as if we were traitors and vassals of France. I had to take some positive action.

On January 2, 1924, I requested an audience with Mussolini and was immediately granted one. After a few introductory remarks regarding commercial relations, I informed the Prime Minister that the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty had been fore-shadowed in Beneš' exposé of October 30, 1923, and was a natural cornerstone for our relations with France. I called attention to the Italian press campaign, which obviously distorted the facts and gave the treaty interpretations and objectives of which it was guiltless. I stated categorically that the treaty contained no secret or military clauses.

Mussolini replied that Italian public opinion was hurt by a treaty that was in the French interest rather than the Czechoslovak. The Italians

were sensitive rather than calculating, and realized only too well that France had been following a distinctly anti-Italian foreign policy, as had been demonstrated by Tangier, Tunis, the military visits of French generals and admirals to Yugoslavia, and by the recent French activities in Greece, to which Venizelos, "*una creatura francese*", was returning. According to Mussolini, France was encircling Italy, and Mussolini vainly sought from Ambassador Barrère some gesture of friendship from France for Italy, since the Italians were friendly to France, as had been demonstrated by the recent Dixmude catastrophe. France was opposing Italy in Belgrade and everywhere else as well. The only state which Italy had regarded as still uncommitted had been Czechoslovakia, towards which Italy had felt spiritually akin and sympathetically benevolent. And now this same state had formalized its relationship with France by this treaty, which automatically made it a cog in the anti-Italian combination of France. No one would ever believe that there were no secret military or other provisions.

I objected that this interpretation was a distortion of the treaty. Even if Italian public opinion could justify its opposition to French foreign policy in the west and in the Mediterranean, it should not thoughtlessly include Czechoslovakia and Central Europe in this disaffection. At issue was a treaty that guaranteed the status quo in Central Europe and, to some degree, in Germany. Even German public opinion did not condemn it completely, except for the stipulation forbidding the restoration of the Hohenzollern dynasty.

Mussolini asked what the two allies would do in the event of a restoration of the Wittelsbachs. I replied that Czechoslovakia would object to a union of Bavaria and Austria, but would make no pronouncement regarding a restoration of the monarchy in Bavaria, which was a question covered by the Weimar constitution.

I maintained further that the text of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty specifically listed the principles, which had been outlined in the Sforza-Beneš Note of February 8, 1921, wherein had been mentioned a definitive Italo-Czechoslovak treaty for the preservation of the peace treaties and for political cooperation, especially with the other Successor States. I stated that the very mention of the Sforza-Beneš Note proved that Czechoslovak policy regarding Italy had undergone no change. I added that the Prague government was most careful lest any agreement with a third party militate against Italy, and that this treaty represented a concrete example of Czechoslovak gratitude to Italy for her war-time assistance.

Mussolini stressed his hope that the trade treaty might clarify the situation and that nothing was then separating Italy and Czechoslovakia; to the contrary, they had every reason to remain friends. He wondered if I would care to explain our standpoint to the Italian press.

I did not reply, but I did request that the Italian press be curbed, lest repercussions within Czechoslovakia become injurious to Italy herself, since Czech public opinion, of its own accord, would react against criticism of any action beneficial to ourselves yet not detrimental to Italy. I pointed

out to the Prime Minister that the Italian press was in a deplorable condition regarding its information, and I quoted some names.

In conclusion, as a friend of Italy, I expressed the hope to Mussolini that Italians would make greater efforts to capture the Czechoslovak market, which was an open "piazza" for all foreign influences, and suggested the establishment of an Italian chamber of commerce in Prague, the official participation by Italy at the Prague Fair, and, with the aid of General Andrea Graziani, propaganda among groups of legionnaires of the Italian campaign.

Mussolini received these suggestions with marked attention and made notes of them.

## 3

After my audience with Mussolini, I again sounded out the views of the French Ambassador, Barrère, regarding Italian feelings towards France and the so-called French policy of encirclement. On the same occasion I stressed the necessity of an Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement to clarify the situation. I stated that, should France make an alliance with Yugoslavia in the absence of any such rapprochement, it would spell a further alienation of all of us from Italy, whose reaction we should all take into account. A similar reaction could be counted upon if the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance should be expanded to include also the whole Little Entente.

Truly it was high time that relations between Italy and the Little Entente be clarified, for the latter represented more than ever, for Italy, an indigestible morsel. One Italian journalist dubbed the situation "a broken watch", and he was correct. Fortunately, at the Belgrade conference of the Little Entente, January 10-12, 1924, in the course of which Beneš was kept informed daily regarding Italian policy and was urged to seek a rapprochement with Italy, through the personal intercession of Beneš there followed a Yugoslav agreement with Italy regarding Fiume. On January 11, Antonievič most confidentially imparted to me the text of the agreement, which was made public the following day as a sensation of the first magnitude.

It was a master-stroke for Dr. Beneš to induce the Yugoslav government to come to an understanding with Italy and to disarm and pacify Rome. On the other hand, it was an indication of the common sense and courage of Mussolini to come to an understanding for which Italian public opinion had not been properly prepared, any more than it had been for Sforza's negotiations at Rapallo in 1921.

Sforza himself did not hesitate to express his complete satisfaction with this agreement and with cooperation with the Successor States in a spirit of complete mutual confidence, and named Beneš as one of the most sophisticated minds on the European political scene. Beneš had indeed proved to be a master watchmaker, who, for the time being at least, had repaired the Italo-Little Entente timepiece.

The key had been Fiume, regarding which both governments sub-



sequently came to a detailed direct understanding. This understanding was embodied in a pact of friendship negotiated during the visits of Pašić and Ninčić at Rome on January 25-28, 1924. Thus the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance was to some degree counteracted and Italy obtained some measure of a balance of power to protect her against complete isolation.

Dr. Beneš, always ready to consummate some combination of alliances whenever possible, went even further. He assigned me the task of informing Ninčić, during his stay in Rome, of his own project whereby Czechoslovakia would eventually *accede* voluntarily to the Italo-Yugoslav agreement and thereby adopt, with Yugoslavia, a common foreign policy. Ninčić approved the idea, and, after a conference with me, announced that he would ask Contarini what would be the reaction of Italy if another member of the Little Entente, for instance Czechoslovakia, should desire to accede to the Italo-Yugoslav accord. I inquired of Ninčić whether he had as yet discussed the question of extending the anti-Hapsburg agreement; to which he replied in the negative; and I asked when there would be open discussions regarding a commercial treaty, to which he answered within one month at Belgrade, on January 28, 1924. At the railway station, upon the occasion of his departure from Rome, Ninčić whispered to me that Contarini had informed him that Italy would have no basic objections to a Czechoslovak accession to the Italo-Yugoslav treaty.

Thus began my last series of negotiations regarding a political accord with Italy during my mission to Rome. It lasted from January to May, 1924, and terminated unfavorably. The result could hardly have been otherwise. Had Beneš paid more heed to his envoy, rather than to his "confidential" sources of information within the Italian opposition, he might have concluded a political agreement with Italy by means of direct negotiations with Mussolini himself as early as his visit to Rome in 1923, or at least he might have proposed some common basis for an agreement that could have developed into something more than a mere appendix to the Italo-Yugoslav treaty, one that might have linked both partners together in an *independent bilateral policy regarding both Central Europe and Germany*.

Just as Mussolini had stated to me on January 2, 1924, and as was most clearly evident, Czechoslovakia at the time was the only state in Central Europe that Italy regarded as still independent from French hegemony, and towards which even a Fascist Italy felt spiritually akin and sympathetically benevolent. I do not rule out the possibility that, *at that time*, (of course, before the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance) an intimate defensive alliance between Italy and Czechoslovakia might have been concluded, for even military circles were well disposed towards us and there might have been arranged some such visit as, for instance, having the Crown Prince Humbert come to Prague.

In this manner Czechoslovakia would have become a member of an *Italian system of guaranty*, such as Italy had thus far been vainly seeking to establish, and, allied with Italy both politically and militarily, she would

have attained, to the south, a much greater measure of actual security than her alliance with France was expected to bring from the west.

In addition, *all Central Europe* might have been reorganized through common action by the victorious and liberated states and there might have ensued economic cooperation based upon a customs union of all the Successor States, such as the Fascists desired. In short, Czechoslovakia would have been dovetailed into its *natural and historic Central European environment*, whereas Italy would have been admitted into this historical group, thus eliminating for her any need for that German alliance which was subsequently to victimize all Central Europe.

However, Dr. Beneš had neither the desire nor sufficient personal or political influence to attempt, in conjunction with Mussolini, such a solution for the problem of Central Europe, and preferred to cling to his preconceived opinions of the importance of the Little Entente and of France; hence he continued to advocate merely the accession to the Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement of a Czechoslovakia already handicapped by an alliance with France. Anyone could foresee that no constructive or permanent result could be expected from such an arrangement. In circulars of February 3, 1924, Beneš again lauded the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance as an ironclad guarantee for the future, as a protection for our vital interests that would still enable us to enjoy diplomatic independence in our relations with Germany, Britain, and Russia. Only the future would reveal how grievously our statesman had erred on this most vital issue.

## 4

The negotiations regarding Czechoslovak accession to the Italo-Yugoslav rapprochement of January, 1924, proved to be far more troublesome and dilatory than Dr. Beneš had ever anticipated. Mussolini did not value very highly any accord with Yugoslavia based upon the "absurd" treaty of Rapallo, still less did he approve of the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance. For these reasons Czechoslovak accession would mean little to him, hence he proceeded to raise obstacles. Whereas Beneš had been contemplating an immediate trip from Belgrade to Rome to implement the accession, he was advised that the initial suggestion for an accession should originate from Ninčić as one of the partners; however, as Antoniević told me, this was a delicate matter, in every respect premature since the pact had just been ratified on February 22.

The affair was rendered still more complex when Rumania found occasion to announce the forthcoming visit of her King to Rome with the object of sealing a rapprochement by the marriage of Prince Humbert with Princess Ileana. Lahovary confided to me that Rumania regarded such a rapprochement as the cap-stone to the Italo-Yugoslav treaty. Contarini told me, however, that the Czechoslovak situation was quite different from that of Rumania, relatively more advantageous to Italy. Nevertheless, there was offered no encouragement for our accession; in fact, the Italians showed a marked distaste for it even during commercial negotiations, and even

threatened to terminate them. This dénouement was prevented solely by the patience and devotion of the Czechoslovak negotiators, ably led by Mr. Dvořáček. Then too, certain Fascist journalists kept sniping at Czechoslovakia and its government, activities which I attempted to counteract to the best of my ability.

After the successful conclusion of negotiations regarding a commercial treaty, on March 1, 1924, Contarini suggested to Dvořáček and me that the visit of Beneš to Rome would be more acceptable to Mussolini if it could be postponed until after the elections that were to be held between the 10th and the 20th of April, 1924. He indicated that it would be necessary to prepare the way for our accession to the Italo-Yugoslav accord in view of the strained relations of Italy with both France and the Little Entente.

Meanwhile, the Fascist government would not permit itself to be deceived regarding the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance by the alleged secret documents exposed by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, which were publicized and commented upon with great relish by the Italian press. The struggle against this farce cost me several days of arduous labor. As soon as I had read about the secret clauses in the morning, afternoon, and evening editions of various Italian newspapers, I sent to Prague three telegrams requesting immediate instructions. All along I maintained that the documents were forgeries. That afternoon I conferred with Barrère, who deemed the texts mere fabrications, and left their documentation to the governments making the allegation. My approach was more direct. As soon as I had ascertained from *Le Matin* that the Czechoslovak envoy in Berlin had repudiated the documents, I sent also, on my own initiative, a categorical repudiation to the "Stefani" and at the same time also to Baron Valentino in the Palazzo Chigi and other journalists.

The next day my action was seconded by a sharp démarche from Prague by Beneš. I called the editor of the *Giornale d'Italia* to whom I submitted my own statement regarding the Berlin forgeries, in which I again announced a policy of absolutely sincere friendship with Italy, in the name of the Czechoslovak government. The editor, Count Stelluti-Scala, appended to my statement his own comments regarding the forgeries and the political significance of my announcement, which, as I hoped, severely undermined public confidence in the authenticity of the documents and halted Italian speculation as to the objectives of Czechoslovak foreign policy. I had the impression that my intervention had done useful service in that particular crisis. I had purposely discussed the foreign policy of Italy in my appeal for public opinion to think clearly and in my warning against foreign intrigues.

On the following day, upon the receipt of a telegraphic report confirming the forgery of one of the documents, I immediately informed the editor-in-chief of the *Giornale d'Italia*, who came for my statement at 10 a.m. and published it under glaring headlines in the mid-day edition of *Piccolo*. Nevertheless, various evening papers published another document (the secret agreement of October 28, 1918) and some Berlin correspondents



continued to spread reports based on additional forgeries. The Italian newspapers, even after they had lost faith in the authenticity of the forgeries, still continued to accuse us of the French high command's having control over our armed forces. On the subsequent day, March 23, I submitted again to the editor of *Giornale d'Italia* the proof, published in *Prager Presse*, of the falsification of the documents of October 28, 1918, which was once more emblazoned in *Piccolo*.

Thus, the contest with the Berlin forgers was terminated, a fact that became evident from the silence, imposed by higher authority upon the evening editions, once it was realized that the German government had had its fingers in the mess. I was unable to determine whether another calming influence might not have been the Rome visit of Marshal Foch, to whom I was presented at the "Circolo di Roma". But our diplomatic independence remained unquestioned when, shortly thereafter, on March 28, 1924, the front page of every newspaper carried the sincere welcome of President Masaryk on the occasion of the arrival of the Italian minister to Prague, Signor Pignatti, who was assuming his new post.

After this press campaign, I continued to confer further with Contarini regarding Beneš' visit to Rome, which was being planned for the latter half of April or early in May, 1924. Contarini, as my friend of long standing and as an able diplomat, stated that he concurred with the view that, before the details of any trip could be ironed out, it might be well to be informed of what our government hoped to accomplish. He explained to me that an understanding on Central Europe could be attained readily, but, that, with regard to Germany, Italy was in an entirely different position, even geographically, and that we would have to pay heed to our German minority. As an aside, with apparent innocence he asked just what understanding did we have with France, and added that many people did believe in the authenticity of the *Berliner Tageblatt* forgeries. He spoke also of Poland and especially of Rumania. Contarini disapproved of Polish foreign policy as being unstable, and criticized Rumanian policies regarding Italian credits in Bessarabia. He detected a rightist trend in Germany. Since the Germans never could pay for reparations in cash, Italy was advocating the reductions and asking for deliveries in kind. I disagreed, maintaining that the followers of Ludendorff might triumph for a time, but that their power would remain transitory and in constant danger of being paralyzed by a common action of the Great Entente, and only under this condition. Contarini promised to discuss with me in greater detail our proposed rapprochement, as soon as he would receive the promised letter from Beneš.

Shortly thereafter, at a dinner at the French embassy, M. Barrère, in an expansive moment, expressed his bewilderment over why Czechoslovakia should have any desire to accede to the Italo-Yugoslav treaty. He feared lest it might enable Italy to dominate the Little Entente. Several days subsequently, I expounded the whole matter to M. Barrère, stressing the point that it would be an error to talk of an Italian infiltration into the

Little Entente, but that it was solely a matter of binding Italy to preserve the peace treaties, particularly with regard to Hungary, and of preventing a restoration of the Hapsburgs.

Mussolini displayed no haste in coming to any agreement which promised no benefits to himself; moreover, at the time, he was fully occupied with the elections and their effect upon the parliamentary opposition.

After the Italian elections, which constituted a great Fascist victory, Beneš at long last (on April 12, 1924) announced his scheduled visit, requesting me, on the nineteenth, to deliver to Contarini his letter containing the agenda for his conference with Mussolini. Apart from technical questions, Beneš sought to decide upon the form of the Czechoslovak accession to the Italo-Yugoslav pact of friendship, either by an exchange of notes or by a special treaty. Beneš added that both Czechoslovak public opinion and parliament would prefer an exchange of notes, and that he desired to conclude some arrangement which would establish a common line of action far into the future for Central Europe, adding that it would be desirable to include a discussion on Germany and the League of Nations. He also stated that he would be happy to confer regarding a presidential visit to Rome, which might materialize in the fall of 1924.

Contarini did not consult me regarding this important communication until May 10, 1924, excusing himself on the grounds that he had not had sufficient time to reply. Shortly before that (on May 3) the Italian press carried the news of my recall from Rome and the shadow of that event, which caused dismay, seemed to fall upon both the Legation and the Chigi Palace. Everyone appreciated my favorable status with Mussolini and my sincere friendship for Italy. Even M. Charles-Roux from the French embassy came to make inquiries. The official press concluded that my presence in Rome was the guarantee of Italo-Czechoslovak friendship. My recall at such a crux was not regarded as an indication of Beneš' consideration for Italy, despite his assurance that there was nothing personal and that no unwarranted conclusions should be drawn (May 13).

On May 10, as I was discussing with Contarini the agenda for Beneš' negotiations at Rome, he remarked that a treaty might cover Czechoslovakia's accession to the Italo-Yugoslav pact and another the problems of state properties and of reparations. He did not favor a renewal of the joint ban against the Hapsburgs. Two days later I informed Contarini that Beneš desired him to draw up the appropriate texts for the contemplated agreements and that he, Beneš, would prepare his own text, after which it would be possible to negotiate upon a concrete basis. Contarini, an experienced diplomat, did not know what to reply, hence he sounded me and Lejacona, a bureau chief who happened to be present, regarding our opinions, stating that the draft of our accession could be drawn up in five minutes, but that the other questions would necessitate preliminary negotiations. I thought that even Beneš had misgivings that France dreaded lest he negotiate with Mussolini some accord detrimental to her interests; in

fact, Maurice Perrot from *Le Journal des Débats* had been sent, probably by M. Barrère, to find out what he could directly from me.

At last on May 15, 1924, Dr. Beneš arrived in Rome. He arrived, unattended, at 7 a.m., and shortly thereafter I briefed him on the Italian domestic situation and on what the Italians desired and expected from his journey. Beneš made it evident that he did not value very highly any accord with Rome and that he would do as the Italians wished. Before the day was over, I accompanied Beneš to a reception at the Chigi Palace, where he met Mussolini and conversed with reporters and with French, Polish and Yugoslav diplomats.

The next day Beneš showed me a new text of an Italo-Czechoslovak treaty, which he had just drafted that morning. The original version comprised a preamble and six articles, of which the first concerned the preservation of the status quo established by the peace treaties, particularly those of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly; article 2, mutual consultation in the event of international complications; article 3, the Hapsburgs (according to article 5 of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty); article 4, a reference to existing Italo-Czechoslovak agreements regarding the maintenance of peace in Central Europe; article 5, the five-years duration of the treaty; and article 6, the registration of the treaty with the League of Nations and its ratification. The treaty was drafted without any title or heading.

This draft had been prepared by Beneš that morning, after Contarini had notified him the previous evening that Italy would prefer a separate agreement, rather than a mere accession by Czechoslovakia to the Italo-Yugoslav treaty. Beneš told me that Contarini requested also that the treaty of Versailles be omitted, to which Beneš agreed with the retort that separate negotiations with Italy regarding Germany would be required. Upon reading the new draft, I said that I found it satisfactory except for two minor points.

At 11 a.m. on May 16 I drove to the Palazzo Chigi with Beneš, who then had a forty-five minute audience with Mussolini. They apparently spoke only in generalities; Beneš explained to Mussolini his own views on the existing international situation; it was agreed that the treaty would be discussed with Contarini only, but that the final text would be presented to Mussolini in order that any differences of opinion might be avoided. So Beneš informed me after the audience.

That noon, at a luncheon at the Excelsior, Beneš proceeded to relate, in a most interesting fashion, the tribulations of the Prague government in attempting to reorient the political parties which then composed the government coalition. After the luncheon, Beneš made a public statement to the Italian and foreign press, whereupon we returned to the Palazzo Chigi, where Contarini requested that we first thresh out the problem of former Austrian state property, of which Italy demanded a share. This was a purely financial matter. In agreeing, Beneš adroitly presented the views of Czechoslovakia and succeeded in retaining the text of the original agreement.



Then the political discussions were opened. Contarini submitted an Italian proposal for "a treaty of friendship and of cordial collaboration between the Kingdom of Italy and the Czechoslovak Republic", from which the article concerning the Hapsburgs had been eliminated. Beneš, in the text that he had given to Contarini during the course of the luncheon, had likewise omitted article 4. However, at the suggestion of Contarini, there was appended to article 3 the statement "the high contracting parties promise to inform one another of any treaties affecting their policies in Central Europe which had been already concluded and to consult with one another before concluding any new ones" (*Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à se communiquer les accords intéressants leur politique en Europe Centrale, qu'elles ont conclus antérieurement et à se consulter avant d'en conclure de nouveaux*). Both Beneš and I realized at once that here was an attempt, on the one hand to ferret out our secret treaties with other countries, and on the other, to tie our hands in negotiating any new treaties on Central Europe. Consequently, Beneš rejected this particular article, pointing out that we had other allies without whose consent we could not undertake such a commitment, and then reassured Contarini that Czechoslovakia had no secret treaties either with "eastern" or with "western" allies (the references were mine). In article 2, Contarini wished to include the phrase "in the event of international complications"—a very wise proposal—, but Beneš would not concede the point, just as Contarini, in article 1, would not include "all treaties", but only, according to version "A", "peace treaties". Contarini left out of his draft the words in the inscription of the treaty "of friendship", hence he presented two different texts to Mussolini, who selected version "B" as being more suitable. Thus were terminated the Italo-Czechoslovak negotiations regarding the pact of "sincere collaboration".

After saying farewell to Mussolini, on our way home I remarked to Beneš that our new treaty was rather anaemic. As a matter of fact the treaty did constitute a purely formal agreement for mutual consultation whenever our common interests might appear to be threatened (article 1), and for cooperation in preserving the peace treaties of St. Germain, Trianon and Neuilly (article 2). In circular dispatches, subsequently sent by Beneš to our foreign missions, he specifically indicated that the treaty concerned merely common Italo-Czechoslovak interests, but that it had absolutely no effect upon existing ties with either France or with the Little Entente. Thus, he himself confessed to the defeat that he had encountered in Rome. Beneš made evident his own dissatisfaction by saying privately that Mussolini's régime could not endure.

The Italo-Czechoslovak treaty of sincere collaboration remained still-born in that it did not commit either party to anything; it failed to reorient either party regarding Yugoslavia, Hungary, or Austria, and, worst of all, it omitted any mention of Germany, thus leaving Italy entirely free to come to some future agreement with that country, without any regard for Czechoslovak interests. Italy herself had requested this omission and Beneš

had been powerless to induce Italy to commit herself to anything concerning Germany. On the other hand, Beneš was unwilling to exchange information regarding our Central European commitments, and thus each country remained free to negotiate with anyone without regard for the other and might even pursue mutually hostile policies in Central Europe. In this manner the Italo-Czechoslovak war-time comradeship-in-arms became dissolved and cast into oblivion.

Munich was to become a mere epigraph to this tragedy of the two countries, which together had been chiefly responsible for the destruction of the Hapsburg monarchy. They united in war, but could not unite effectively in peace, and Germany ruined them both, one as an enemy and the other as an ally.

NEW YORK CITY

## NOTES

The Slavic and East European Division of the Reference Department of the Library of Congress has recently issued *Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Newspapers, 1917-1953: A Union List*. The compiler has included as complete a record as possible of newspapers published in these areas and which are now in the possession of American libraries. As a research aid, this publication will be invaluable to students of recent Russian history. Copies may be obtained for \$1.45 from the Card Division, Library of Congress, Washington 25, D. C.

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Professor Ferdinand Hrejsa died in Prague, on November 5, 1953, at the age of eighty-seven.

He left unfinished his magnum opus, *Dějiny křesťanství v Československu*. In addition to five volumes, published in 1947 and 1948 (see the *Journal*, vol. IX, January 1950, pp. 430-1), there appeared, in 1950, the sixth volume of this monumental history of Christianity in Czechoslovakia. It covered only a short period, from 1564 to 1573, stopping before the opening of negotiations between the Protestant Estates of Bohemia and Emperor-King Maximilian II out of which came the oral recognition by the ruler of the *Confessio Bohemica* in 1575. Professor Hrejsa devoted much time to the study of the *Confessio* and published in 1912 a large book on that subject. The Comenius Faculty of Protestant theology announced several times that volumes VII to IX of Hrejsa's *Dějiny* were under preparation, but thus far none of them has left the press. This is regrettable, because Hrejsa's new version of the story which he originally presented in his 1912 book was eagerly awaited. It is very likely that he prepared the text before his illness, but it is a question whether the missing volumes of the *Dějiny* will see the light.

Professor Hrejsa was active for many years as a minister of the Czech Lutheran Church. He was one of the architects of the union of Czech Lutherans and Calvinists, in December 1918, forming the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren. In 1919 he was appointed to the chair of Church History at the Protestant School of Theology. This school was then named after John Hus, but the present régime removed Hus' name from the title and replaced it by Comenius. Professor Hrejsa lived, since 1937, in retirement from his teaching duties and devoted all his time to literary activities. Protected by his age he was able to observe dignified silence in the past few years, and left this world with a "stainless scholar's crest."

O. O.

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A rather unusual Festschrift was presented to Professor Theodor Mayer on his seventieth birthday in August 1953.

He served in the twenties for several years as professor of medieval history at the German University in Prague and held, afterwards, various posts in Germany. A volume of essays was prepared when he reached sixty to commemorate his activities in Prague. The printing was completed in February 1945, and a copy was sent to him. Others were destroyed during the bombing of Brno by the advancing Russians. A new edition was printed from that single copy and presented to the septuagenarian last summer at



Constance. The volume is now available under the title *Festgabe für Theodor Mayer* (publ. by Otto Müller Verlag, Freilassing—Salzburg, pp. 290).

Some of the contributors lost their lives during the turmoil in which ended the Nazi occupation of the Czech lands. One of them was Otto Peterka, an expert in the history of law, the other Gustav Pirchan, a medievalist who specialized in the period of Charles IV. Joachim Prochno, who is also listed as dead, worked in Bohemia under the Protectorate. The fourth name marked on the title page with a cross is that of Mayer's former colleague, Wilhelm Wostry, who died in 1951 in Saxony. His contribution is the longest of all, about one hundred pages, and deals with the controversies relating to the origin of the native dynasty of Bohemia, the Přemyslids.

Other contributing scholars are: A. Blaschka, A. Ernstberger, R. Schreiber, W. Weizsäcker, E. Winter, and H. Zatschek. Their essays treat various aspects of the medieval and modern history of Bohemia. Rudolf Schreiber, working now as State archivist at Speyer, was responsible for the reprint of the volume and presented a dedication copy to Professor Mayer on behalf of those contributors who survived the storms and are today active both in Germany and in Austria.

O. O.

## BOOK REVIEWS

HASSINGER, HUGO, *Geographische Gruntlagen der Geschichte*. Freiburg: Herder 1953. Pp. 391.

Death robbed Hugo Hassinger, Professor at the University of Vienna, of the pleasure of seeing this excellent work in print and deprived the field of cultural and historical geography of the services of a personality which joined creative imagination to scientific bent. The present volume furnishes a geographical introduction to history from the rise of the Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Chinese civilizations to the Europeanization of the globe. The story of the origin of cultures and the expansion and decline of empires, of the wandering and the settlement of peoples is told against the background of physical geography, i.e., the climatic conditions that favored or limited the expansion of agriculture, the ocean currents and trades that helped or hindered navigation, and the topographical formations that traced, more or less permanently, the highways of overland migration and the frontiers of settled regions. It is the virtue of Hassinger's methodology that it eschews metaphysical speculations about penultimate causes and derives from a cautious evaluation of ethnological and archeological findings a series of approximations: from recent discoveries in the field of botany, especially that of cultivated plants, and in the field of oceanography, especially currents and trades, there emerges the picture of cultural interrelationships on a global scale which antedate by many centuries the recorded exploits of European transoceanic navigation and transcontinental exploration. Hassinger's work is permeated by the recognition of the transformation of the traditional cultural-geographic scheme—a transformation which new insights, made possible by new techniques of inquiry, have brought about.

The book is divided into eight chapters. The first supplies a philosophical discussion of the influence of the geographical factor on history; the second and third are chiefly concerned with the distribution of the high cultures of antiquity and the ecology of cultures, i.e., the environmental factor in the development of skills, customs, architecture and social institutions. Hassinger's treatment is happily divorced from notions of geographical determinism. It is inspired by the idea of the interaction of many variables. Among these, geography is perhaps the most important and surely the least changeable one. Yet geography, too, is susceptible to modification by man: geography largely determined where history was made, but it was man who made it. Man impressed his stamp upon geography. It is a fascinating question—which, incidentally, Hassinger wisely refrained from answering categorically—to which extent the climatic changes within historic times of the Mediterranean region are man-made. It is certain that the modification of the water régime of North Africa and North America, and the expansion of cultivatable land northward, together with the development of short-growing grains, represent, for better or for worse, massive human interventions in geography.

Chapter four surveys the formation of the earliest stages and growth of the first great civilizations in the river and oasis lands of the Near and Middle East and the Monsoon belt of Asia; chapter five traces the displacement of the historic and cultural center of gravity from the southern to the northern coasts of the Mediterranean and the life-cycle of the Graeco-Roman civilization. These two chapters not only conform to high standards of scholarship but also make excellent reading. Not that they propound startlingly new theories! But the story is con-

cisely told by a geographical specialist who also happened to have been steeped in the history of antiquity. Chapter six summarizes the evolution of the European state system and recounts the gradual transfer of political and economic power to the Atlantic litoral and to northern and eastern Europe. Chapter seven deals somewhat perfunctorily with the Age of Discovery and Europe's transoceanic conquests. Chapter eight surveys comparatively the political and economic history of the great empires, ancient and modern.

Hassinger's book is offered forthrightly as an introduction to an immense field in which many specialized disciplines pursue their particular lines of investigation—sometimes in friendly collaboration with, and sometimes in dogmatic disregard of each other. The numerous references contained in the text and the appended bibliography, which is at once bountiful and discriminatingly selective, chart the principal routes of specialization. This book is wholly successful in accomplishing what its author set out to do. For this reason it is not so exciting as are some of the more speculative studies of history which now engage the attention of the academic public. But Hassinger's posthumous contribution compensates for what it may lack in provocative ideas by a wealth of solid information. The text is illustrated by eleven maps which, it seems to me, are indifferently executed and insufficient for the purpose of presenting the subject matter visually. This defect should be ascribed, however, to the material limitations which still plague the publication abroad of scholarly texts. An English edition, reinforced by added and improved cartographic materials, might prove a welcome aid to the college teacher of political and cultural geography and of history in this country.

*University of Pennsylvania*

ROBERT STRAUZS-HUPÉ

UUSTALU, EVALD, *The History of the Estonian People*. London: Boreas Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. 268. 21 s.

The history of the three Baltic nations, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, has formed the subject of a number of useful publications made available to English-speaking readers in recent years. The tendency, however, has been to deal collectively with all three, and the development of the northernmost of these countries in particular has not been presented in any detail since John Hampden Jackson's excellent *Estonia* (2nd ed. London, 1948). Mr. Jackson, moreover, was concerned with drawing a vivid picture of the country, its vicissitudes and achievements, for the general educated reader rather than with providing full factual information on points that might have been felt to be of interest primarily to professional historians. Nevertheless, such information needed to be supplied, especially since even professional circles often seem to be completely unaware of the important work accomplished by Estonian and Finnish scholars during the twenty years of the country's political independence. The fine schools of Estonian and Baltic history, anthropology and archaeology at the University of Tartu, working meticulously with modern methods and on a much larger scale than their predecessors, succeeded in collecting and organizing a vast body of evidence that in many ways revolutionized the conception of Estonia's development from pre-historic times to the present. It is only since the studies of such distinguished researchers as, e.g., A. M. Tallgren, Harri Moora, Richard Indreko, Ferdinand Linnus, Gustav Ránk and Oskar Loorits, that the dim beginnings of Estonian life on the North-Eastern coast of the Baltic may be outlined with some confidence. We now know that this Balto-Finnic race was probably the first group of human beings ever to settle the territory from which it is now being gradually but ruth-



lessly ousted after several thousand years of toil, struggle and intermittent but sometimes highly remarkable achievement in creating and consolidating a culture of its own. It goes without saying that the story of the last seven hundred years also clamored for re-examination, as it had been badly distorted by historians of alien origin, who all too often re-touched it to justify the privileged position of their own national groups. As regards both sins of omission and commission, their methods were not entirely unlike those prevalent among the historical experts of the present rulers of the Baltic area.

Mr. Uustalu's book, while not large enough to fill all gaps, seems on the whole to be based on a painstaking study of the relevant material accessible in print, to which the author has been able to add the results of his own research on the events of the last fifteen or twenty years. In addition, he has had the benefit of immediate contact with two of the most solid Estonian experts in his field, Dr. R. Indreko and Professor E. Blumfeldt, both now residing in Sweden. His treatment of the subject can accordingly be approached with considerable confidence. The presentation is mainly factual, comments being reduced to a minimum: an attitude made almost inevitable by limitations of space. Certain periods, e.g. prehistory and the approach and arrival of national independence, are highlighted, whereas others, like the Middle Ages, during most of which the Estonian people were forced into a passivity interrupted only by sporadic, if often violent, revolts, are discussed much more briefly. Yet everywhere the discussion is systematic and well-organized, endeavoring to sketch all essential aspects of the country's external and internal history, i.e., political events as well as social conditions and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the intellectual life of the population.

The picture emerging from this presentation is one that American readers, at least, will be likely to follow with almost horrified fascination: that of a people tenaciously clinging to a soil made livable only by extreme exertions, wresting prosperity from it during the brief intervals between enemy attacks, wholesale massacre, subjugation and mass expatriation, repeatedly getting itself reduced to only a third or a fourth of its original numbers, yet resuming its struggle for an independent existence every time history offered even the remotest chance. Mr. Uustalu's sober style, free from any touch of sensationalism, doubles the impact of his story for the attentive reader, even though minds insufficiently familiar with the general historical background may occasionally find themselves bogged in the complexities of international relations in the Baltic area. Somewhat more extensive surveys of the general European situation at the beginning of each chapter might have helped to mitigate this difficulty.

Over-emphasis, then, is definitely not one of the faults of this book. Nevertheless, one important point, among others, appears very clearly from the carefully defined facts it presents: that the Estonians were and are a Western nation, often fighting Western aggression, yet above all concerned with preserving their national identity from attacks directed against them from the east. Any hopes they occasionally harbored of deriving help from eastern allies against the *Drang nach Osten*—whether in the numerous wars of the early Middle Ages or in their ceaseless attempts to secure economic improvement and education in their native tongue under the Tsarist régime—almost without exception ended in bitter disillusionment, making them seek Western or Northern (mainly Finnish) support for their own unremitting efforts. When the country at long last fought its way to independence immediately after the First World War, it was as thoroughly occidental in its outlook as any country could be, and probably more conscious in its attitude

than most, in view of the difficulties it had had to overcome in order to assert its preference. Everything done during that period in the political, economic and intellectual fields showed how closely the Estonian mentality was linked with that of the old democracies of Northern Europe.

The author makes it quite clear that Estonia's national independence was not a mere corollary of the benevolent policy towards national self-determination initiated by President Woodrow Wilson. He shows, on the contrary, what obstacles the Estonian leaders had to cope with before the West decided to acknowledge the nation as an entity existing in its own right rather than a mere element in the inextricable Russian tangle. This aspect is too frequently overlooked by historians as well as politicians in the West, who seem sometimes swayed by a conscious or unconscious great power complex, sacrificing exactitude to oversimplification and emphasizing quantity to the detriment of quality. The small nations of Northern and North-Eastern Europe, if anybody, are qualified to carry on the most vital traditions of the West, for which some of them have borne heavier sacrifices than any of the greater Western nations has done. Estonia is a case in point.

The volume is not altogether innocent of minor mistakes. Some of these may be due to insufficient revision of the English text, which looks like a translation from an Estonian original. This lack of revision appears also in the English of the first sheet or two, which is not always idiomatic, whereas later on the text becomes very readable. There are, however, also other errors—sometimes errors of omission. Kristjan Jaak Peterson died in 1822 and consequently was unable to teach at the University of Tartu twenty years later; nor was he exactly the first Estonian poet, although his predecessors produced nothing of any real literary quality. The decisions of the Bolshevik-imposed Diet in 1940, which led to the enforced incorporation of Estonia in the USSR, were indeed made unanimously, but not without some initial hesitation, which prolonged the session; even the Communists in Estonia were taken aback when they realized the full extent of their commitment. But these, as well as some other flaws, are not serious enough to impair the basic value of this book. The definitive history of Estonia in English still remains to be written, but the present volume deserves to be welcomed by students interested in facts rather than fancy about the Baltic region.

*University of Florida*

ANTS ORAS

SHARP, SAMUEL L., *Poland, White Eagle on a Red Field*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp. 338. \$5.00.

Someone has said that books on Poland may be divided into two main categories: one of indiscriminate eulogy and the other of uncompromising indictment. Mr. Sharp's *Poland, White Eagle on a Red Field* is a brilliantly written book, from a journalistic point of view, highly readable, and almost falls into the second category.

Of the two methods of reasoning and of drawing conclusions—inductive and deductive—Mr. Sharp uses the latter: that of posing a thesis and then looking for facts and opinions which support it.

His thesis is that Poland cannot be an independent nation because of many unfavorable factors: untenable geographical position between two great and dynamic powers, lack of natural and defensible frontiers, its position as a small nation with meager natural resources and therefore economically unviable, and above all, the fact that Poland is of more vital interest to Russia than to the Western Powers. The Poles are dreamers, romanticists, sentimentalists—prattling

about justice, right and wrong—but in international relations it is historical determinism and brute force that determine the outcome of events, and not faith, sentiments or ethics. As for America, the question of Poland's independence reduces itself to the simple equation: Our historical or sentimental friendship with Poland versus the hardboiled necessities of power politics. And the implied conclusion is that Poland is destined to be under Russian domination; that the law of the jungle will ride on the wave of the future.

True as all or most of these facts and arguments may be (and they are not a revelation), the present reviewer has some reservations. First of all, the author is biased and lacks balance in his judgments. He has chosen a thesis and produced a catalogue of national demerits in support of his contention; omitting, or soft-pedaling, any merits the Poles as a nation may have to justify their aspirations for freedom and independence. For his facts and opinions, to support his thesis he has made a thorough search in diplomatic and political history to find unfavorable comments (which he took out of context) by foreign and Polish writers, historians and statesmen. In fact, he admits his biased approach when he states in the Preface: "It is extremely difficult to apply to the Polish problem the admirable formula suggested by Spinoza for the study of politics: Not to laugh, not to groan, not to be angry, but to understand."

In order to add further authority to his thesis, Sharp made a trip to Poland in 1948, thanks to a travel grant from the Harvard Russian Research Center. "I was fortunate enough to make my trip," he writes in the Preface (p. vii), "before the temperature of the cold war had dropped to the zero point of absurdity. I have therefore enjoyed, and still feel obliged to acknowledge, the customary courtesies of the Polish [Communist] authorities in Warsaw, including the supreme courtesy of being left alone to study, travel, and meet people of various shades of political opinion." As though unshadowed travel by foreign observers and "various shades of political opinion" are permitted in Communist-dominated countries. And be it remembered that by 1948 Communist authority had already jelled in Poland.

Besides bias, Sharp assumes a mocking and patronizing tone. A few examples: in discussing the Jewish situation in Poland, he makes a great deal of persecution and pogroms. He does not appear to be exceedingly overwrought over Hitler's policy with respect to the Jews but does indulge in an innuendo at the expense of the Poles, when he says (p. 224): "there were *individual* cases of active assistance to hiding Jews, but to *many* Poles, offering shelter to a candidate for extermination became a source of extortionist income." [Italics are mine.—S.P.M.] In my opinion it is not quite fair to thousands of Poles who risked their lives to protect their unfortunate fellow citizens, to be classed among the *many* extortionists.

With regard to the Katyn Forest massacre of thousands of Polish officers, Sharp writes (pp. 292-3): "The perseverance with which some Polish officers have gone about gathering evidence of the gruesome Katyn story and bringing it to the attention of the world is, humanly speaking, *quite touching*. . . . Poland has lost millions of citizens and the death of a few thousand more, barbaric and senseless as it was, would not deserve so much attention as it has received," were it not for the clumsiness of the Russians and the "touching" perseverance of the Poles.

Sharp mentions Pulaski and Kosciuszko as one of the bases for American "traditional" sympathy with Poland, but concludes that there was not much in it so far as their contribution to the cause of American independence is concerned. The whole business, he says (p. 255), "is the composite result of deliberate cul-



tivation on the part of Polish Americans." But he fails to explain how it happened that "the Pulaski myth," Mr. Sharp himself concedes, "has become the property of the nation"; how it happened that the American people erected an equestrian statue of Pulaski in their capital; how it happened that the Corps of Cadets at West Point on their own initiative (more than a hundred years ago, before there were any Polish Americans in appreciable numbers to do "deliberate cultivation") erected a monument in the memory of Kosciuszko.

Sharp's story of the Warsaw Uprising is essentially the same as we know it from other sources. But he occasionally gives it a Russian touch of interpretation when he says, for example (p. 180), that the uprising was "politically provocative" and that (p. 168) "it was not at all directed against the Germans, but against the Russians."

From the long-range point of view—not looking backward but forward—it seems to me that Sharp overestimates the conceptions of historical determinism and brute force and underestimates moral factors and the possibility of collective security for European nations. Of course America is not going to send her army to liberate Poland, or any of the other nations behind the Iron Curtain, simply because of sympathy with this or that nation, but at the same time there is a deep sense of right and wrong in the American people, an abiding belief in justice and principles in international relations, which are perhaps among the greatest assets of America as a world power today. The Voice of America and other media are keeping alive the spirit of freedom in peoples behind the Iron Curtain by reminding them of these moral assets. On the other hand, Sharp's arguments might be a trump card in the hands of the Russian and Polish Communists who could say to the people of Poland: "You see, America has been deceiving you. She has been feeding you with compliments and words of promise which she has no intention to back up. Your future lies with Russia, which is your best friend."

Although the author does not believe in the possibility of European federation—because Russia would not like it—yet that may be the only solution for nations, "big" and "small" now under Russian domination. This belongs in the realm of aspirations, but were this to come about and collective security be established for European (or even Central-Eastern European) nations, America would also be safer. In this Atomic age there is no such thing as natural or defensible frontiers.

*Kosciuszko Foundation*  
New York, New York

STEPHEN P. MIZWA

RAFACZ, JÓZEF, *Sąd referendarski koronny* (Royal court of protection of rights of peasants in Poland—1507-1793). Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk (Friends of Science Society of Poznań), 1948. Pp. ii, 121.

This is the last work of Józef Rafacz published after his untimely end in 1944 when he was shot with a group of professors of the University of Warsaw by the German troops. Rafacz specialized in the history of the Polish law and taught it at the Faculty of Law of the University of Warsaw since 1922. He published several valuable books on different institutions of Polish law and in 1936 a textbook for university students entitled *Outline of History of the Ancient Polish Law*. During the last years of his life he prepared a general study on the history of Polish law. The manuscript on the protection of the rights of the peasants has been found among the notes of this great scholar and patriot and published in

the *Studies on the History of Polish Law*, a scholarly series started in 1900 by Oswald Balzer.

Rafacz gives conclusive proof that the Royal Court for peasants, established in the lands of the Polish Crown, was organized by the constitution of 1507, probably under the influence of the great reformer of laws, the chancellor of the crown, Rev. Jan Łaski. One of the reasons for the creation of this court was to liberate the sovereign from numerous complaints of peasants addressed directly to the king. Two officials, one member of the clergy and one secular lawyer, were appointed and called at first "iuris periti auditores" later, "referendarii". At the same time, around 1503 disappears the official called judge of the royal court, "Iudex curiae". The jurisdiction of the court extended to the peasants of the lands of the crown only; it did not apply to the peasants living on the seignorial lands of the nobility or of the church. A separate court was established for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but the jurisdiction of the court of the crown ("koronny") extended to all territories forming the so called "crown" ("Korona") and namely to Great Poland, Little Poland, Royal Prussia and Ukrainian voivodships.

Rafacz points out the characteristic features of this court. First of all the informality of the procedure, the reason for which is stated in the texts of the epoch: the royal officials could not require from uneducated peasants such knowledge of law as was required from the nobility. Moreover, the judgments were written in Polish, obviously for the same reason, and not in Latin as was the case in other Polish courts up to the second half of the eighteenth century. The only exception concerned the German settlements of the Malborg region for which the judgments were written in Latin. This realistic attitude helped immensely the peasants, who could thus explain their grievances in simple language.

An important achievement of Rafacz is his division of the history of the court into two periods: first, from 1507 till 1764, and second, from 1766 till its abolition in 1793.

In fact, during the first period one "referendarius" rendered judgments, while after 1766 the "referendarius" was supposed to be accompanied by assessors.

The jurisdiction of the court "ratione materiae", rather vague during the first period, is strictly defined in 1766. At that time the jurisdiction of the court was restricted to civil matters while criminal matters were to be referred to other courts. In 1766 the Polish Diet (Sejm) decided to define the scope of the jurisdiction of the court, while before that date the said jurisdiction was established by the slow process of practice by the king and his officials. Furthermore, the reform of 1766 abolished the right of appeal which existed to a certain degree during the first period.

To expedite the cases before the court special commissioners were appointed by royal letters of commission which defined the rights and duties of such commissioners. They usually carried on investigation in the field, and sometimes were authorized to render judgments. Such judgments were always subject to appeal to the court.

On the whole, it is an extremely well documented book and certainly of great help to the student of the history of the institutions of Polish law. A logical and clear division into five chapters subdivided into several sections makes it easy to read. A reader with an insufficient knowledge of the Polish language will find a short summary in French (pp. 118-119) and a short biography of the author in French (pp. 120-121).

University of Montreal

L. K. RABCEWICZ ZUBKOWSKI

Bog, INGOMAR, *Die Bäuerliche Wirtschaft im Zeitalter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Die Bewegungsvorgänge in der Kriegswirtschaft nach den Quellen des Klosters verwalteramtes Heilsbronn*. Coburg, 1952.

More than half a century has passed since Erdmannsdörffer questioned the accuracy of the catastrophic picture of the Thirty Years War painted by Gustav Freytag, and called upon economic historians for assistance in depicting the war in its true colors. The challenge has been accepted, and the monograph under review begins with a survey of the methodology evolved for this revision. It is now generally recognized that local records must be studied, and that economic conditions before and after the war must be taken into account. Bog adds one more important factor to be taken into consideration: state action, or the lack of it, as a determinant in the economic effects of the war.

The area under discussion is the secularized abbey of Heilsbronn situated midway between Ansbach and Nürnberg, and four neighboring territories, all under the overlordship of the Margraves of Brandenburg-Ansbach. Agriculture predominated and this study centers on the peasants and their holdings, and the sales of their produce. The chief source of information is the well-kept series of official financial records and correspondence in Heilsbronn.

There were serious weaknesses in the agricultural economy: the three-field system, of course, but at least as important, the small proportion of meadow to arable land. Lack of meadow meant few cattle, little dung for the fields, and therefore a small yield. On a farm of fifty acres, for example, there was, *horribile dictu* (to quote the author), only the dung of one-twentieth of a cow per acre. Besides, rents, taxes and tithes devoured a large part of the peasant's gain. In spite of these handicaps, agriculture before the war was not in debt.

The agricultural economy was intact until the passage of Tilly's troops through the area in November 1631. However, even before this date the war seems to have had some deleterious effect, for twenty-seven peasants were then in debt to the government for taxes in sums too large to be accounted for solely by the depredations of Tilly's soldiers. The year 1632 was catastrophic. Wallenstein's famous camp on the outskirts of Nürnberg, and the Swedish King's army brought disaster. To the peasant, Swedes, Friedlanders and Bavarians were all enemies. From 1632 to the end of the war 30 per cent to 50 per cent of the population remained on the farms.

If at the end of the war about half of the peasants were still tilling the soil, how did they survive? There is only one recorded case of peasant armed self-defense against marauding troops. Usually when the soldiers appeared the peasants took refuge in the towns (seldom in the woods) and returned when the troops departed. At first the officials ran with the peasants, but during the last ten years of the war, under the leadership of Margrave Albrecht and a few faithful officials, there was a noticeable increase of state protection. The peasants were warned of approaching troops and evacuations became orderly, when possible armed protection was given, the Margrave and his assistants bargained with the officers for the amount of food to be supplied to the troops, and taxes and rents were lowered when necessary. These measures became increasingly important in the last decade of the war when the land was overrun by troops. However, there is only one case of brutality which bears any resemblance to the tales of atrocities told by Freytag. Plundering was usually for food—to keep alive.

Bog is careful to point out that he is writing about only one small segment of Germany. Many more similar monographs should be undertaken where local



records are available. In this model of economic history the author also draws two interesting political conclusions: lordship (*Herrschaft*) has become the state, and state interest in economic affairs foreshadows mercantilism, or should one better say cameralism?

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E. A. BELLER

VENTURI, FRANCO, *Il Populismo Russo*. In two volumes. *Biblioteca di cultura storica*, No. 46. Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1952. Pp. xvii, 633; 635-1194. Lire 6,500.

This tightly printed two-volume work is a fundamental contribution to the literature of the Russian agrarian socialist movements between 1848 and 1881. It belongs in every university library and certainly should be translated into English. Professor Venturi has exercised the highest standards of historical scholarship in this exhaustive treatment of the subject. That Venturi should evince a sympathy for the general course of the populist movement is quite to be expected, in view of his own life experiences which have included several months of imprisonment in Mussolini's Italy and participation in the moderate socialist groups of the anti-Fascist Resistance after 1953. The author, who took his degree at the Sorbonne and who hitherto has conducted his research mainly in the field of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, is professor of medieval and modern history at the University of Cagliari.

Venturi presents a careful analysis of the origins and development of the ideas of the leaders, both major and minor, of the Russian populist currents and a narrative of their almost unending conspiracies and internecine struggles. The author has sought to point out the links, wherever they exist, between Russian and Western European socialists, so that the work may be regarded in a broader sense as "a page in the history of the European socialist movement." To this end, he takes pains to point up the Western influences upon Petraševskij, Herzen, and Bakunin in the '40s, Černyševskij in 1860, Ištutin in 1866, Lavrov and Tkačëv, Land and Liberty (*Zemlja i Volja*) and the People's Will (*Narodnaja Volja*) in the '70s. Although many references are made to cross-fertilization of ideas between the Russian populists and such Western Europeans as Babeuf, Fourier, Cabet, Barbès, Blanqui, Marx and Mazzini, the author carefully avoids exaggerating their influence. Quite properly he stresses the indigenous sources of Russian agrarian socialism—e.g., the Slavophiles' idealization of the socialistic elements in the peasant commune (*obščina*) and the producers' cooperatives (*artel'*); the gnawing land-hunger of the peasantry in the nineteenth century; and the impetus of the numerous earlier peasant revolutionary movements.

Venturi's decision to limit his field of study to the period between 1848 and 1881 is not arbitrary. In general, these years represent a period of the Russian revolutionary movement when it no longer was characterized by the liberalism that had prevailed at the time of the Decembrists, and a period when it had not yet become so diversified as it was to be by the end of the century. The abortive nature of the European revolutions of 1848 was an important factor in disabusing Herzen, Bakunin, and Černyševskij of their youthful Western orientation and causing the populist ideology to crystalize in their minds. (To be sure, many aspects of their populist thought antedate 1848 and derive from the ideology of the Decembrists and Slavophiles.) Although the selection of the terminal date for the study—Alexander II's assassination by agents of *Narodnaja Volja* on March 1, 1881—seems somewhat more arbitrary, Venturi has justification for it. Open mani-

festations by the revolutionaries were suppressed temporarily, even though *Narodnaja Volja* did not disappear immediately. To be sure, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party which emerged at the end of the century was the lineal descendant of the populist movement, but it operated on a much broader scale than any of the earlier currents and in a milieu that was quite different from that of the reign of Alexander II. Finally, the industrialization of Russia and the appearance of Marxist concepts in the 1880's deprived some of the socialist parties at the end of the century of that predominantly agrarian base which had characterized all Russian socialist groups between 1848 and 1881.

As Venturi notes, the term "populism" (*narodničestvo*) did not come into use until about 1870, when hundreds of intellectuals, inspired by Herzen and Lavrov, went "to the people" to learn of their problems and engage in a program of indoctrination among them. However, it has become increasingly common in current historiography to use the term in a broader sense, to include similar aspects in the programs of the "socialists," "nihilists," and others of the decades prior to 1870.

Limitation of space makes it difficult to present an adequate summary of this encyclopedic study, but a list of the chapter titles will give an impression of the contents: Herzen; Bakunin; Peasant Problems and Socialism in the '30s and '40s; *Kolokol*; Černyševskij; Intellectual Movement of the '60s (Dobroljubov and Ščapov); Peasant Movement; Student Movement; Early Groups; First *Zemlja i Volja*; "Young Russia"; Kazan Conspiracy; Populism and Nihilism; Išutin's "Organization" and Karakozov's *attentat*; Nečae;v; Tkačëv; Bakunin and Lavrov; the *Čajkovcy* and *Narodničestvo*; Workers' Movement; *Zemlja i Volja*; *Narodnaja Volja*; and March 1, 1881. The space devoted to these individuals and groups is roughly proportionate to their relative importance, but Lavrov may have been somewhat slighted.

Among the ideas which linked (sometimes tenuously, sometimes closely) these people and groups were deep-rooted interest in the economic welfare of the Russian peasantry; distaste for mere political reform of the Western European variety; distrust of the Western industrial capitalist economy; and a burning desire to achieve a distinctly Russian brand of socialism based on the peasant *obščina* before such a program would be rendered impossible by the maturation of capitalistic and industrial tendencies in Russia. Through most of the movements ran another common thread: the debate between advocates of Bakunian "propaganda by deed" (terrorism and assassinations of key individuals to set off the revolution) and advocates of the Lavrovian school of long-term agitation at the grass roots level, to be facilitated by an intimate association between revolutionaries and peasants. Time after time, the clandestine groups split and re-organized because of this basic internal conflict.

The principal merit of Venturi's work is that it represents the fruit of an immense amount of research in the libraries of Moscow and Leningrad and other European repositories. While serving as cultural attaché in the Italian embassy in Moscow for three years after the war, he was able to study the vast amount of material on the subject which has been gathered and published in Russia during the past half century, much of it unavailable elsewhere. Extensive footnotes give detailed references to the sources. An excellent index of all the persons referred to, a list of the pamphlet and periodical literature consulted, and a chronological table of important events in the period complete the work. Many readers will be pleased to find an Italian translation in brackets for all Russian titles and terms.

Photographs of leading revolutionaries of the era are included.

The encyclopedic nature of the work is at once its strength and weakness. At times, Venturi might well have shortened some of the detailed biographical data about minor personalities. The work would also be improved by more references to contemporary domestic and foreign events in the period. The reviewer is aware, of course, that Venturi has not intended to write a general history of the period; but if the reader is not frequently reminded of the major historical trends he is apt to gain the impression that much of the revolutionaries' work was conducted in a vacuum. Finally, in view of the book's excellent documentation, especially from Russian primary sources, this critic was a little surprised to find almost no references to English-language studies, as, for example, E. H. Carr's works. This probably arises from the fact that Italian research libraries all too often suffer from serious *lacunae* in foreign publications. These relatively minor criticisms are, of course, more than offset by the innumerable praiseworthy aspects of this study, which is the most complete work on the subject in any language and which in all likelihood will not be superseded for many years.

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CHARLES F. DELZELL

GULLBERG, ERIK, *Tyskland i Svensk Opinion, 1856-1871*. Lund, Sweden: Gleerup, 1952. Pp. viii, 382. Kr. 18.

Dr. Gullberg has given us a thorough, well-balanced account of the various trends of opinion regarding the vital issue of Sweden's relations to Germany as she was striving to find her place in the international system—or lack of system—during the difficult years from 1856 to 1871. It includes a study of the policy of the government, the opinion of men influential in public life, and the editorial policy of a dozen newspapers, as well as some attempt to evaluate their influence on public opinion and the extent to which they express the feelings and thoughts of the people. He shows the dilemma that repeatedly baffled liberals as they were faced with the conflicting claims of idealism and practical politics. The issue which brought this conflict to a focus was Pan-Scandinavianism and the Slesvig-Holstein problem.

As it soon became evident that the system established by the Congress of Vienna would not remain static, the great problem for the small states was to find a way to maintain their neutrality in case of conflict between the powers. In Swedish thought, fear of Russia was a dominant factor and Russian autocracy was hated as a system in direct opposition to the aims of the peoples of Western Europe.

While Karl Johan, backed in part by conservative opinion, was pursuing the practical policy of friendship with Russia, nationalistic liberal thought was seeking a better solution. It seemed to many that the neutrality of the Baltic and the safety of Sweden might best be attained by cooperation of the Baltic countries which, moreover, were closely related in blood, culture, and seemingly in political ideals, for Germany appeared to be working toward a liberal national state.

Pan-Germanic thought in Sweden was stimulated by Ernst Moritz Arndt, while the Pan-Scandinavian feeling, which became strong in the forties, was influenced by the example of Germany. But Pan-Scandinavianism caused a setback in any hope for closer relations with Germany, when in the Slesvig-Holstein crisis of 1848 Swedish opinion sided with Denmark. Furthermore the Frankfort Assembly gave Swedish confidence in Germany a severe jolt.

When in the Crimean War, Sweden's foreign policy shifted to become pro-Western, and the November Treaty with France and England left Sweden with



disappointed hopes and uncertain security, Oscar I put the blame squarely on Germany: "It is Germany which has betrayed the most sacred interests of freedom, civilization, and humanity. It will in due time suffer a well-deserved punishment."

He now embraced Pan-Scandinavianism with ardor. This movement had strong support in Germany: it might serve as a means of acquiring Holstein and part (at least) of Slesvig, thus making Denmark a truly national state, but too weak to stand alone. Then a strong anti-Russian state would be formed in the North. Oscar was not blind to the possibility of attaining a Scandinavian union under Swedish leadership, following this pattern, but openly he favored the national-cultural ideal of Pan-Scandinavians in the North.

To have a friend in Germany was important, but it seemed increasingly evident that it was to Protestant Germany with Prussia as leader that Sweden must turn, not to Catholic absolutist Austria. Yet liberal opinion was becoming more and more disillusioned about Prussia too, as it was clear that her internal development was away from democracy. And her leaning toward the Austrian side in the Italian war of 1859, her support of Russia in the Polish revolt, as well as the growing insistence on a speedy settlement of the Slesvig-Holstein question (especially after Bismarck came to power) roused the fear that she was a potential danger to other smaller free states also, even to Sweden.

Karl XV had considerable sympathy at home when he tried to induce the western powers to give Denmark diplomatic support. But he met with no enthusiasm from France and Great Britain, and no effective step was taken to prevent the war of 1864. Divergent as opinion had been, very few Swedes were ready to take up arms to help Denmark, but after her tragic defeat, there was an upsurge of sympathy for her and hostility toward Prussia. This was somewhat softened when the Treaty of Prague held out promise of a plebiscite in Slesvig, but again sharpened when Bismarck took no steps to carry out the promise. But where was a strong liberal friend to be found? It was even intimated that Germany was not much better than Russia, nor was there much choice between Bismarck and Napoleon. In the Franco-Prussian War it seemed to most Swedes that France was the aggressor, but sympathy veered in her favor when Bismarck forced her to cede Alsace-Lorraine—a crime against nationality that could not be condoned.

Sweden was isolated, and feelings in Norway and Denmark gave no hope that a strong Scandinavian state could be formed. In contrast to Karl XV, the crown Prince believed that the natural and wise course was to seek once more the friendship of Germany. When he became King Oscar II, in 1872, he was able to carry out this policy. He knew that the people were not back of him, but believed public opinion would awaken more slowly, and that it was the duty of the monarch to take the lead.

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KAREN LARSEN

*I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani. Prima Serie, 1861-1870. Volume I (8 gennaio-31 dicembre 1861). Ottava Serie, 1935-1939. Volume XII (23 maggio-11 agosto 1939). Rome: Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 1952. Pp. xlvi, 603; lviii, 694.*

The circumstances of the first World War and of the subsequent peace, the Russian Revolution, and the great debates on war guilt which followed the treaty of Versailles, gave birth to the great collections of diplomatic documents published

in major part between the two world wars. All the major European powers joined in this undertaking with the notable exception of Italy.

This exception in turn was the result of Italy's unique position among the participants in the first World War. The issue of responsibility for the outbreak of a conflict that she entered with deliberate calculation (for the enhancement of national interest if one will, but hardly in self-defense) could not strike in her the same responsive chord that it did among other nations. Most favorably situated in the climate of equilibrium of power, she remained relatively disinterested and detached in this debate and generally favorable to the restoration of this equilibrium destroyed by the war.

Even before the demise of Fascism, however, plans had been initiated for the publication of an Italian documentary collection comparable to others being published. Taken up again after the war, these plans are now beginning to come to fruition under the guidance of the *Commissione per la pubblicazione dei documenti diplomatici* of the Foreign Ministry. Two more volumes have already appeared since the publication of the two under review, and more are in preparation.

Coming so late in the day, it is natural that the motivation that prompted the other national series should be largely absent in the Italian whose avowed purpose is chiefly to supply information on the course of Italian diplomacy. The selection of documents is therefore guided by the criterion of relevancy. This inevitably raises the question of the applicability of this criterion to a period as close to us as that of the years preceding the outbreak of the second World War.

The publication, which will run to some one hundred volumes when complete, is divided into nine series, under the direction of eminent Italian scholars who are also members of the commission directing the whole enterprise. Senator Moscati is president of the commission and Professor Toscano its vice-president as well as in charge of the last two series.

As to the arrangement of the documents, the decision was made to adopt the chronological order of the *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, rather than the topical grouping of the British and German collections. There are advantages and drawbacks to either scheme but it was felt that the chronological order would better serve the purpose of giving a rounded picture of Italian diplomatic activity as events developed. At the end of each volume there is in addition a *tavola metodica* that groups documents chiefly by countries, and an index of names that identifies individuals. Nothing is missing that the apparatus of scholarship could supply.

One could expect little in the way of startling revelations or disclosures in these volumes. Nor do the documents supply cause to revise earlier estimates and judgments of Italian or other policies. The first volume, first in order of the entire undertaking, covers the year 1861. Naturally enough we find its dominant themes to be the issue of recognition of the newly constituted Kingdom and the solution of the Roman question, equally important matters, but the first having priority if a choice had to be made. No doubt was felt about the outcome of either, though Cavour was too sanguine about the possibility of a settlement with the Pope. Questions were raised abroad as to the genuineness of the South's desire for union, and inevitably France's, and more particularly Napoleon III's, views loomed largest among the cares of Italian foreign ministers. In view of this predominant concern with matters essentially domestic, the aims of Italian foreign policy could

not but be severely restricted, even though there was desultory talk of sending a ship to Mexican waters, for example.

Volume XII, the penultimate of the eighth series, deals with contemporary matters, and is written in Italian rather than in French as are previous volumes. This volume covers the period between the conclusion of the Pact of Steel and the Ribbentrop-Ciano meeting at Salzburg. Despite the general disclaimer of specific motivation, its publication at this time was prompted by the wish to satisfy scholarly and general interest in the events of our time, which may be construed by others as the issue of the origins of the second World War.

We see Italy closely bound to the Axis, and the evolution of the Danzig crisis is clearly traced. Warnings were not lacking from Attolico and others in Berlin, and were becoming increasingly pointed, of the probability of the course of German action and of the dangers inherent in the fact that German leadership in general, and Ribbentrop in particular, had lost contact with reality (see particularly, docs. 467, 503, 535, 687, 740, 743, 750), and even that Germany might act without consulting her ally.

Unlike Ribbentrop, the Italians were convinced that an attack on Poland could not remain localized. Mussolini did not want war *yet* and argued at length the case for delay. The Italian proposal for a conference that would exclude Moscow but include Poland and Spain found no favor with Hitler, who was averse to the humiliation of having to face others (except Mussolini) as equals, as he had done at Munich.

Naturally, Moscow looms very large in the story and Rosso's reports from that capital are unsurpassed in the acuteness of their analysis and the soundness of their estimates. Grandi in London, by contrast, cuts a much poorer figure. Britain is definitely the heart of the anti-Axis coalition after the disillusionment of Prague, and France, having no policy of her own, follows the British lead. Reports from Tokyo, Ankara, and the capitals of southeastern Europe provide valuable sidelights on the course of the struggle between the rival groups of Axis and Western democracies.

This publication should be read in conjunction with the parallel undertaking sponsored by the Milan Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale—a history of Italian foreign policy from 1861 to 1914, of which the first volume, by Professor Chabod, *Le Premesse*, covering the period 1870-1896, has appeared. Between them these undertakings constitute an impressive manifestation that does high credit to Italian historical scholarship.

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RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

WEIANT, EDMUND TAYLOR, *Sources of Modern Mass Atheism in Russia*. Newark Ohio, 1950. Pp. iv, 142.

Mr. Weiant's doctoral dissertation, a study of some "Sources of Modern Mass Atheism in Russia," is an unusual book. To begin with, its physical aspect is beneath criticism. At times one gets the impression that it is composed entirely of printing errors. Perhaps it is useless to question the spelling of Russian names when even that of Swedenborg is rendered incorrectly; and common nouns often fare no better than proper ones. The possessive "'s" form is used repeatedly as the plural. There is no index, while the bibliography ranges from highly specialized and relevant articles to Professor F. Schevill's *History of Europe*. The style is uneven, but frequently very bad. Whole pages—strangely enough, for the author is



an American scholar—read like poor translations of some clumsy German original.

More remarkable is Weiant's point of view which he proclaims with passionate faith and dauntless courage, and which has to be summarized, for brevity's sake, as "Kierkegaard or death!" The author denounces the established church (in this case the Russian Orthodox Church—quite a denunciation, full of righteous fury, if not of sense or substance), proclaims his preference for atheists as against "the lukewarm ones," and in general follows faithfully the usual pattern of his school. Furthermore, Weiant raises a variety of basic problems associated with God, man, and religion, and resolves those too in a dogmatic and final manner with the help of long quotations from his master. Unfortunately, Kierkegaard, who himself knew how to write well and to the point, loses much in Weiant's application of his works. As to fundamental criticism of this aspect of the book, two alternative suggestions may be in order: either it is all unnecessary, or, if indeed Christianity itself is to be considered the issue in the study, then this reviewer at least would like to see more references to Jesus Christ and fewer to Soeren Kierkegaard.

It is a pity that Mr. Weiant's acquaintance with Russian history is not on a par with his knowledge of Kierkegaardian theology. Indeed, his introductory essay which summarizes the evolution of Russia from its beginnings to the second quarter of the nineteenth century is one of the worst recent ventures into that much abused field of learning. Its sounder passages are in the nature of direct quotations from Professor B. Pares' well-known textbook; its more ambitious parts consist of a motley collection of outworn clichés asserted with new vigor and presumption.

The most surprising thing, however, about Weiant's book is that, in spite of its grave and extraordinary failings, it is really rather good. For, once the deplorable introduction is over, Mr. Weiant turns to an able, informed, and incisive analysis of the religious views of the three leading radicals of mid-nineteenth century Russia—Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen. This investigation forms the great bulk of his study, and it deserves attention. One does not have to share the theological assumptions of the author to follow his meticulous examination of, for instance, the deep tragedy of Herzen, which he convincingly considers as of a much more serious nature than the many wanderings and disappointments of Bakunin and of Belinsky, or his demonstration of how ignorant Russian radicals often were of Christianity and of how they rebelled against the Christ of Hegel or of Nicholas I without ever facing the Christ of the Gospels. The material is not new, but the argument is cogent and refreshing. It is particularly impressive in contrast to the crude and naive treatment of the subject by the Marxist, as well as many non-Marxist, writers. Special note should be made of the fascinating discussion of the last phase in the development of Belinsky when, in the months immediately preceding his death, he became disappointed in utopian socialism and reached out for yet another answer to his ceaseless quest in life. (The author's conclusion on Belinsky: "let no man call him an atheist"). The treatment of Bakunin is a little less satisfying; more could be said, for instance, of his transition from Hegelianism to Left Hegelianism. Also, one wishes that there were a greater discrimination in the brief comments on Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and Pisarev.

It is to be hoped that Weiant will continue his interesting studies in Russian intellectual history.

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NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY

HORTHY, NIKOLAUS VON, *Ein Leben für Ungarn*. Bonn: Athenaum-Verlag, 1953. Pp. 327. D.M. 14.80.

KERTESZ, STEPHEN D., *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953. Pp. 270. \$4.75.

The blurb of Admiral Nicholas Horthy's memoirs describes the author as one of the "great figures of European history in the first half of the twentieth century." It is mentioned that he was, among other things, a famous story-teller. He lives up to this latter reputation; his memoirs are liberally sprinkled with what he probably considered the best of his anecdotes. The claim, however, that he was a great figure of European history has no foundation whatsoever.

Nicholas Horthy was a highly successful admiral of the Austro-Hungarian navy, and it is a great pity that he could not stay on the seas, for on the land his talents were much less spectacular. Born into a Protestant family of noble and Transylvanian origin, young Horthy fell under the spell of the Catholic-aristocratic world of the Habsburgs. His idol is still Franz Joseph and the greatest joy of his life came when in 1909, as a naval officer, he was appointed one of the aides-de-camp of the old king and emperor. After the happy times of a "Flügeladjutanten Seiner Majestät des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I," in 1914 Horthy returned to the seas where he fought with courage and chivalry. At the end of the First World War the sad task befell him to surrender, as commander of the Austro-Hungarian navy, his unconquered ships to the newborn state of Yugoslavia. All that he understood from the collapse of the Habsburg empire was that evil forces had destroyed it.

In his native Hungary after the revolutions of 1918-1919, Horthy helped to restore "order" by organizing a new national army. Count Michael Károlyi's unhappy democratic experiment and Béla Kún's bloody Communist terror were for him two versions of the same evil. Horthy succeeded in gaining the confidence of the Western representatives in Budapest, and the counter-revolutionary régime elected him Regent, an office he held from 1920 to 1944. He considered himself trustee only of the legitimate king, but opposed the twice attempted return of the Habsburg heir to the Hungarian throne in 1921 because it would have meant war with the neighbors—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia—who surrounded mutilated Hungary with an iron ring. He fought for a peaceful revision of the unjust Trianon Treaty. But the "successes" of this policy—the two Vienna awards—were marred by the tragedy of the Second World War in which Hungary fought against Hitler's Germany "with diplomacy" and against Stalin's Russia "with arms." Horthy was anxious to surrender to the West, and when the military situation made this impossible his emissaries sued for peace in Moscow. But the *volte face* failed because the Hungarian Nazis, with German help, took over the country.

Captured by the Germans, interrogated by the Americans, Horthy finally found refuge in Portugal. At the age of 85, Horthy, looking back on his long life, feels that he was leading Hungary "on the best way," sees his policies vindicated by the collapse of East-West cooperation—although he explicitly abstains from taking an "I told you so" attitude—he is looking forward to the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy and, most interestingly, he confesses his faith in the peasantry, the backbone of the Hungarian nation, "the defense and survival of which has been the aim" of his life.

From the Horthy memoirs, however, the peasant is conspicuously absent, except to receive a few paternalistic pappings on the back. Titled people of a

great variety populate Horthy's narrative, and it can be safely predicted that the Hungarian people, if and when they become at long last a free nation, will view the Horthy era only as an unhappy chapter in their long history of servitude. Namely, the years of peace after the First World War will appear to them as wasted and not used for badly needed democratic reforms. Admiral Nicholas Horthy, even in retrospect, fails to recognize this missed opportunity.

Hungarian foreign policy is the topic of a well documented scholarly study written by Stephen Kertesz, professor at Notre Dame University and former diplomat who served both under the Horthy régime and during the coalition period after the Second World War.

In Kertesz' interpretation, foreign policy does not evolve from the domestic conditions but is determined rather by external factors—in the case of small nations by factors mostly beyond their control. He does not even engage in speculation as to what could have been the foreign policy of Hungary if the country had undergone a democratic transformation after the First World War. He emphasizes the unhappy geographic situation of Hungary, he discusses the near-sighted policy of the Western powers, rebukes them for the "dismemberment" of Austria-Hungary, reviews the great diplomatic mistakes of the Second World War, and after giving due consideration to the petty rivalries of the national states in Danubian Europe he comes to the conclusion that in a world conflagration the small nations are nothing but "puppets of fate," "prisoners of destiny."

While this deterministic, or fatalistic, point of view is dominant in Kertesz' interpretation, there is a vast amount of facts collected in his book which the student of Central European affairs—with whatever philosophy of history—will find very valuable. Kertesz was in the inner circle of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry of which was the "center of anti-Nazi resistance" and is, therefore, in the position to furnish first-hand information on the unsuccessful attempts to conclude a separate peace. After the war he headed the peace preparatory committee and from this key position he was able to observe both the aggressive Communist tactics and the passive attitude of the Western powers. The latter "... increased the feeling among Hungarian politicians that the Hungarian nation had been completely abandoned to Soviet Russia and the Slav interests."

Kertesz points out the hostility of Czechoslovakia against the shortlived democratic governments of Hungary after both world wars; this is a fact which should help to dispel such widely shared opinions that nothing else but the reactionary régime in Hungary stood in the way of Danubian cooperation. In addition to German and Russian imperialism, and Western mistakes, it was the nationalistic rivalry of the Danubian governments that caused the tragic failure of democracy in Central Europe. In the preface of his book, Professor Kertesz mentions that he did not try to explore "basic social tensions"—we wish he would have done it. Nevertheless, he succeeded in clarifying one of the basic conditions of peace in the Danube Valley: the need for national equality.

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STEPHEN BORSODY

A ZALESKI, EUGÈNE, *Les courants commerciaux de l'Europe Danubienne au cours de la première moitié du XX-me siècle*. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1952. Pp. 564. 2,000 frs.

A survey setting the present economic developments behind the Iron Curtain into a proper historical perspective was more than needed. This study by Eugène Zaleski has filled the need in so far as the present and past trade movements and



commercial policies of the Danubian area are concerned. In the first place, it provides a descriptive, factual, almost statistical analysis of trade movements within the Danubian basin, and of its relation, as a whole, to the East and West. It is modest in interpretation and conclusions, but much more solid in its presentation of factual material.

The survey gives careful consideration to several periods: pre-1914, 1918-1929, 1930-1933, and post-1945; although half of the book is devoted to the developments after 1945. It is evident almost from the beginning that this historical approach to the explanation of today's happenings will result in a better understanding of the basic problems of the Danubian area, whether they be problems of trade, industrialization, lack of capital, economic nationalism, or foreign penetration. The crisis of 1929-33 only exposed and accentuated the fundamental weaknesses existent earlier, and gave rise to new forms of protection. Today the Communist Industrial Revolution is dealing with these same problems.

However, the author makes a plea for only one cause, that of the reintegration of the Danubian basin into the European economy. It is hard to disagree with his analysis of the main causes of "the Danubian malaise" which he attributes to the chronic instability of foreign demand for Danubian products, the need for raw materials, capital and industrial equipment; their separation from world markets, and various political factors.

The story behind the facts, richly supplied in the book, is not a very heartening one. The exchange of foodstuffs and raw materials for manufactured articles, which had been the pattern of trade between the West and Eastern Europe before 1914, and largely also thereafter, suffered a great blow in the 1929-33 crisis. The slump in prices of Danubian agricultural exports caused misery and suffering which led to a reorientation of the Danubian economy toward the promotion of industries, and measures were taken to provide economic protection.

An attempt to integrate the whole Danubian basin into the German "Grossraumwirtschaft" and turn it into a tributary of industrial Germany was defeated in World War II. In the years following the end of hostilities, Soviet Russia made a bid to obtain the same position Germany had held before her defeat, though she sought a different type of conquest. The analysis of Soviet pre-war and postwar trade, the similarities of today's pattern of trade with the Danubian countries and the pattern established already in 1940-41, lead us to the conclusion that this is going to be a conquest by imposition of deliveries of raw-materials instead of the traditional pattern of an industrial conquest! The Soviet régime, in the role performed in the West by free enterprise and commercial revolution during the last century, is exploiting the vast resources and potentialities of Russian soil. The fruits of this exploitation, limited only by her planned economy and lack of transport facilities, are the characteristic object of Russia's trade with the Danubian region. Foodstuffs and raw-materials are imposed on her partners for industrial articles; often the finished products are paid for only by "a commission", i.e. by part of the delivered raw material. The trade between USSR and her satellites is strictly bilateral and its conditions are hard. It is estimated that this trade exceeds the volume of mutual satellite trade.

The composition of inter-Danubian trade presents a different pattern from that of previous periods. The proportion of industrial products is increasing in exports of even formerly agricultural countries. Czechoslovakia is the Danubian machine-tools work-shop; Poland and Hungary are also becoming exporters of

investment goods. Agricultural exports have almost disappeared from the export lists of the Danubian states.

Is it possible that this unilaterally imposed and exploited Danubian Industrial Revolution may contain some good in itself? Will it contribute to an ultimate unity or division of Europe? Here is an optimistic answer: "Before the war", writes Prof. E. Dolleans in the preface to Zaleski's book, "when there was no political division between East and West, there were two Europes; one agricultural and one industrial. Today, at the time of deep political divisions . . . we slowly reverse the road to a single industrial Europe".

New York City

JÁN ŽÁK

BERGSTRÄSSER, LUDWIG, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland*. Munich: Isar Verlag, 7th rev. ed., 1952. Pp. 337. DM 12.

Since this book was first published in 1921 it has been the standard guide to the history of political parties in Germany. Periodic revisions have appeared—the fifth edition, which the reviewer has at hand, in 1928 and the sixth edition in 1932. In the present edition the excellent introduction has been somewhat expanded, while the three divisions: I, Party Theory and Development to 1848; II, From the Revolutions of 1848 to 1870; and III, From the Foundation of the Reich to the First World War, are unchanged. Much of the fourth part, From the First World War to the Hitler Dictatorship, remains the same, although the closing years have been thoroughly revised. The fifth part, 1945-1951, carries forward the account in the same organizational framework.

The introduction defines and states the theory of political parties, stressing their necessity in a democratic state. Particularly in the case of coalition governments strong party discipline is essential. On the other hand the author finds that one of the biggest drawbacks to proportional representation is that the voter does not need to make compromises and can always vote for the party line. The necessary compromises are then transferred to parliament and the average voter never understands why they are made. Group or functional representation may be tolerated for an advisory body, but is inadequate for a law-making chamber which should be recruited by general suffrage.

Four great problems confronted Germany after 1814; unity, participation of the people in state affairs (freedom), adjustment to a world economy, and the relationship of social classes. Many of these had been solved in England and France earlier; in Germany these problems appeared simultaneously and their cross currents complicated party development. The existence of parties both on a state and a national level with different suffrage laws for state and national elections created another difficulty. The Conservative Party under the Empire had a national influence beyond its due because it was dominant in Prussia, thanks to the three-class system of voting there. The steady growth of political parties had the result even before 1918 that, while they still did not control the government, their cooperation was necessary to any government. The author clearly outlines the revamping of the parties under the Weimar Republic, showing from what groups they mainly garnered their strength. The confused party situation during the last days of the Republic is succinctly stated, although Von Papen's memoirs would indicate that slight changes should be made in this account. After the Second World War different policies were followed in each zone, the Russians being the first to permit political parties to function again. This account naturally is concerned chiefly with the parties of West Germany, their membership and plat-

forms. In the Weimar period the opposition parties aimed at the overthrow of the republic, but today both government and opposition parties are loyal to the Bonn constitution.

The great merit of the book is its conciseness. While it suggests important topics and events that are pertinent to the discussion at hand, knowledge of these is assumed, and the book is not aimed at the general reading public. Scattered throughout are excellent bibliographies, which the author unfortunately has not been able to bring up to date. This is partly because of the way this revision was undertaken, and partly because of inadequate library facilities at hand and the unavailability of books published outside Germany. One appendix is devoted to listing some materials on party history, another cites where detailed analysis of election statistics can be found. In a study where elections and coalition governments are constantly referred to, a brief summary of the results of the various national parliamentary elections is a crying need. A list of the chancellors and the party coalitions supporting their cabinets would also be most welcome. In this day of alphabetical designations a list of abbreviations should be included, particularly because the author often refers to parties by initials before their history and full name has been presented. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that these additions be made to a future eighth edition of this excellent book.

*Bowdoin College*

E. C. HELMREICH

TAYLOR, J., *The Economic Development of Poland 1919-1950*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952. Pp. xiv, 222.

Professor Taylor has written a very useful, readable and scholarly book on the economic history of Poland from 1919-1950. This book fills a gap which has been felt by those who have taught in the East Central European field. Research and scholarship on East Central Europe has been focused chiefly on the fields of political and cultural history. It is the merit of Taylor's contribution that it provides a combination of expert knowledge of history and of economics.

His analysis of Polish economic problems and development is penetrating and based on important sources. Sympathy for the Poles, which the author entertains and which is evident especially in the final chapters on Nazi and Soviet occupation, has not influenced his objectivity in his cool and balanced description of Polish economic problems and shortcomings. Nor was Taylor deceived by the floods of current Communist publications. He rightly uses the term "Gleichschaltung" to symbolize communist economic policy in Poland.

Taylor enumerates the following basic problems of Polish economics: "(1) rural over-population; (2) industrial under-development; (3) the development of the towns and their reintegration with the rest of the national economic system; (4) the revival and direction of international trade as a means of solving the other problems."

Those problems, continues Taylor, were complicated by the impact of a number of factors:

- "1. The economic aspects of the Jewish question;
2. The effects of the economic foreign policies of other countries, for example, the restrictions on immigration into the United States, Brazil, and the British dominions;
3. The effects of the customs war with Germany from 1925 to 1934;
4. The impact on the Polish economic system of the world economic crisis of 1929 and the years immediately following;



5. After the rise of Hitler, the economic problems presented by the military necessity of developing certain areas and sectors of the national economy were rapidly and more intensively than would otherwise have been the case.

Finally, in view of the traditional market orientation of Poland's principal industries, the closing of the Russian market due to the autarchic policy of the U.S.S.R. was catastrophic."

In his introduction Taylor mentions Polish experts, distinguished and prominent, who supplied him with information. Among them, however, there is not one connected with or familiar with either Polish labor or peasant movements. The persons he mentions have no experience or insight into the economic problems of the working class and peasantry of Poland. This is reflected in Taylor's book. With all the book's merits, and the merits are great, the reader will hardly find economic trends, economic plans or programs of the powerful democratic movements in Poland.

Professor Taylor discusses post-war developments in the field of social legislation and health insurance, quoting on this issue the opinion of a brilliant Polish economist (who was, however, rather remote at that time from their particular problem), who called these provisions "extravagant compared with the general environment." An evaluation of the merits of social legislation and health insurance of course depends largely on the guiding values of industrial development, whether industry should serve the public interest or its own. No doubt there were shortcomings in the Polish social system, as there are in any other enterprise. The whole system deteriorated largely when the democratic enforcement of social legislation and health insurance was abolished by the semi-dictatorial government, and when the authoritarian bureaucracy destroyed this great experiment in democracy. But it was hardly "extravagant".

Similarly, this writer could hardly agree with Taylor's analysis of the "economic aspects" of the Jewish question. In the United States Jews are employed in certain industries, as they were in Poland, and no economic "problem" was created. It was in Poland rather a sociological and political problem. Economic antisemitism was a political weapon of the reactionary forces.

There was a need for a dynamic economic policy. Pilsudski, otherwise a man of talent and a semi-dictator, had no understanding of economics, nor had his advisers. In times of depression, Poland has followed a suicidal policy of deflation. At that time Polish Labor suggested an energetic, dynamic economic policy, in many respects similar to the New Deal. Similarly, leadership of the Peasant Party had a clear understanding of the agrarian problems and fathered later a dynamic and democratic program (*Agrarian Problems From The Baltic To The Aegean*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs).

There were factors, however, for which the government of Poland could not be made responsible: Partition, and exploitation prior to 1918, ably discussed by the author. There was even one major factor which contributed considerably to economic difficulties. Practically since the Rapallo treaty, since the early twenties, the young Polish Republic was threatened by the growing expansionist trends in Germany and the Soviet Union.

Professor Taylor quotes the rather balanced *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which enjoyed the reputation of a democratic paper, and which in an editorial of June 14, 1925, stated about Poland "... in a few years, together with Russia, we shall administer the *coup de grâce*." In unpublished "Secret Papers," some of which

this writer had opportunity to read, one can find even earlier memoranda of the German strategists on Poland's partition, written in a similar vein.

Poland was indeed, as the late Raymond Leslie Buell put it, a key to Europe. It was one of the keys of the French security systems. In view of this threat and in mortal danger, Poland had to carry a tremendous military budget. 1939 and 1945 are proof that those dangers were real.

Taylor's synthesis brings the economic history of Poland up to 1950. In his introductory chapter he gives us an excellent survey of Polish economic development throughout history. This reviewer's criticism concerns rather some details. The whole book is a contribution to the field of East European studies and an able synthesis of an important historic period.

Brooklyn College,  
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FELIKS GROSSE

GORLITZ, WALTER, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 1934-1945*. Stuttgart: Steingruehen-Verlag, 1952. 2 v., pp. 623, 624.

Those who for one reason or another were disappointed in Goerlitz's earlier work on the German General Staff will do well to suspend judgment until they have read these two volumes, which they will find an agreeable surprise. In addition to providing an excellent summary of the course of German military operations—already available in Tippelskirch's *Geschichte des zweiten Weltkriegs*—Goerlitz places them in their international and internal political setting, and discusses the interaction of the one upon the other. This is done with penetration, and, although Goerlitz admittedly writes "from a German point of view," he does so with a large measure of objectivity. This is in itself a considerable achievement for which the author is to be congratulated, although there are some serious shortcomings in his handling of the political aspects of the Russian campaign.

So far as general military or ground operations are concerned, there is little that is not covered in Tippelskirch, Kesselring and in a wide variety of French and English sources, but even air and naval experts will find the sections on "War in the Air" and "War on the Seas" rewarding. The comparable section (over 1000 pages) on "Partisan or Guerrilla Warfare in the West, the Balkans and the U.S.S.R." is the best exposition of the subject known to this reviewer, and one deserving careful study, since, with the exception of such early classics as Napier's *Peninsular War*, most of the literature in this field is controversial and tends to be highly colored by personal or partisan bias.

Goerlitz extends his interest in divided competencies and counsels within the Armed Forces (OKW) and Army (OKH) High Commands to the similar divisions which characterized the entire bureaucratic structure of Nazi Germany. He traces the ultimately total effect of these divided policy-making and executive responsibilities, not only on the conduct of the war, but also on the civil and military government of occupied territories. The picture which emerges is one of rival military services and embattled bureaucracies more actively engaged in fighting each other than the external foe. This disastrous effect of these divisions on the German war effort is frequently overlooked, particularly in the United States, where such luxuries could be more or less tolerated during World War II without seriously endangering the outcome of operations in which the allied forces enjoyed a crushing superiority in men and materials.

Goerlitz is one of the first German historians to appraise correctly the importance of Nazi policy and practices during and after the Polish campaign: "The

had to ruin, the deification of power and naked force, began in Poland. The march to victory thus transformed itself into a march into darkness. It was the prelude to the great tragedy of the German military in this war!" What Goerlitz fails to stress is that German policy toward the U.S.S.R. was largely an extension of policy and practices in Poland, and that in abdicating to the SD and SS in Poland, in spite of the courageous protests of the theater commander, General Blaskowitz and others, Germany's highest military leaders themselves permitted Himmler to obtain what later became a strangle-hold on their own organization. In spite of the clear warning of Canaris and others, available records show that the German military authorities were quite happy to allow the SS and SD to take over such "political housecleaning" tasks as the liquidation of the Polish intelligentsia and leadership classes, and acquiesced in allowing police and occupation authorities to take practical control of the entire theater, exclusive of a narrowly defined zone of actual military operations. The military authorities thus fixed the precedent which, at the time of the Russian campaign, set in motion a tragedy which could only move inexorably to its predetermined conclusion according to rules which they themselves had already established.

This lack of political perspective generally characterizes Goerlitz's handling of the Russian campaign, which is otherwise an excellent summary of military operations and includes a judicious appraisal of the operational effectiveness—usually over-rated—of Russian guerrilla activities or partisan warfare. The Russian campaign was to a large extent an enormous political gamble predicated on an early collapse of the Bolshevik system. This wishful thinking was conditioned by Nazi ideology, and by the sanguine atmosphere resulting from the success of German political and military warfare in the West, especially in France. When the Soviet system failed to collapse after the initial defeats, German military means were inadequate to obtain a decision on the battlefield without the help of the Russian peoples. But by that time Nazi ideology and the brutal pattern of practices previously established in Poland, had already alienated the Russian peoples, and a political decision was thus excluded. The crusade "to liberate the Russian people from the hated Bolshevik yoke" quickly lost in altitude what it gained in forward motion, and it was inevitable that the gulf between German words and deeds would soon become unbridgeable. Thus, the Russian campaign was less one of "lost opportunities," than one of political impossibilities from the outset.

Goerlitz very skillfully evaluates the interplay of such political and military factors in such western countries as France, the Benelux countries and Denmark, but misses many of the essential factors operative in the Russian theater. The political framework and political warfare potential latent in the Russian campaign were seriously misjudged at the time by most German experts, with the exception of a few advisors such as Schulenberg, Hilger, and others, who were rarely seen and almost never heard. Perhaps it is too much to expect a German historian to be able at this time, working from secondary sources only and writing mainly for a German public, not to come up with what appears to this reviewer to be an apologia for the campaign in Russia.

Despite these serious shortcomings, the usefulness of the book as a whole should not be under-rated. Goerlitz writes in a clear, easily readable style, almost entirely free from journalistic excesses. Two excellent name and place-name indexes and a topical organization of the contents already noted, add greatly to the usefulness of the book for general reference. The bibliography, however, lists only general secondary sources, omitting the various private and other military



monographs to which the author has obviously had access but discreetly avoids listing.

Washington, D. C.

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

BRANDT, KARL, *Management of Agriculture and Food in the German-Occupied and Other Areas of Fortress Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953. Pp. xxxiv, 707. \$10.

In reviewing a volume of lectures on the Allied occupation record in Germany delivered by Dr. Brandt on a California campus, the hope was expressed by this reviewer that the author might contribute a detailed study of the food and agriculture aspect of the American military government. Brandt and his associates in the Food Research Institute at Stanford University have not as yet produced such a monograph, but the appearance of this book and a companion volume to be published under the title *The Management of Agriculture and Food in Germany* may be regarded as no mean solace. It may be added, however, that such a substantial study serves to whet the appetite for a corresponding work on Allied food and agriculture activities.

The title of this volume is accurate enough as titles go, but it should be pointed out to begin with that the scope of the study is by no means narrowly confined to the technical side of the problem. The result is that the monograph should be of considerable interest to students of military government in general, the administration of occupied areas, public administration, and international relations, and to the specialists in the various areas included in the study, as well as to those who seek a detailed knowledge of food and agriculture policies and problems of the Germans in the far-flung areas which they occupied in Europe during World War II.

In undertaking such a research project Brandt was confronted by many problems, some of which are familiar to most scholars, but others which the average scholar fortunately does not face. Among the former, though certainly somewhat aggravated, may be noted the task of organizing and presenting an immense mass of detail relating not to a single area but to Soviet Russia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Serbia and the Banat, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Greece, Slovakia, Bohemia-Moravia, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Holland, Belgium and Northern France, France, and Italy. An example of the latter relates to sources—to begin with at least it appeared that most of the German food and agriculture occupation records had been destroyed in the course of the war, though eventually some of these were forthcoming in connection with the War Crimes trials. In order to surmount such a serious barrier, Brandt, as economic adviser to the American Military Government in Germany during 1945-46, spent much effort in searching for "trustworthy and competent German observers and, if possible, eye-witnesses of the agricultural and food administration of the occupied territories." He found such experts in Dr. Otto Schiller, professor of agricultural policy at the Landwirtschaftliche Hochschule in Hohenheim, who had had much practical experience in eastern Europe and Russia, and in Dr. Franz Ahlgrimm who had served as consultant to the Economic Staff East in Berlin and had made numerous trips through the occupied parts of western Europe, and they have collaborated with him in producing the present study. Despite such ingenuity the author confesses that a good deal of his statistical material is incomplete or not too reliable. Nevertheless, he has managed to gather together an impressive amount of material which throws much light on German administration of food and agriculture.

Indeed if scholars had available as detailed studies in political administration, industrial exploitation, and so forth, they could consider themselves fortunate.

The picture revealed, particularly clear as regards the occupied area of the Soviet Union, Poland, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Belgium, and France, and less clear in the case of the Danube countries, Greece, Finland, and Italy, is a very complicated one. Those who think of the Germans as unusually foresighted and careful, methodical, unimaginative in organizational pattern, and thoroughly disciplined, will hardly be prepared for the careless planning in certain areas, the lack of uniformity in organization, and the striking failure to maintain reasonably good relations with the civilian population in such places as the Ukraine. Those more familiar with the inner workings of National Socialism will be less surprised at the expediency, the great chasm separating the attitude toward the Poles and Russians on the one hand, and the Danes, Norwegians, and Dutch on the other, and the use of political administrators of the Nazi variety reporting directly to Hitler in certain areas, as against military commanders in others. Those who have been connected with Allied military government will be interested to note that the Germans experienced some of the same difficulties familiar to themselves: the troubled relations between military government personnel in the field and headquarters staff in Berlin, inadequate cooperation between tactical forces and military government officials in the occupied areas, the unrealistic policies and programs drafted by officials in Germany for the occupied areas, the headaches caused by various more or less autonomous German agencies operating alongside of military government in the occupied areas.

Several significant items may be noted which may not be in keeping with American preconceptions. Despite the living off the land of the German military forces in most of the occupied areas (though not for example in Norway) and the demands made on certain areas such as the east and France for additional agricultural supplies to be consumed in Germany, the needs of the local population usually received a fair amount of consideration and the ration standards were maintained at a higher standard than has sometimes been thought. If a good deal was taken out of various areas much was also sent in, and it is interesting to note that where agreements were made to repay with food stuffs sent in from Germany there were generally observed, and indeed the calory counts showed the Germans with credits rather than debits. While the Germans were able to draw enough food from the occupied areas to supplement home supplies in a significant fashion, many of their expectations were badly disappointed. The use of civilians, particularly specialists of one kind and another, rather than military personnel, as military government officials in certain occupied areas is of interest, and while the evidence is not very abundant it would seem that such an arrangement might offer advantages.

Altogether this book may be regarded as an important contribution in a field where careful research has been notable for its absence.

*Ohio State University*

HAROLD ZINK

**BOLDIZSÁR, IVÁN**, *Against the Hungarian People*. Budapest: Hungarian State Publishing House, 1952. Pp. 144.

This curious little book, written manifestly for the orientation of the English speaking nations, is worth notice from one single point of view only: it shows how the art of diplomacy and propaganda is practised in the satellite countries. The author, a former so-called Hungarian liberal, is now an ardent

fellow-traveller who serves his masters without scruples and without reserve. As far as I know he has maintained the mask of independence by belonging to the still existing remnants of the former Peasant Party. The system still adheres to the fiction of being a coalition of the workers, peasants and "progressive intellectuals."

Boldizsár's hardest task was to narrate the recent dark history of Hungary as a single plot against the Hungarian people. The happy, prosperous, proud and independent country is continuously menaced by the intrigues and conspiracies of the western imperialists, under the leadership of the United States, who try to undermine the work of liberation, who want to re-introduce the Habsburg rule, and who plan to restore the latifundia to their feudal owners. A former farm-hand is quoted as saying: "The Western imperialists and their Hungarian accomplices could not bear to see that on the soil, once watered by the tears of farm-hands, tractors now plough and factories are being built, or that in the schools the children of former servants are studying."

Boldizsár describes in fifteen short chapters the new attempts against the reborn Hungarian people. He easily proves how absolutely right the evidence of the Hungarian White Book was that "as often as a conspiracy to overthrow the democratic order was organized by the reactionary and profascist elements in Hungary, the agents, diplomats and other representatives of the United States government took an active, in fact an initiating part . . . They organized and supported the conspiracy within the Independent Smallholders Party, headed by Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy; set up Károly Peyer's right-wing Social-Democrat spy ring and Zoltán Pfeiffer's right-wing anti-People's party; they were behind the Mindszenty conspiracy which aimed to restore the Hapsburg monarchy, the Rajk conspiracy, which they operated through Tito, and the plot led by Archbishop Grösz, which was actually a sequel to the Mindszenty conspiracy." Among the many ridiculous accusations the author missed a few which were justified against some western governments who occasionally made use of the wrong men.

The men who tried to organize public opinion against the growing communist tyranny are openly vituperated against by Boldizsár as political adventurers, and he denounces the United States as the ruthless leader of the imperialist aggressors intentionally driving the world towards a new war with Russia and the other peace loving peoples. The soviet historian uses an enormous array of "facts and documents" to prove his case before the English-speaking nations. These facts are derived partly from secret information (for instance information concerning the visit of Cardinal Mindszenty to America a few years ago and the discussions he led in utmost secrecy within closely guarded monasteries and palaces); partly from the elaborate Hungarian White books, accepted as infallible oracles; partly from the depositions of accused men before the People's Courts whose shining impartiality and correct legalism is widely known by all free peoples; partly from excerpts from official papers and speeches at the peace propaganda meetings; and partly from historical analogies drawn by the author himself. He does not doubt for a moment the criminal intentions of the imperialists and the overwhelming role of the American dollar diplomats. "Truman's government," he writes, "is sacrificing 100 million dollars to finance and arm the scum of Europe. Who are these? Former members of the White Guard and S. S. men, Volksbundist hoodlums, Horthyist gendarmes, Maniu's henchmen and Iron Guardists, who were the tormentors of Rumanian and Hungarian peasants alike, the hypocritical traitors associated with 'fathers' Hlinka and Tiso . . . these are all the fascists whose



chief patron is now the American Government." This vigorous and eloquent recapitulation of history finds further support in some remarks of James Reston in "The Department of Dirty Tricks." This half jocose, half critical portion of the paper was jubilantly quoted by the Hungarian official press as a "commentary" of the author on the policy of the State Department.

And so it goes in the same spirit, the same tone, the same proofs on every page of the booklet. If the trained diplomats and propagandists of the satellites can really believe that such nonsense can influence the opinion of the West, they show their abysmal lack of information and judgment. In the sharp-tongued atmosphere of prewar Budapest cafés there was a popular joke which characterized incompetent and self-confident critics: "That is how little Moritz imagines world history to happen." But in that idyllic period the role of little Moritz was innocuous. Now, however, he has become an international danger in countries without a *real* democratic tradition.

Oberlin College

OSCAR JÁSZI

*Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany.* New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1953. Pp. 184. \$2.25.

Under the auspices of the East European Fund, Inc., the Research Program on the U.S.S.R. recently published a very interesting and instructive "Collection of Papers" by former Soviet officials. The seven authors of this work are not only eye-witnesses to the facts they describe, but also experts on Soviet economic policy. They lived and worked in various economic and industrial branches in the Soviet Zone of Germany before they succeeded in escaping from the Zone and arrived in America.

As stated by Robert Slusser in his introduction to this book, after the capitulation of Germany the Soviets seized only the so-called Soviet Zone, according to the terms of the division of Germany into the four zones, American, British, French, and Soviet. Thus, it was impossible for the Soviet leaders to establish their power immediately over all of Germany, and they at least had to postpone the fulfillment of their dreams about this cherished goal. In the meantime, the Soviet leaders concentrated on the exploitation of German economic resources for the rehabilitation of their own great losses in industry, transportation and agriculture, caused by the war. They demanded from Germany reparations as high as ten billion dollars—and, as their Western Allies protested against such a large sum, the Soviet leaders decided to obtain the equivalent of this sum by the wholesale plundering of goods in their zone.

In addition to this violent plundering of industrial and consumer goods during the first period of Soviet occupation, the authors of the first two chapters of the book, Vasily Yershov and Vladimir Alexandrov, testify to the numerous cases of physical violence committed by the Soviet Army and civilians against the German population of their zone.

The third contributor to the book, Vladimir Rudolph, concentrates on the dismantling operations. According to his report, there were at the end of the war various schools of thought among the leaders of the U.S.S.R. as to the question of using the German spoils of war. So, for example, Georgi Malenkov, the present Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., was an adherent of an absolute and all-inclusive economic disarmament of Germany; whereas Lavrenti Beria, who controlled the Ministry of the Interior and State Security at that time, advised that some of Germany's industry be left intact. In general, however, the Soviet leaders almost

entirely disregarded Beria's policy. By depriving their German zone of all but the bare minimum for their survival, they fomented hatred in the population and revengeful feelings towards the oppressors.

Only in the field of agriculture was there preserved some interest in the propaganda of the Communist Party. It is true, as Mr. Yershov testifies, that the Army of the Occupation confiscated large quantities of agricultural products, livestock, and timber resources from the Soviet Zone. At the same time, full collectivization of the land in the zone was started. There were established State farms and machine lending stations, as well as some State monopolies of feed and fertilizer.

According to Viacheslav Nevsky, this emphasis on collectivization of agriculture is part of the program which he calls "preparation of the psychological base" to make collectivization acceptable to the German peasants.

The last chapter of the book by Nikolai Grishin is devoted to the Saxony Uranium Mining Operation. A company was formed by the Soviets for the exploitation of these mines under the name of "Vismus Corporation." Investigation disclosed that a certain Herr Schmidt, an authority on the local mines, had been arrested by the Soviet troops and sent to a concentration camp as a militant Nazi. He was released and was appointed chief miner of the "Vismus Corporation." He was given a high salary, a car, an apartment and officer's rations. He was warned, however, that if his work were not conscientious or if sabotage were discovered, he would pay with his life.

*Washington, D. C.*

ARNOLD D. MARGOLIN

## SHORTER NOTICES

BENZ, ERNST, *Die Ostkirche*, Freiburg-Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1952. Pp. xi-421. DM 25.

The author of this important work adopted a new kind of treatment in regard to his subject: instead of presenting a straight-forward historical account of the Eastern Orthodox Churches, or an interpretation of their theology, he surveys the German literature on the subject from the time of the Reformation to the present day. This includes the works of such outstanding and recognized authorities as Luther, Melancthon, Leibnitz, Hegel, von Baader, Kattenbusch, von Harnack, Holl, Spengler, Sigmund-Schultze, Seeberg, Benz himself, and a host of lesser lights. Thus these authorities comprise diplomats, theologians, philosophers, ecclesiastics, historians, and other cultural leaders. Hence, the book is not so much an interpretation of Eastern Orthodoxy, historical or otherwise, as a convenient historiographical study of German opinion about it. As such, it will undoubtedly serve a useful purpose, particularly as a contribution to historiography. No summary of the opinions of the various writers studied is possible for the reason that there are so many of them, and furthermore because they differ so much in their appraisal of Eastern Orthodoxy.

Nevertheless, the book is a serious contribution to the literature of Eastern Orthodoxy, and as such it is to be heartily recommended.

Hartford Seminary Foundation

MATTHEW SPINKA

SCHNEE, HEINRICH, *Die Hoffinanz und der Moderne Staat. Geschichte und System der Hoffaktoren an deutschen Fürstenhöfen im Zeitalter des Absolutismus*. Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1953. Pp. 267. DM 22.

This is the first of three volumes in which the author proposes to give the history of the court Jews in North Germany during the age of absolutism. The present part, on Brandenburg Prussia, reaches as far back as the fourteenth century and extends into the nineteenth, but it concentrates upon the years from the beginning of the Thirty Years War to the act of Jewish emancipation in 1812. The author states that he has worked about twenty years on the subject. Since published material was almost entirely lacking he has searched the archives of the North German states and of Paris, The Hague, Vienna, Munich, and Stuttgart, and has uncovered vast amounts of untouched sources. He promises to include in his volumes a register of the archival data and to publish some of the important documents, the originals of which will have been destroyed during the recent war.

The author sets out to test the validity of Sombart's thesis that the Jewish court bankers played a decisive part in the founding and development of the modern state. In the present volume he concludes that they exercised slight influence in the early period but that they became "a conservative type of person loyal to the king and moulded by the law of life of the Prussian state" and that in the age of absolutism they had "a significant part" in the development of that state (p. 244). Sometimes in great detail, sometimes in short order, depending upon the importance of the person and the availability of sources, the author traces the family history of dozens of these court Jews. He shows how they particularly exploited the opportunities provided during wars to make fortunes by supplying the armies with all kinds of necessary materials and by advancing loans to the governments. His volume is enormously detailed, without, however, giving the reader a clear picture of just how "significant" these persons were. He makes the story appear to be so shoddy that the reader who has not worked in all the archives wonders about the standards of absolute rulers who put up with their dealings and how such court bankers could have furthered, as the author maintains, the cause of Jewish emancipation. Too narrow a concentration upon



financial details and an apparent lack of sympathy with his subject have prevented the author from leaving the reader with an appreciation of the remarkable achievement of these individuals. By failing to place the economic data in a social and cultural setting he has merely supplied some of the raw material for what should be a fascinating story. He might have learned something from the methods used in this country for portraying the complex process of assimilation.

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EUGENE N. ANDERSON

HARKINS, WILLIAM E., *Anthology of Czech Literature*. New York: King's Crown Press, 1953. Pp. 226. \$3.50.

With the publication of the *Anthology of Czech Literature* by Professor William E. Harkins, Columbia University has added a notable title to its distinguished list of Slavic studies. Nothing of this quality has appeared in England or America; Czech readers published heretofore (now out of print) have been agglomerate samplings of prose and verse chosen at random. Within his allotted space and expressed design, Harkins offers over fifty excellent selections from more than a score of representative Czech writers who reflect, exclusive of drama and the novel, the belletristic adventure of Czech genius during the century and a half of its belated renaissance.

The eight critical introductions to the chronological groupings provide a discerning survey of Czech literature since the Age of Enlightenment. Apart from Professor René Wellek, whose many scholarly contributions adorn the *Columbia Dictionary of Modern Literature* and the learned reviews, no contemporary Britisher or American has published anything significant in the field of Czech literary criticism. Harkins's essays are a meritorious contribution. The discussion of symbolism and decadence is sound, and the review of Czech literature between the world wars provides information hard to find in English sources. The biographical summaries are unusually informing. The omission of selections from young writers now vociferating in Czechoslovakia is not an oversight; none of them has the promise of Wolker, Hora, Seifert, and Halas, all of whom Mr. Harkins has wisely included in his anthology.

Now that freedom of the press is in jeopardy throughout the land, students of Czech language and literature, who have been waiting for such an anthology, are fortunate that the publication was made possible by a grant, not of the Czechoslovak Republic, but of the Rockefeller Foundation, which, at the moment, does not appear to be an agent of the U.S.S.R. But one wishes the grant had been sufficient to permit linotype composition, providing more linear space and more rest to the eyes. Nevertheless, Mrs. Božena Nosco is the expert of whom every Slavist with manuscript to print fondly dreams; typographically her work is flawless.

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O. STEPANEK

WITTE, HERMANN, *Bauernbefreiung und Staedteordnung und die Ostpreussen* (Heft 9, Schriftenreihe, Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis) Kitzingen/Main: Holzner-Verlag, 1951. Pp. 24. DM 80.

The "Göttinger Arbeitskreis" has been in existence since 1946. Its members are mostly East-German scholars who, now living in the Federal Republic, have been publishing a score of brief and concise studies on the major aspects of the history of the "German East." Filled with information and timely interpretations, these publications are designed to acquaint West Germans and others with the history of the "lost territories"; to re-evaluate that history for the benefit of the "homeless" as well as the "hosts."

Hermann Witte stresses in this particular study the historic and significant fact that von Stein found the greatest understanding for his superb reorganization

plans of 1806 in the eastern provinces of Prussia. There Kant and Kraus had prepared Eastern Königsberg (with its "Königsberger Kreis") for the reforming concepts of the Western (Westphalian) von Stein. For the varied population of East Prussia, Germans and Slavs, Salzburgers, Dutch Mennonites, French Huguenots, to name just a few, and for the ideas for which stood such diverse favorite persons as Kant and Kraus, but also Herder and Hamann, von Stein became a new catalyst. His ethic poise, profound pedagogical insights, energy, tenacity, nimbleness and authority loom high behind the agrarian and social reforms of 1807-08. It is true that after Stein's premature dismissal, Hardenberg's indifference bode ill for the future. Peasant emancipation failed to preserve "freed" peasants as freeholders. Liberalism played havoc with 300,000 peasant-holdings east of the Elbe, falling victim to the free market and being absorbed by the thus created estates. So also withered the hopeful beginnings of rural self-government, the village assembly. While this was an incalculable misfortune for the future existence of Prussia, in the reforms of city administration von Stein's concepts were retained much longer. Following von Stein's advice, his Westphalian friend von Vincke visited England. His report on English local self-government impressed von Stein. The citizens' interest in the commonweal was awakened by creating a governance of cities calling for popular participation. The consequent law of 1808 lasted essentially till 1933.

The nobility considered von Stein a Jacobin. And after 1812 when he returned from his exile with the Russian armies—whose sincerity he did not doubt—Schön and Auerswald were in command. Stein had started the great Prussian reforms, but his opponents carried them out. It was no longer 1805. The economic situation had changed. And through active participation in the Liberation, East-Prussians themselves had contributed to the change.

Witte concludes by indicating how different Prussian and German history would have been in the 19th century had von Stein and his co-workers been permitted to finish their work.

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New Rochelle, New York

MUHLEN, NORBERT, *The Return of Germany, a Tale of Two Countries*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953. Pp. 310. \$4.50.

Konrad Adenauer's CDU/CSU deputies command (this is written just after the federal elections of September 6, 1953) an absolute majority of one seat in the West German Bundestag. How their unique position of strength will affect German policy during the next four years is not yet clear. This book suggests some of the possibilities while veiling others, only partly because of its exceedingly ill-timed publication. Written before the uprisings in East Germany in June 1953, it is an attempt to present in "popular" style an interpretation of post-1945 movements and men in both the eastern and western remnants of the Reich that Hitler built. Neither analytical nor systematically descriptive, but personal, Henry Regnerish (to coin a term which may be original in the published word, but not in the thoughts of many contemporary readers), repetitious, over-wordy, and largely undocumented, the book might better have been entitled (like many counterparts which have appeared during the last two years on the German problem), "Random Thoughts on the Germans after 1945." The net result is a compilation of a great many useful facts about contemporary Germany, mixed with enough sweeping half-truths and penetrating insights to keep the attention of a serious reader. The author seems to be at his best in his demonstration of the Russian orientation of many neo-Nazis, in his discussion of the survival of *Obrigkeit* in both of the new German democracies, and in his useful chapter, "Soviet Man of German Make," which helps to make the June uprising—and its successful suppression by Soviet power—understandable.

Muhlen could only roughly estimate the strength of the various tendencies in Germany which attracted his attention in 1952, and the reader is left to share certain confusions which the author never dispelled in his own mind. His comments on party politics and bureaucratic high-handedness in chapter six tend to refute his major thesis, which is a strong affirmation of faith in the democratic potentialities and inclinations of West German leaders. On a number of lesser matters the author is apt to mislead the non-specialist reader. His statement (105) that associations of manufacturers exerted less influence over the first Adenauer government than did the labor unions should be surprising to the unions, the chancellor, and the business community; the author misses the real meaning of the *Lastenausgleichsgesetz* of May, 1952 (254-55); and on a minor factual point, it is something less than true to state that Karl Liebknecht was murdered by "Nazis" (199). Muhlen's frequent implications that neo-Nazism is only a spectre of Communist invention and his tendency to equate advocacy of a harsh German policy in America with espousal of the Kremlin line suggest other instances in which half-truths are generalized into irresponsible half-lies.

Few readers of this journal will agree with Muhlen that the United States has "too rarely" treated Germans "as equals and as fellow men" (294). We are told that we must, without asking too many embarrassing questions about German internal affairs, show our "faith in the German people" (300). But the facts which Muhlen himself presents suggest that this faith must be tempered by caution, even among those who, like this reviewer, believe cooperation between West Germany and the United States to be a categorical imperative for both in the present world situation. Too rarely, to paraphrase Muhlen, have German governments acknowledged others "as equals and as fellow men."

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